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EFFECT OF SOVIET SS-20 THREAT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 3, Dec 79 pp 427-444

[Article by Lothar Ruehl: "The SS-20's Challenge and Soviet Strategy for Europe"]

[Excerpts] The author, Lothar Ruehl, was born in Cologne in 1927. He is a graduate of the Institute of Political Studies and has a doctorate in political research and studies awarded by the University of Paris-I. From 1954 to 1973, he was a newsman in Paris, special correspondent for SPIEGEL and DIE WELT, and then assistant editor of DIE WELT. He is currently editor and special international security and military affairs correspondent in Brussels for the German ZDF television service. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Euro-American Institute for International Security Research in Los Angeles, the DGAP in Bonn, and the steering committee of the Foreign Affairs Ministry's East-West Relations Commission in Bonn. He has contributed to numerous works on international policy, strategic and military questions, in both Germany and the United States. He is the author of "Machtpolitik und Friedensstrategie" (1974), and "Vietnam" (1965-1966).

The USSR's unrelenting and steadily increasing arms buildup over the past 10 years has created a military power unequalled heretofore in peacetime and upset the East-West balance of forces. Western allies consider the offensive capability attained by the Soviet armed forces to be "excessive" in comparison with real defense needs.¹ Although this opinion is ambiguous and subjective it has been voiced by an East European communist leader, President Ceaulescu of Romania, who denounced the danger the USSR's continuous arms buildup and the Warsaw Pact's military reinforcement were posing to security in Europe.² Since 1970, the Atlantic Alliance has frequently denounced the growth of the Soviet armed forces and the increase in the offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.

Despite continued negotiations since 1973 on European security, strategic arms limitation (SALT II), and mutual reductions in opposing forces within Central Europe (MBFR), Moscow has not changed its opinion as to the useful purpose of military superiority, in spite of the decision announced in Berlin by Brezhnev concerning unilateral withdrawal from Germany of 20,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks.³ Admittedly the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] did not deal with military security, the MBFR talks have not reached any agreement, and the Vienna treaty on SALT II limits merely the rate of growth of the USSR's and United States' strategic nuclear arms. The USSR retains the right to maintain 14,000 warheads and nuclear bombs on strategic vehicles, whereas in 1979 it had 5,000 such weapons. Thus the authorized increase is some 280 percent. The United States could deploy more than 17,000 nuclear weapons on strategic vehicles between now and 1985, or an increase of 87.5 percent over its 9,000 weapons in 1979. According to official American estimates,⁴ U.S. strategic forces will have approximately 11,500 operational nuclear weapons in 1985 versus 9,500 by the Soviets. The ratio of forces will, therefore, have changed from 2 to 1 in 1979 to 1.2 to 1 in 1985, in favor of the United States. The American lead in number of strategic nuclear weapons capable of striking their assigned targets has been constantly narrowing since 1969, the opening year of the SALT I negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Moscow agreements in 1972.

Inasmuch as the guiding principle of the arms control process defined by SALT is "approximate quantitative parity" in launch systems, this change in the ratio of forces is normal and intentional. Yet it also does reflect a more radical change: the United States has lost its strategic superiority over the USSR: the United States is no longer the world's leading nuclear power, even though American nuclear technology and industry still retain a substantial qualitative lead. This change was inevitable the moment the USSR entered the nuclear arms race. Once it had acquired a mass destruction capability with a sufficient number of thermonuclear weapons carried by reliable intercontinental or intermediate-range surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, or sea-to-surface delivery vehicles, the USSR was in a position to change the strategic equation of mutual deterrence terms.

The Soviet IR-MRBM offensive capability gave the USSR's strategy and policy toward NATO limited but real advantages: Soviet IR-MRBM's could threaten the American fixed surface MRBM sites on the periphery of the USSR in Italy and Turkey; they could threaten major NATO air bases and the ports on which NATO forces in Europe and the Mediterranean depended and still depend. The very fact of the existence of a considerable number of IR-MRBM's and medium bombers in the USSR complicated the operation of deterrence for the United States, which was now threatened itself by other Soviet nuclear attack systems: 600 to 750 IR-MRBM launchers and some 50 air bases for TU-16 bombers with their nuclear bomb storage sites constituted a set of important ground targets in populated and partly urbanized European regions of the USSR. As long as "massive retaliation" remained the American doctrine, American strategists could allow themselves to overlook this large number of targets in their political calculations about Moscow.

But once the American strategy was aimed at limiting the ravages of nuclear war on the enemy's territory so as to be able to delay the all-out exchange of "wild" nuclear strikes, this additional 600 to 750 targets in the USSR made it become very difficult to conduct a nuclear attack restricted to selected targets. Hence it became doubtful whether the United States could use its nuclear weapons to neutralize these substrategic targets within the USSR in a war limited to Europe: as its own calculations revealed, it would run the risk of escalating to total nuclear war, inasmuch as the USSR would be threatened with too great a degree of destruction upon its own territory by a limited offensive against its IR-MRBM forces. The USSR's own IR-MRBM's could keep western Europe under a specific threat which the United States did not share since the nuclear war could be limited to Europe. It thus became risky for NATO to use those tactical nuclear weapons having a range extending beyond the battlefield, namely light bombers carrying nuclear bombs and Pershing missiles with a range of about 700 kilometers. NATO had considered these weapons to be supplements to the American strategic force. Thus the threat of Soviet IR-MRBM's against Western Europe could deter NATO from the first use of nuclear weapons throughout the entire European theater, and particularly in attacks against targets in Soviet territory.

Introduction of the new IRBM, the SS-20, into the Soviet armed forces since 1977 has further enhanced the value of the advantages the SS-4's and SS-5's have provided the USSR for the past 20 years. But the SS-20's deployed in various European regions of the USSR have also radically altered the terms of the strategic equation in Europe. Modernization of the offensive IR-MRBM capability in the USSR occurred during a phase of East-West relations characterized by the SALT process for limitation of the number of central strategic systems, and during negotiations on mutual reductions of land forces in central Europe (MBFR talks since 1973). The SS-20 is the first new Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) system since the SS-5 was introduced in 1961. Hence the SS-20 was the result of a decision made in Moscow not to abandon the offensive options offered by surface-to-surface IR-MRBM's after 20 years of experience with such systems (SS-4 introduced in 1959). Why this decision, made in the early 1970's, to modernize a capability its principal adversary had abandoned 10 years earlier: and which European countries could not create for their own purposes without active American assistance? Why confront its negotiating partners on security in Europe with an exclusive threat tailored, as it were, to their size? Three explanations are usually given in the West for all Soviet arms-related decisions:

1. Intellectual inertia and sociological sluggishness that allow the military to amass weapons blindly and continuously add new-technology products to their already overloaded arsenals;
2. Determined efforts of both the military bureaucracy and officials of the arms industries to increase their share of state resources and USSR's GNP so as not to lose their rank and their influence on policy;

3. Competition between the different branches of the Soviet military-industrial complex at the technological and administrative level. This competition is said to cause an overabundance of new systems and exert pressure on the political authority not to overlook anything in securing the best possible force for the USSR.

Observers readily add still another explanation to the effect that the Soviet leadership and senior military officials are unduly concerned about the risks of a conflict in which the USSR would find itself confronting a formidable American-German combination and probably China at the same time. History and experience are said to have taught the Russians the necessity of having numerical superiority with which to offset any qualitative military and technological inferiority. The traumatism of World War II reportedly weighs heavily on Soviet decisions about arms and security policy. China is said to be an added weighty factor in such decisions.

All of these considerations are in all likelihood quite close to reality, although the three specific reasons listed above are not sufficient to explain the intensive Soviet arms buildup of the past 10 years. Applied to the SS-20 and Backfire [bomber] problem, these psychosociological attempts at explaining an obvious fact do not settle the matter, because Western statesmen have strongly cautioned the Soviet Government several times since 1976 against the buildup's detrimental effects on detente and force limitations.

During the final phase of the SALT II negotiations, between 1976 and 1978, the Soviet Government had the opportunity to display some concern for moderation on the SS-20 issue toward European countries as well as the United States. The American SALT II negotiations had pointed out how the SS-16 and SS-20 pair would create complications for verification of the agreements. These two systems are an ambivalent and ambiguous combination of an ICBM and IRBM, the SS-20 being the IRBM version consisting of only two stages of the three-stage SS-16 ICBM. The two launcher and propulsion systems can launch the same missile with the same warhead (MIRVed or not). Both launchers can be truck-mounted and used as mobile platforms. Under these conditions, it would have been possible for the USSR to convert SS-20's into SS-16's: the SS-20 is not covered by the Vienna treaty limitations on the number of strategic missiles, whereas the SS-16 as an ICBM is subject to the SALT II limitations. Deployment of the SS-20 could, therefore, have constituted a factor of insecurity for SALT. In 1978, the USSR offered to neither produce nor deploy SS-16's, including their essential components, so as not to create confusion. The Americans accepted this offer and the 1979 agreements do indeed contain a Soviet stipulation to this effect.

This example is very illustrative of the Soviet interest in keeping the SS-20 separate from and unrelated to SALT arms control: by eliminating the SS-16, the USSR removed the SS-20 from any contact with SALT and thus retains total freedom of action with the SS-20. The opposite approach would have been possible: the USSR could have renounced producing and deploying the SS-20 IRBM so as to be able to keep the SS-16 option within the SALT process and

limitations. The USSR could have helped verification of the Vienna treaty just as well by eliminating the SS-20 and would also thereby have renounced threatening Europe and the Middle East with a modernized and reinforced nuclear offensive capability. The choice must have been political and not military or bureaucratic, in that Soviet leaders had been aware of Western misgivings since 1976, and especially since the summer of 1978 when President Carter asked for restraint in Soviet arms buildup vis-a-vis NATO (in Europe particularly) and specifically mentioned the SS-20 as a highly offensive weapon in every respect.

With the SS-20, which could well be only the first system of a new technological generation of Soviet IRBM's, the USSR has acquired a new range of operational options against all countries on its periphery within an air distance of about 4,000 kilometers. The range of a MIRVed SS-20 with three 200-KT thermonuclear warheads was measured as 4,600 kilometers in 1978 by American telemetry. Even when based behind the Urals, the SS-20 can still strike part of Western Europe and the Middle East with their warheads. The effective range of the Soviet IRBM capability has thus been increased some 1,000 kilometers over the SS-5 (3,500 kilometers with a single 1-megaton warhead). The fact that the SS-20's in the USSR each carry three MIRVed warheads triples the number of ground targets the SS-20 force can attack: each SS-20 missile can thus neutralize three targets faraway from each other, and several SS-20's can be concentrated with their independent warheads on a set of ground targets so as to avoid the neutralizing EMP [electromagnetic pulse] effect between nuclear weapons detonating too closely together at too short a time interval.²⁰

The SS-20 launcher can fire three missiles in three volleys within a period of time short enough for operational usefulness. The mobility of the launcher and its entire technical support organization permit relatively quick changes of firing position. In this way, each launcher or launcher group (or battalion)—nine launchers per group—can be protected against retaliatory counterbattery fire after it has launched its missiles. The Americans, and consequently NATO, consider that each SS-20 launcher always has three operational missiles, although it has not yet been shown that the SS-20 weapon systems will be authorized three missiles per launcher. In any case, the operational capability of the Soviet IR-MRBM offensive force can be tripled in the event all SS-4's and SS-5's are replaced by SS-20's: instead of 600 missiles each armed with a single 1-megaton warhead, 600 missiles each armed with three 200-KT warheads could either hit 1,800 different ground targets or deliver 1,800 warheads onto a variable number of targets. With three missiles per launcher, the substitution of SS-20's for SS-4's and SS-5's would raise this offensive capability up to 5,400 MIRVed warheads, in other words, up to the quantitative level of the USSR's strategic forces in 1979 at the time of the signing of the SALT II treaty in Vienna. This possibility inherent in the SS-20's technical qualities clearly show the real value of this new weapon system. On the other hand, the USSR could, on the contrary, substitute only 200 SS-20's for the 600 SS-4's and SS-5's and thus retain the same capability—qualitatively enhanced by the trajectory's increased accuracy, warhead miniaturization, and cross-targeting capacities—with only one-third of the

launchers, still considering only one missile per launcher. These two contrary possibilities indicate the extremes of the wide range of options the SS-20 has opened for Soviet strategy. The SS-20 provides a degree of operational, strategic, and political flexibility the former IR-MRBM's did not allow.

From an operational standpoint, the SS-20 force can be employed by sections, according to regional and tactical schedules, because the launchers are mobile and can, therefore, elude preventive or retaliatory attacks by an enemy having offensive weapons of sufficient range. The latter is not the case with the United States at the present time, or with all of NATO, including France, and even less with China. Employment of missiles by groups, employment staggered in time and differing with situational requirements and target of conditions, provides great flexibility in the conduct of the war and also in taking action in a crisis involving a risk of armed conflict. Such employment also makes it possible to retain, under any circumstances, an operational reserve that could be decisive. The capacity to fuel a nuclear war with unstoppable ballistic missiles that are also practically invulnerable on the ground prior to launch, provides a combination force capable of conducting a limited preventive strike against one or two selected regions--Europe or the Middle East, for example--and several retaliatory second strikes.

This capability is absolutely new, one could say revolutionary for nuclear strategy in the ballistic missile field (the new American Pershing 2 systems, not yet operational, employ a reloading technique). Prior to the SS-20, no ballistic missile with a range of more than 800 kilometers had a mobile launcher with a system enabling it to be reloaded in an operationally acceptable period of time. The Vienna treaty formally prohibits any technique permitting an ICBM launcher to launch several missiles simultaneously or consecutively. This rapid reloading technique²¹ will very likely be used for tactical ballistic missile systems (SRBM) of different, and at times, variable, ranges of from 100 to 1,000 kilometers so as to give them greater flexibility of employment and an increased attack capability against ground targets that would have to be neutralized successively. With its 4,000-kilometer range and MIRV system, the SS-20 can transpose such an operational flexibility from the tactical and geographically confined (in its continental dimensions) level so as to strike targets of strategic military or civilian importance according to variations in war plans dictated either by political considerations or by the conduct of operations.

All the characteristics of the SS-20 that put it in a class by itself in comparison with the older American or French as well as Soviet IR-MRBM's, indicate that its designers intended to give the Soviet forces a master weapon employable over a rather vast theater of war, and also offer the Soviet government continental strategic options usable in case of conflict without having to trigger a general nuclear war. As part of the major operations of a limited war, in Europe for example, an SS-20 could neutralize NATO's major air bases, ports, and other logistical centers. At SHAPE, the threat to European ports that are maritime bridgeheads for reinforcements and logistical support from America is considered to be of capital importance,

and the use of SS-20's against these ports and air bases in Europe is included in the contingencies recently considered. The SS-20 threat to NATO LRTNF [Long Range Theater Nuclear Force] bases could prompt NATO authorities to consider the use of nuclear weapons present in Europe to be too risky. At the outset of armed conflict in Europe, a preventive first strike by SS-20's against the some 400 to 600 bases and other essential installations of the NATO forces could disorganize the NATO defense system and eliminate the NATO LRTFN, a force capable of penetrating eastward. The hypothetical degree of this calculable risk is determined by the combination: accuracy, yield, and number of SS-20 warheads employed against targets selected on the basis of the requirements of a disarming first strike. Another key factor is the SS-20 system's CEP or circular error probable, in other words the warhead's margin of deviation from the target's desired ground zero. The SS-20's CEP is, of course, not known. NATO has no valid information on this point at the present time.

Thus the margin of uncertainty is probably as great as the SS-20's margin of deviation. The prevailing opinion among NATO military experts gives the SS-20 a larger CEP than the American Minuteman, in other words probably a radius of between probably 400 and 1,000 meters from desired ground zero. The contention by some experts that the SS-20 has a CEP of merely 200 meters is unfounded based on the information available to American military authorities who are the only ones to have the means of systematically observing, telemetering, and analyzing SS-20 tests. With such a CEP, the SS-20 is still far from being a surgical instrument of the flexible and selective strategy. A 200- to 300-KT warhead of the Minuteman's thermonuclear class, is much too destructive to permit concentrating its effects upon a small-scale military target and thus limiting collateral damage. Employed against such militarily important targets as the regional logistical support facilities of the allied air forces in Germany, or the support bases of the Pershing SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile) battalions, or such air bases as Ramstein, Laach, Geilenkirchen (to be used by AWA'S [Airborne Warning and Control System] aircraft), the SS-20's would still cause terrible destruction over a densely populated and largely urban territory. Some 400 to 600 targets in Western Europe attacked by the same number of 200-KT warheads in a few hours time at most, would have to absorb 80-120 megatons of thermonuclear energy, assuming no dual target coverage by two SS-20's. The effect of an attack of this magnitude on West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Northern Italy or France would resemble massive destruction more than a selective and limited attack. But certain targets such as the strategic submarine bases at Holy Loch in Scotland and Rota in Spain, the naval bases in Italy, Greece, Turkey, and France, the major Atlantic ports, the French SSBM [Surface-to-Surface Strategic Ballistic Missiles] sites, etc. are most likely targeted by SS-20's, or will be.

On the strategic level, everything depends on how the targeted countries view the challenge posed by the SS-20 and how the Americans react to that challenge. Logically, the options offered by an SS-20 force with regard to NATO change the strategic equation in Europe and all NATO calculations relative to the

process of escalation under the flexible response strategy. The first use by NATO of nuclear weapons against a Soviet offensive in Europe could entail exorbitant risks and be prohibitively costly in case of an SS-20 attack, whether it be a preventive first strike against LRTNF ground bases, or a retaliatory second strike. Estimates resulting from contingency analyses based on this or that number of SS-20 warheads launched, could raise serious questions about the advisability of using American strategic missiles against the USSR in executing selective missions as part of an operation of limited support to the defense of Western Europe. Decoupling defense of Europe against a Soviet threat from the security of America has always been in the interest of the limited conflict strategy followed by the USSR with regard to NATO.

On the political level, the SS-20 has already created havoc in the imagination of Europeans. Exaggerated statements by so many commentators and politicians, and also by NATO military leaders, have made the threat appear even much greater than it could actually become. Georg Leber, former West German defense minister, and Luns, the NATO secretary general, referred, back in early 1979, to a wrong number of SS-20's as already deployed, namely 600. There is no doubt, however, that Moscow considers the SS-20 IRBM force, and also the Backfire options, to be a superior instrument for the intimidation of Europe and Asia, to be, in a way, the supreme weapon for domination by nuclear terror in combination with its rational and effective use against the enemy's military means. The SS-20 force seems to be viewed in Moscow as a means of imposing strategic terms upon the Eurasian continent and overcoming military risks that might be beyond the control of the Soviet armed forces. As a weapon for protecting the geopolitical glacis around the USSR, a weapon for supporting intervention abroad, a weapon for interdicting the enemy's options against the USSR, and as a weapon for destroying the strategic unity of NATO territory and disrupting the process of escalation by NATO, the SS-20 could radically alter the fundamental concepts of security by definitively upsetting the balance of forces between the USSR and NATO in Europe.

As of early 1979, 108 SS-20 launchers were operational in the USSR. They were organized into 12 groups (or battallions) of nine launchers each. Some 63 of these launchers were deployed against Europe, with approximately one-third of them positioned so as to be able to attack targets in Europe or the Middle East. This number of 63, acknowledged by American intelligence agencies and accepted in mid-1979 by NATO, means that a total of 189 SS-20 missiles with 567 warheads could have been deployed against Europe (3 x 63 x 3), assuming that each launcher had three missiles available and each missile had three warheads. NATO estimates there will be 254 SS-20 launchers in the USSR by 1982, with 171 of these deployed against Europe. This would mean that in 1982 NATO would be confronted by more than 500 SS-20 warheads if each launcher were armed with a single MIRVed missile, but by more than ²²1,500 warheads if three missiles were available to each SS-20 launcher. The implication for the 400-600 key NATO installations in Europe, and particularly for the LRTNF bases, are obvious. And so are the

political implications: either Europe accepts this new security situation in favor of the USSR and renounces arms programs designed to restore an approximate balance to Eurostrategic options; or else Western Europe decides to establish a counter force, not for the purpose of balancing the Soviet SS-20's on a weapon-for-weapon basis--this would not be possible given the lead the SS-20 already has and the resources the USSR has to increase the number of these weapon systems--but in order to pose additional risks to the Soviet territory and armed forces in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet military regions west of the Urals. To evade such a Western response, the USSR still holds some valuable trumps in its hand with its number of SS-20's already deployed and with a buildup rate of about 50 launchers per year.²³ NATO has decided to offer to negotiate on continental nuclear weapons with a view to limiting their number and areas of deployment.

The American Pershing 2 missiles (range: 1,800 kilometers) will not become available to NATO until 1983 and the surface-to-surface cruise missiles (approximate range: 2,500 kilometers) until 1982. During such negotiations, the USSR might well propose a halt in LRTNF deployments by both sides so as to freeze the ratio of such forces. In that case, the USSR could have 171 SS-20 launchers facing Europe versus merely some 400 Western medium-range LRTNF systems. Including all systems of this class, the USSR would thus have, by end-1981, up to 1,470 medium-range (1,000 to 4,600 kilometer) weapon systems, including the 171 SS-20 launchers, counted with only one missile each, and the 121 new Backfire medium bombers.²⁴ As for the Soviet IR-MRBM's in this "regional balance," 200 SS-20's with one MIRVed missile per launcher, can replace the 600 SS-4's and SS-5's without reducing the force's offensive capability. A freeze on new systems could even be reinforced at a lower level by withdrawal of the USSR's older IR-MRBM's as a token of good will toward Europe without Soviet continental strategy losing one single offensive option. This example is purely hypothetical and probably does not actually correspond to Soviet intentions. It may, however, serve to clarify the problems the SS-20 creates for European security policy as well as NATO strategy.

In conclusion, the political decision on the SS-20 might be viewed as having been taken for the purpose of conflict, in anticipation of which the USSR would want to arm itself as well as it can. Such a conflict appears less improbable in 1979-1980 than 10 years ago, even in the West. From this perspective, the SS-20's continental options may be regarded as an additional insurance policy in the Soviet portfolio. Just how important the SS-20's are to Moscow can be clearly seen in the fact that in his Berlin speech on 6 October 1979, Brezhnev made no mention whatever of either the number of warheads on medium-range missiles or the SS-20's when he declared he was prepared to withdraw a certain number of IR-MRBM launchers from the western USSR on condition that NATO add no system of this category to its arsenal in Europe.

FOOTNOTES

1. Communiqués of the NATO defense ministers and the NATO Council in December 1978 and May 1979. The term "excessive" was first used by the NATO military committee in May 1975 in an official publication.
2. Public statement, 11 August 1979.
3. Speech in East Berlin on 7 October 1979 at ceremonies marking the GDR's 30th anniversary.
4. Estimates published in U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown's 1979 budget report and based on the number of warheads allowed by the Vienna agreements and the current programs of the two negotiating partners.
5. See the supplement listing the number of strategic systems stipulated on 18 June 1979 at Vienna in the appendix to the SALT II treaty.
6. Page 88 of "The Military Balance 1979-1980" published by the IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] of London, on which the figure shown is 365 as of mid-1979. The difference stems from the fact that the United States included in its total of heavy bombers a certain number of nonoperational aircraft maintained in reserve, so as not to show an artificial distinction between the two technical categories and a numerical inferiority due to American logistical planning.
7. MIRV is an acronym for "multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles." The first such system was the Poseidon SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] with 10 warheads, each of 50 KT. It still remains the principal MIRV-type weapon in the U.S. forces.
8. MRV is an acronym for "multiple reentry vehicles." It is a simpler system that only enables the warheads to be delivered simultaneously over a target area. The standard such system is the Polaris A3 (arming the British SLBM's).
9. See the U.S. Secretary of Defense's budget report for FY 1973 and subsequent fiscal years.
10. Information given and reiterated since 1972 by Henry Kissinger and official American sources.
11. See Kissinger's statements to U.S. Senate committees, his interview with the ECONOMIST in 1979, and his statements in Brussels on 1 September 1979.

12. See particularly William Kaufman's "The McNamara Strategy," Henry Kissinger's "Nuclear Arms and Foreign Policy," public statements by NATO secretaries general, SACEUR's, etc. See also Lothar Ruehl's "La Politique Militaire de la V^e Republique," and the writings of Generals Pierre Gallois and Charles Ailleret for slashing criticism.

13. See "The Military Balance," IISS, London, op.cit., since 1975-1976. For an analysis, see "Adelphi Paper 141," 1979.

14. The approximate number of 750 IR-MRBM's--intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles--had been constantly cited since 1964 by official U.S. and NATO documents. These figures never specified where in the USSR these missiles were deployed. "The Military Balance 1979-1980," p 87, lists the current number as 500 SS-4's, 90 SS-5's, and 120 SS-20's as of July 1979. On the basis of photographs taken by U.S. satellites, it is generally agreed that two-thirds of the IR-MRBM's in the USSR are deployed in the western part and against Europe.

15. Unofficial American reports based on current estimates.

16. See Ruehl, op.cit., and annual DOD budget reports by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

17. Figures given by "The Military Balance 1972-1973" and less detailed figures submitted by Henry Kissinger to various congressional committees in Washington.

18. On the strategic problems of the Cuban Crisis, see particularly Robert and Alberta Wohlstetter's "Controlling the Risk at Cuba."

19. All published reports on the SS-20 are based on unreliable data about the actual performance of this weapon system, the only information being those indications released by American sources, but without revealing any technical details. Consequently the number, range, and accuracy of the SS-20 warheads remain unconfirmed and should be used with caution in any analysis and even more so in reaching strategic and political conclusions. According to official but nonpublic information given to the NATO allies since December 1978 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, one or more SS-20 test firings since late 1977 have been measured by American telemetry as having a range of approximately 4,600 kilometers and being armed with three warheads. The 1979 DOD FY80 report merely states that the SS-20 has an operational range of more than 3,000 kilometers with three warheads.

20. EMP, or electromagnetic pulse, is also called the "fratricidal effect" because warheads from the same missile may neutralize each other. To avoid this possible hazard to the effectiveness of an attack by MIRVed weapons, plans may call for the delivery of warheads from different missiles on one target, and thus covering, for example, 15 targets with 30 warheads from 10 different missiles, each of which would carry three MIRVed warheads.

21. The rapid reloading technique enables several missiles to be fired from the same launcher within a short period of time. This technique is based on the use of containers for mobile systems. According to American reports, the mobile SS-20 launcher is designed to handle three or four missiles.

22. Figures given by American sources at NATO in June 1979.

23. Information given in the West German government's annual defense and security "White Paper 1979," dated September 1979, p 107, on which the number of operational SS-20 launchers is listed as 100, and the total number of "offensive nuclear medium-range systems" is reported to be 1,370 versus NATO's 386 in Europe (including 122 French systems). The 10 August 1979 issue of the German Foreign Policy Association's bimonthly review EUROPA-ARCHIV - No 15, p 472--gives a slightly different but basically comparable ratio of USSR-NATO "offensive LRTNF systems," in other words an East-West "continental balance" in Europe: 1,400 for the USSR versus approximately 590 for NATO; with a ratio of nuclear warheads and bombs deliverable by operational systems: 2,440 for the USSR in Europe versus 1,260 for NATO in Europe. "The Military Balance 1979-1980," by the IISS of London, compiled a different inventory expanded to include weapon systems having a range below that of the medium-range systems, i.e. at least 1,000 kilometers. According to this report, the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe (i.e. the USSR plus its allies) currently have 5,364 missile systems and combat aircraft capable of launching nuclear weapons at long- and medium-range versus 2,045 for NATO. The ratio of warheads is 2,244 to 1,811. And a ratio of forces based on "the system's utility factor" (explained on pp 116-117), i.e. operational capabilities, is reported to be 1,209 for the USSR versus 1,065 for NATO. The authors state (p 116) that the ratio of "usable warheads" in 1979 was 2,244 for Russia versus 1,811 for NATO.

24. Estimate made by NATO American sources in 1979. When the Vienna SALT II treaty on strategic arms expires in 1985, American sources expect the Soviets to have more than 3,000 warheads of the "intermediate and medium-range categories," or "continental" category from a European standpoint. This is an increase of more than 100 percent in comparison with the 1979 offensive nuclear capability.

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PCF'S ANTI-TNF INITIATIVE DIVIDES COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS

PCF Mobilizes Militants

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 79 p 11

[Article by P.J.]

[Text] The PCF [French Communist Party] and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] have issued a call to demonstrate, on Thursday 20 December in Paris, against the Atlantic Council's decision to install new American nuclear missiles in Europe. Twelve minor organizations have joined in this call, which was made public on Tuesday 18 December after a third meeting that was not attended by the PS [Socialist Party]. "We hope others will join," said Mr Charles Piterman, who represented the PCF. "There are still 48 hours remaining."

The PS's executive bureau was to have decided its position by late afternoon on Wednesday. Mr Lionel Jospin, member of the PS national secretariat, had indicated on Tuesday that if his party agreed to meet with the PCF it would want to discuss "the entire matter," that is, not only the NATO decision but also the Soviet Union's nuclear forces, especially the SS-20 missiles "aimed rather in our direction."

It seems, therefore, as if the PS is preparing to accept the PCF's invitation but on the basis of a broadened debate to include the disarmament problem as a whole. The socialists are saying, in effect, that France, having withdrawn from NATO, must consider the Atlantic Alliance's decisions in the general context of the armaments race and taking into account the special position it occupies by virtue of its own deterrent force.

For the same reason, it appeared on Tuesday in the corridors of the National Assembly that the socialist group would not vote in favor of the censure motion introduced by Mr George Marchais, who has interpellated the government on its attitude toward the NATO decisions. The communists would thus succeed in their aim, if it is true that their parliamentary initiative, which is to be the subject of a debate in the Assembly on Thursday, is intended solely to posit themselves as the only true defenders of the peace

that is threatened by "American imperialism" and the "German hegemony," according to the terms used by Mr Marchais to the members of the PCF parliamentary group. The PCF secretary general emphasized the need for the militants of his party to make a special effort to ensure the "maximum success" of Thursday's demonstration.

Marchais Introduces Censure Motion

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] The censure motion introduced by Mr Marchais on Tuesday 18 December, in support of his interpellation of the government, states:

"The decision to install at our West European borders 600 new American nuclear rockets is heavily laden with threats to European peace and security, to the security of France itself.

"It constitutes a formidable escalation of the armaments race. It exacerbates international tension. It grants the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], contrary to the treaties signed shortly after the Second World War, accession to the most sophisticated atomic weapons.

"This decision has been taken at a time when France should instead be taking steps toward disarmament, at a time when the security of all peoples should be being sought through a balanced reduction of weapons and not through a new accumulation of instruments of death on the European continent, which already has so many of them.

"The French Government, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, bears a major responsibility in the situation thus created. It has made itself an accomplice in this unjustifiable decision.

"It has refused to open a debate in the National Assembly on these problems.

"It thus concurs in the transformation of Europe and of France into a potential atomic battlefield for the account of the United States and of the FRG.

"For these reasons, and in accordance with Article 49-2 of the Constitution, the undersigned deputies request the National Assembly to pass the present censure motion."

Additional Marchais Statements

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] On Tuesday 18 December, Mr Georges Marchais addressed the members of the communist parliamentary group attending a dinner in Drancy (Seine-

Saint-Denis). To the argument that installation of American nuclear missiles in Europe is intended to level out the current imbalance of forces favoring the Soviet Union, the PCF [French Communist Party] secretary general responded: "The (Soviet) SS-20 rockets have been in existence since 1975. They are taken into account in the SALT II agreement, which is based on the existence of an overall balance of the forces in Europe. This balance--recognized again recently by the London Institute for Strategic Studies...--has been deliberately destroyed by the Germano-American decision, and by that alone."

Mr Marchais continued, "In the first place, the installation of nuclear missiles in Europe would transform our countries into the appointed battlefields for an atomic war. It is not we who would decide on that war. The decision to use those nuclear weapons would reside within the authority of just one man: the president of the United States. In sum, our lives would be hanging by a thread in the hands of one man seated thousands of kilometers away from here. In the second place, as all the observers have discovered, this decision was proposed by the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]."

According to the PCF secretary general, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the FRG is asking the Western nations to "superarm" his country so that it can "defend Europe against the Soviets." "We have heard this language in other eras," said Mr Marchais. "We know where it has led us. The German people bear a heavy responsibility to history. It is not within the power of anyone to relieve them of this responsibility. And it would be criminal of France and of the French people to forget the lessons of the past, of a recent past."

"What is at stake," Mr Marchais explained, "is the choice between, on the one hand, peace, with continued detente and concrete steps in the direction of disarmament, and on the other, a step in the direction of a return to "cold war," a step-up in the arms race, the increased risk of a new world conflict. To be sure! The world balance of power relationships, which has changed in favor of the forces of social, national and human liberation, no longer permits imperialism to start devastating wars at its own pleasure. It is up to the forces of peace now to show extreme vigilance, the more so since a profound crisis has struck the developed capitalist countries....)

"What is at stake is the choice between, on the one hand, the national independence, the sovereignty of France, or on the other, submission to American imperialism and to German hegemonic policies."

Reasons for Communist Initiative

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Dec 79 p 7

[Article by Xavier Marchetti]

[Text] Communist grand organs are being heard. Western Europe is under the direct aim of 120 Soviet SS-20 rockets, each armed with three atomic warheads, each warhead five times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, and the PCF [French Communist Party] is making the most of it. Countering, NATO is going to install in Europe (in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], for all practical purposes) 108 American rockets capable of suitable response. Meanwhile, the PCF rants, exhorts, demonstrates and calls upon all the forces of the left to do the same.

An old reflex revealing the PCF's profound--and, in the final analysis, permanent--collusion with the Soviet Communist Party? Obvious, for anyone caring to see it.

France is no longer in the Atlantic military organization, and is taking no part in the new redeployment of rockets and missiles. But she is still a member of the Alliance. And it is from this standpoint that the PCF would like to have France rise en masse in protest against the West's prerogative and the means it chooses to defend itself.

What is the motive, aside from mere propagandistic aims? Does the PCF believe that the French deterrent force, unaided, would be unable to discourage an eventual setting in motion of the Red army against the West? It would seem so to hear them howl as they are now doing against NATO's redeployment. Does it think that a French protest--properly unanimous and popular--will suffice to persuade the Atlantic military organization to drop its response plans? To judge from the zeal the PCF is displaying, it would have us believe--but who will believe?--that it is suddenly stricken by political naivete.

Naturally, there is the familiar slogan: The Soviet Union seeks world peace and will never attack. The problem is that the Soviet Union has still not discontinued superarming itself to the point of dangerously disrupting, to its own advantage, the balance of exterminating forces.

Do what it (the PCF) will, the debate cannot overlook this simple fact. Militarily, whenever the weapons can be perceived before the intent, the matter has become serious. The PCF's stratagem is to create fear: NATO missiles in Europe will draw atomic fire on Europe, and hence on France itself.

Need one be reminded that all pacifist campaigns are started through this same reasoning, and that they always end in the same disasters?

Organizations Supporting PCF Initiative

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] At the conclusion of a third meeting on 18 December at the headquarters of the the Peace Movement, 14 organizations including the PCF [French Communist Party] and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] issued a call to demonstrate on Thursday 20 December at 1800 hours, marching from Place de la Nation to Place de la Bastille, under the bannered slogans: "NO to the New U.S. Missiles in Europe" and "YES to Disarmament and Peace."

The call signed by the organizations says specifically that "the installation on West European soil of nearly 600 new American nuclear missiles (...) makes Europe the privileged target of an atomic war fought with medium-range missiles, (...) places the lives of hundreds of millions of Europeans in the hands of the president of the United States, who alone will decide to fire them" and "opens the way for the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] to control atomic weapons."

The signatory organizations, aside from the PCF and the CGT are: MJCF [French Communist Youth Movement], UNEF [National Union of French Students], UNCAL [National Union of Lycee Action Committees], ARAC [Republican Association of Former Combatants], ANCAC [National Association of Former-Combatant Railwaymen], FGP [Federation of Gaullists of Progress], UDT [Democratic Union of Labor], Amis de "Temoignage Chretien" [Friends of "Christian Expression"], UJRE [Union of Jews for Resistance and Mutual Aid], Union Progressiste [Progressive Union], Mouvement de la Paix [Peace Movement], and MDPL [Movement for Disarmament, Peace and Freedom].

Socialist Refusal of Support

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Dec 79 p 12

[Text] Mr Francois Mitterand was to have taken the floor in the National Assembly the afternoon of Thursday 20 December to introduce PS [Socialist Party] proposals on world disarmament and to explain the reasons for the PS refusal to vote for the censure motion introduced by the PCF [French Communist Party].

Mr Laurent Fabius, the PS spokesman, had in fact indicated at the conclusion of the PS executive bureau meeting on Wednesday night that the socialists would neither support this motion nor take part in the demonstration that has been organized for late afternoon Thursday at the instigation of of the PCF and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor].

The socialist leaders have nevertheless asked Mr Pierre Beregovoy, the PS national secretary for external relations, to immediately forward to the communist leadership detailed counterproposals for broadening the debate

to include all the issues relating to security, disarmament and peace, not only in Europe but in other parts of the world as well; for example, Mr Fabius pointed out, in Cambodia.

Mr Fabius stressed that the PS not only reproaches the communists with having limited their response to include only the NATO decision, but takes exception as well to the manner in which, "totally unilaterally, and without consulting nor waiting," the PCF laid down the order of business, the place and the times of the proposed meetings. The socialists feel that these meetings are being convened "coincident with refusals by the communist leaders to take part in joint actions being proposed by the socialists in the arena of struggle on burning issues in French social and political life. They are being convened in a climate and on the heels of statements that are very hostile to the PS and that are without any doubt intended to bring about the failure of the process. Many of the organizations contacted by the PCF have taken the same position as the PS."

The PS spokesman added that his party will keep all organizations--labor unions, movements and associations--informed regarding these problems. "Lastly," said Mr Fabius, "representatives of the Socialist International will be contacted urging them to take concrete initiatives in the service of this great cause to which the French socialists are dedicated: disarmament, detente, security and peace."

Mr Mitterand, responding to questions Wednesday on France-Inter, stated that the PS is prepared to engage in discussions on disarmament with the PCF, on condition that they not be limited to demanding that the United States withdraw its missiles, without having made the same demand upon the Soviet Union. After pointing out that the Soviet nuclear weapons are aimed directly on French cities and military installations, the first secretary of the PS expressed the hope that the armaments race will stop and that the American nuclear missiles as well as the Soviet ones will all disappear from European soil.

Interpellation

The right of interpellation, set forth in Article 156 of the National Assembly's rules of procedure, is a carryover from the provisions which under the Third and Fourth Republics permitted a deputy to request of the government at any time an explanation of this or that aspect of its policy. He was required only to address a written request to the Assembly president explaining briefly the object of his interpellation. This request was immediately notified to the government and the Assembly advised of it. Discussion of the interpellation could be followed by a vote that the government raise the issue of confidence or that the vote itself be recorded in the proceedings as a vote of confidence.

Under the Fifth Republic, an interpellation cannot take place without the introduction of a censure motion, in accordance with the principle that

the government cannot be defeated except by a positive majority voting on a single issue and supposedly capable of assuming power in substitution of the government in place. This is the first time since 1958 that Article 156 of the National Assembly's rules of procedure has been invoked.

Socialist National Secretary Response

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] Referring to the invitations addressed to the PS [Socialist Party] by the PCF [French Communist Party], Mr Lionel Jospin said specifically on Europe 1 Channel Tuesday 18 December: "The PCF has rejected very many proposed joint actions on basic issues directly concerning layoffs, unemployment and the daily lives of the people. The record speaks for itself. Suddenly, the PCF rediscovers that a basic issue calls for a summit and invites us to a summit meeting on an international policy problem (...).

"I do not understand the sudden haste. The deployment of these forces is scheduled for 1983. There is certainly time to await the decision of the PS executive bureau in regard to such a meeting.

"Be that as it may, if one is to discuss world tension, perhaps one should not examine solely the Western side of the matter. The measures that have been announced are certainly serious. But there are also missiles called SS-20's, installed in silos in the USSR, whose noses are pointed, it seems to me, somewhat in our direction. The danger, if it exists, therefore, is in the armaments race between the East and the West."

Analysis of Socialist Decision

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Dec 79 p 12

[Article by Patrick Jarreau: "An Old Quarrel"]

[Text] The differences between the PCF [French Communist Party] and the PS [Socialist Party] on defense issues and on alliances are not new. The PCF "Change of Course" platform adopted in October 1971 contended that "France must not be committed to any military bloc whatever. The new government must therefore take the necessary steps to pull France out of the Atlantic Pact (...), a politico-military organization with aggressive aims, dominated by the United States." According to the PS "Change of Life" platform (March 1972), a leftist government's foreign policy should, on the contrary, be conducted "without bringing into question again France's membership in the Atlantic Alliance."

The two parties converged again, however, to advocate the dissolution of the military blocs (Atlantic Pact and Warsaw Pact) and the organization of a system of collective security among all the European countries. But

on the issue of disarmament the PS position was that "from the time it takes office, the leftist government must decide to halt production of the Strike Force," whereas the PCF position was that in addition to this "all existing stocks must be liquidated."

The joint platform on government, signed in June 1972, affirmed: "With a view to assuring the security of France and considering the current situation on the European continent, the government must base its national defense policy at one and the same time on the seeking of collective security and disarmament, the respecting of its alliances and a reorganization of the French Armed Forces." The platform specified that "the problems, if any, ensuing from France's membership in the Atlantic Alliance" would be resolved with the "intent of putting the country on the road to independence from all politico-military blocs."

The joint platform stipulated "simultaneous dissolution" (the qualificative adjective was taken from the socialist platform) of the two blocs and active participation in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation proposed by the Soviet Union (the future Conference of Helsinki). It provided that the French forces could take part in a "European Collective Security System." It stipulated on the other hand the "abandonment of the strategic strike force program" and the "immediate halt of production on the French strike force" in the event of a leftist victory.

Differences of interpretation between the signatories of this platform were not long in appearing. In July 1973, Mr Charles Hernu, the PS official responsible for defense matters, having taken part in a controversy over French nuclear experiments, in which he had advocated the need to examine "the entire defense problem" and to take into account especially the possible evolutions of American policy, was counseled by L'HUMANITE to take his guidance in these matters from the June 1972 platform document, which according to the PCF daily was "not far" from being "a doctrine."

Some months later, Mr Francois Mitterand stated, and the communists did not deny, that the joint platform had included "some important language on the nondestruction of stocks" of nuclear weapons built by France, whereas nothing of the sort had been included in the cited document. On the other hand, the PCF, reacted in November 1973 to a statement by Mr Hernu to the effect that the future French army could be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. "This proposal," L'HUMANITE insisted, "is contrary to the solutions set forth in the joint platform."

The evolution of the PS toward counting on the strike force began officially in 1976 when the party's Executive Committee took under advisement the reports of Mr Hernu, Mr Robert Pontillon and Mr Jean-Pierre Chevenement, all of them concurring that a leftist government must take into account the "nuclear situation." A similar evolution was taking place in the PCF, where soon thereafter Mr Louis Baillot, the party's official responsible

for defense matters, stated that nuclear defense was now a fact that could hardly be ignored. In June, Jean Kanapa stated before the PCF Central Committee that if communist participation in the government of France "poses a problem" for the other member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, the leftist government "should state its readiness to renegotiate the terms of that alliance." Jean Kanapa expressed his support, on the other hand, for "an authentically national defense policy" and proposed renegotiation of the joint platform on these different points.

The Kanapa Report

The significance of this step emerged 1 year later when, in May 1977, the PCF Central Committee adopted a report by Jean Kanapa that marked the party's switch in support of the nuclear strike force. The communists proposed that the joint platform's chapter on defense be updated, taking into account the fact that nuclear weapons represent for France its sole means of real deterrence, that the credibility of this weapon lies in the ability to use it without resorting to the NATO systems of detection and surveillance, and that French defense cannot in any way be shared with Western high commands.

The PCF's turnabout, besides surprising a large number of its militants, caught the socialists unawares and not having yet prepared their position on the defense issue. Negotiations on updating the joint platform during the summer of 1977 stumbled against this issue. The "maintenance" of the nuclear weapon and the "all-directional" strategy being advocated by the PCF roused the curiosity of the Socialists, who suspected their partners of having in mind some form of national economic self-sufficiency or of nonalignment, or even of alignment with the views of the Warsaw Pact. Some socialists, prepared to agree to nuclear armament, envisaged it within the framework of a European defense, which the PCF refused categorically. Mr Mitterand became convinced that the communists intended to bring into question again France's membership in the Atlantic Alliance and to manipulate France's special position into an alignment favoring the Soviet positions.

The communists accused the socialists of doubting France's capability for an independent defense and of consequently placing France's security under the American nuclear "umbrella." Following the breakup between the two parties on 22 September 1977, however, Mr Georges Marchais reaffirmed that the PCF no longer considered agreement on the issue of France's withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance a prerequisite to an overall agreement with the PS. On the other hand, he criticized Mr Mitterand's proposal to organize a referendum on the civil and military nuclear issues (the PS first secretary had abandoned this proposal on the eve of the last negotiating session, but the socialist version of the "updated joint platform" published in January 1978 indicated that "the final decision must be left up to the French people").

In January 1978, the PS national convention entrusted with defining the party's policy on the defense issue decided in favor of "keeping operational" France's nuclear armament until an international conference on disarmament could be convened. Mr Mitterand stated that France would be a "loyal ally" but not an "integrated" one of the Americans, within the Atlantic Pact.

In May 1979, the PCF 23rd congress confirmed the positions taken by the communists during the negotiations on the joint platform.

The PS, for its part, has submitted for current discussion by its militants the "socialist draft plan," setting forth the PS's key ideas on this subject. The draft specifically states that "the socialists have chosen the option of collective security and actively oppose nuclear proliferation." France, according to this plan, would propose the convening of a permanent European conference for the reduction of conventional and nuclear forces and of tensions in Europe.

The draft plan then challenges "the traditional view of the threats, wherein the Eastern bloc is seen as the sole source of the danger." It adds: "In its essential dimension, the menace is the transformation of Europe into a theater of operations on the sole initiative of the superpowers. The strategy of graduated-response confrontation proposed to us by the blocs is the corollary to sanctuarizing the two major powers. It may be legitimately asked whether the real intention of the Atlantic and Soviet high commands is not to wage the battle in Europe in the event of an East-West confrontation. This could explain the NATO recommendations: strengthen the conventional forces and develop tactical nuclear weapons."

After stressing that France's continued membership in the Atlantic Alliance "cannot signify acquiescence in the American strategy," the draft plan supports "keeping operational an independent French deterrent force as a component of a collective security system conceived on the European scale."

PCF's Pro-Sovietism Evident

Paris LE FIGARO in French 18 Dec 79 p 1

[Article by Edmond Bergheaud: "Euromissiles: PCF Alines Itself with MOSCOW"]

[Text] The PCF [French Communist Party] is intensifying its campaign against the NATO decision to deploy new American weapons, missiles and Pershing 2 rockets in Western Europe.

Clearly, in the defense domain as in the others, the PCF intends to be "in the vanguard of the struggles." And there can be no doubt that, although all the leftist organizations have been invited to join in this fight and

in the demonstration planned for Thursday, a parade from Place de la Nation to Place de la Bastille, the masters of the operation will be the communists.

But added to this aspect of internal policy, there is a second and perhaps more important one that concerns international policy.

Convergences have become more and more marked in the last few months between the attitude of the Soviet Union and the positions taken by the PCF. Indeed, the matter of the American weapons only serves to confirm this fact.

Well before NATO's meeting in Brussels, Moscow had let it be known that an Allied military reinforcement in Europe would be detrimental to detente. The PCF fell into step, casting a revealing light on the true nature of the bonds that unite the French communists to the Soviet Union. When the latter's military power balances that of the United States, the Western communist parties put some distance between themselves and official Soviet policy. They too take advantage of detente.

But let the Russians voice some concern in regard to their own security and immediately their country becomes the "homeland of socialism" that must be supported despite its mistakes and its economic failures.

As early as 10 December, hence even before the NATO meeting (13-14 December), Georges Marchais wrote to the president of the republic, inviting him, "in behalf of detente and peace," and in the interest of assuring France's own security, "to undertake steps immediately toward concluding a Franco-Soviet mutual security pact." "Such a pact," according to the PFC secretary general, "would not conflict with France's membership in the Atlantic Alliance. Obviously, the signing of this pact could not bring into question the existence of our independent national deterrent force." The president of the republic intends to reply, by letter, to the PCF secretary general after the conclusion of the current parliamentary session.

There once again is the now familiar theme: The deterrent force must be an "all-directions" one; that is, it must be able to serve, as necessary, not only against the East European countries but also against the United States.

No sooner had the NATO decision been taken than Georges Marchais was pressing the various leftist parties and organizations to meet for the purpose of "assuring a joint response. We must hasten to express the indignation and opposition of the people of France."

Of the major labor organizations, only the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] attended the meeting held last Saturday at PCF headquarters, the FO [Workers Force] and CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] having

decided to maintain a labor-oriented posture and not step down into the political arena. Among the political organizations, the PSU [Unified Socialist Party] had advocated the holding of such a meeting.

The most eagerly awaited response to the call for a meeting, however, was that of the socialists. In his reply to Georges Marchais, Francois Mitterand pointed out "the gravity and complexity of the issues raised," and the fact that it was up to the PS [Socialist Party] executive bureau to decide whether or not the PS should be represented at such a meeting.

The socialist executive body meets the day after tomorrow. For the moment, the two parties have agreed to maintain telephone contact.

The PS's attitude was severely criticized by the PCF. The latter's central committee secretary, Charles Fiterman, after accusing the socialists of hardly ever seeming to show a "desire for fast action," insisted on the need for joint action. The PCF then addressed a second letter to the PS, inviting the latter to take part in the demonstrations against the NATO decisions.

The response of Pierre Beregovoy, the PS national secretary, to Charles Fiterman did nothing to enhance relations between the two political parties. Pierre Beregovoy wrote: "We intend to examine your proposal, taking into account the current status of our relations, and to address the problem of the installation of Pershing 2 rockets and of cruise missiles in its relationship within the general context of disarmament in Europe."

The PS national secretary added that the communists' pressurized followup, "which tends to confront precisely those to whom it is addressed with an accomplished fact, does not appear to reflect a desire to achieve the widest and most unified agreement possible in this matter."

The communists, who are frequently stricken by memory lapses, seem to have forgotten that the cause of the failure of the negotiations on the joint platform was in part the issue of defense policy. Francois Mitterand was, in fact, unable to agree to an all-directions policy that, in placing the Russians on the same footing as the Americans, would naturally result in the neutralization of Europe, which, in turn, would benefit only Moscow.

Thus, an era looms recalling that of the "cold war." The PCF was then in the vanguard of the "fight"--as it intends to be again today, in military matters, and on issues of foreign policy, to the full extent of its definite ties to Moscow's spheres of interest.

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MARCHAIS DEFENDS ANTI-TNF MOTION OF CENSURE

Challenge Issued

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 21 Dec 79 p 4

[Text of address by Georges Marchais to National Assembly on 20 December 1979 on TNF issues, the French role.]

[Text] Georges Marchais spoke in the National Assembly yesterday in defense of the censure motion filed on Tuesday by the Communist group, a motion which denounces the government's attitude with regard to the decision to emplace American missiles in Europe.

The text of Georges Marchais' speech follows:

"It was not conceivable that our Assembly should adjourn without debating the fearful consequences, both for the security of our country and for peace, of the recent decisions made by NATO.

"Now Mr Prime Minister, you have refused to take part in such a debate. You have chosen that France should remain silent in the face of the immense dangers that those decisions conceal.

"The abdication of the responsibilities which are the responsibilities of our country, we have chosen not to accept. That is why I decided to challenge the government and to call upon you ladies and gentlemen of the Chamber of Deputies to adopt the motion of censure that the Communist group has proposed to you.

"What is at stake today are the vital interests of our country. In the first place, it is a question of its own security; I would say: of its very existence.

"A simple examination of the characteristics of the 108 Pershing II rockets and the 464 cruise missiles in question—whether it be a question of their size, their power, their accuracy, their capacity to escape all discovery and all control, or of their declared objective: to reach the Soviet Union from European soil—is sufficient to understand the importance of the

strategic imbalance to the benefit of the Atlantic powers which their emplacement on our continent would bring about. At the same time, the extreme danger of this decision is understood, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact having many times declared that such a superarmament would call for countermeasures on their part.

"Naturally, those who have turned themselves into spokesman for the American and West German leaders in our country are trying to justify this unacceptable decision. They are trying to reverse roles by presenting the German-American initiative as the reply to a prior situation created by the Soviet Union. And in particular they invoke the existence of new rockets called the SS-20.

"Those arguments have no serious foundation.

"Those SS-20 rockets have been in existence since 1975. They are all emplaced inside the Soviet territory. Their emplacement was a perfectly well-known fact at the time that SALT II was negotiated and signed exactly 6 months ago, and SALT II is based on mutual recognition of an overall parity between the blocs. No one has been able to suggest what new fact might have been discovered since the signing of SALT II which would justify the thesis of an imbalance. And for good reason: there has been no new Soviet armament, nor any threatening gesture on its part. Completely to the contrary, it was during this period that the Soviet Union began unilaterally to diminish its armed forces and its weapons in the German Democratic Republic. And it has accompanied those measures with precise proposals for negotiation, including a proposal for the reduction of the SS-20's stationed in the western part of its territory. I add that as late as last 22 October Mr Luns, the Secretary General of NATO himself, recognized that there was a parity of strategic weapons in Europe.

"In fact, as all observers recognize, the program of 'modernization' of American nuclear weapons had been defined well in advance of the discovery of the SS-20 rockets. On last 2 February, the West German minister of foreign affairs himself dated that decision to 1975.

"Everything shows then that the responsibility for the renewal of the armaments race belongs totally and exclusively to the United States and to Federal Germany.

"The NATO decision deals a serious blow to the process of detente expressed in particular in the signing of the SALT II agreements.

"It also means that gigantic sums--at least 2 trillion francs--will be wasted to the detriment of the real needs of the peoples for the sole profit of Boeing and multinational armament firms.

"Finally and chiefly it represents a terrible threat to peace in Europe. The decision to use new nuclear rockets will in fact belong only to the President of the United States. As of that moment, Western Europe, transformed into a launching platform for American nuclear rockets, would be a battlefield designed for an atomic war. To sacrifice Western Europe for the sake of dealing the most terrible blows possible to the Soviet Union at the same time that they see their own territory spared—that is obviously the calculation of the American strategists. It is monstrous.

"The President of the Republic tells us: we are not concerned by that new situation, as France is not a member of the NATO military organization. That is absurd and it is not exact.

"It is absurd, because by what miracle, once the missiles are installed in Federal Germany, in Belgium, in Great Britain and in Italy, would the consequences of a nuclear conflict spare our country? As a Communist journalist notes: 'Will it be the customs agents who forbid atomic fallout access to our territory?'

"And it is inexact. Since you, Mr Prime Minister—you, your government and Mr Giscard d'Estaing—are accomplices of those unjustifiable NATO decisions. You approve them.

"At the close of the Brussels meeting, the NATO secretary general was able to declare, without being contradicted, that your government was pleased by those decisions. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke of confidential contact with Mr Giscard d'Estaing. Finally, one may read in the final communique of the Atlantic Council of 13 and 14 December, in which your government participated, a pledge by all those governments to improve their military capabilities and to develop standardization and interchangeability of weapons. All those who are devoted to an independent national defense with respect to French alliances will measure the road that we have traveled since 1966.

"In fact, your acceptance of this NATO decision is the logical effect of an orientation that your government has been following for years under the pressure of Mr Giscard d'Estaing. The doctrine of the forward-facing battle has today been totally replaced by the doctrine of all-around defense. We are not talking about an abstract debate: we are measuring today its fearful consequences. At this moment, in case of conflict—including a conflict provoked by the United States or Federal Germany—French troops would be dragged into combat alongside Atlantic forces. Put in another way, France would be a partaker in an atomic war for interests which are alien to it.

"Such is your policy, Mr Prime Minister. It threatens the security of our country, peace on our continent and peace in the world. The government must be censured.

"The decisions of NATO, in the second place, are putting the independence and sovereignty of France in jeopardy.

"According to all observers, it is Federal Germany which has taken the initiative of proposing these decisions. And it is that country which has thrown all its weight into the balance to brutally impose those decisions onto little countries in NATO like the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark or Norway.

"This more and more preponderant position, this more and more hegemonic position of Federal Germany in Western Europe owes nothing to chance. It follows a plan drawn up by the world capitalist forces. In the context of a worldwide relationship of forces which is favorable to the forces of social, national and human liberation, imperialism in crisis is proceeding to a new division of labor. The United States, which is still the leader, is leaning more and more on Federal Germany as a relay point on our continent. All in all, the Americans are telling the Europeans to 'take more responsibility and greater risks; reinforce the military power of Germany; and make it a solid spearhead capable to opposing the Soviet Union by force' and unhappily, when it uses such language, American imperialism finds governments like yours which will accept a subordinate role.

"Thus, since we are living in a time where it would be possible, as the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act permit you to do, to progress along the road to detente, to the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs and to collective security, you are locking our country into a West European bloc dominated by the Federal Republic of Germany, with its power restored, and its claims, its envy and its arrogance renewed.

"We are alerting our people to that grave danger. We have the duty to do so. And we have the right. It would be criminal for France and for the French to forget the lessons of history. Our warnings have been only too well proved by the sad, often tragic experience of our people.

"How many times have we not heard in this same chamber both you and your predecessors--and they belonged to all political parties except the French Communist Party--swear that the military strength of Federal Germany presented no danger!

"You have told us: Germany will never be rearmed. And Germany has been rearmed.

"You have told us: Germany will never be a member of the Atlantic Pact. And Germany has become a member of the Atlantic Pact.

"You have told: Germany will never have the atomic bomb at its disposal. The greatest number of American nuclear rockets will be stationed on its soil. And the close collaboration that exists between the American and West German war industries is well known.

"Today you are telling us: this situation does not present any danger, since the decision to use those rockets does not depend on Federal Germany.

Growing Federal German Hegemony

"You are taking the French people for children. How could anyone believe, in fact, that assuming the hypothesis of an attack on the Warsaw Pact countries by the Federal German army—that Bundeswehr which Chancellor Helmut Schmidt recently assured us has become 'the best army in the history of Prussia and of Germany'—how could anyone believe that given this hypothesis the Pershings and the cruise missiles would not be used?

"You, Mr Prime Minister, with the president of the republic, you bear the responsibility for this acceptance of German's nuclear superarmament, for this submission of our country to its growing hegemony.

"Besides, all through your speeches and your articles, you do not hide your admiration for the regime on the other side of the Rhine and your alignment with every one of its desires. I have before me an interview that you gave to the newspaper RHONE-ALPES of 12 December. The way you are fascinated by Germany borders on indecency.

"When we read you, we see that the Germany of Bonn means monetary stability. It is a modern administration, based on initiative and responsibility. It is an economic structure which is distinguished from ours by the smaller scope given to the public enterprise sector and agriculture, and consequently by the lighter burdens on the state budget resulting from them. Finally, it is its quality and its relations between the social partners. There is a country, you exclaim, where no union or political party publicly and noisily declares its desire to reject all kinds of consensus!

"Very well, Mr Prime Minister, we must say that you are right in one respect: France is not Germany. Our working class, our people stand on their own two feet. They struggle. They struggle against your policy of austerity and of unemployment. They struggle against your policy of restricting rights and liberties, they struggle against your policy of unconditional alignment with the United States and Federal Germany.

"At this very moment, at the request of 15 organizations, the workers of the Paris region are meeting to stop the installation of the new American nuclear rockets, and to impose the only reasonable solution for the problem that has been presented to us: immediate negotiations leading to measures to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons.

"I call upon you, ladies and gentlemen of the Chamber of Deputies, to echo their demands and censure the government.

France's European, World Role

"There is a third reason why the vital interests of our country are in jeopardy.

"I wish to speak of the role that France has in Europe and in the world, because it is one of the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN, one of the four countries which received the surrender of Nazi Germany.

"Our country, which needs detente, is well placed to take the urgent initiatives that the situation demands. To take refuge in silence and renunciation would be to abdicate that responsibility and compromise the future.

"We are asking that France do everything, absolutely everything that it can do to check a disastrous process. It must clearly declare its resolute opposition to the implementation of NATO decisions, show that it has everything to fear from a race to the abyss which runs the danger of going completely out of control, to act to lower the level of the military confrontation between the blocs and to promote disarmament.

"Far from giving the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany a free hand to carry out their dictate, it is necessary to seek the support of the great movement of opinion which is growing in Europe and in our country--a movement to which the Communists are proud to give their contribution alongside other democratic, patriotic, labor and Christian forces.

"If the government declared that it is necessary to open negotiations without delay to permit the reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe while respecting the equal security of each state, if it asked that all constructive proposals, even partial proposals, be seriously studied, no matter what their origin might be, if it immediately invited such a conference to be held in Paris, if it asked all concerned countries to renounce for that reason every fait accompli which might have incalculable consequences, who would be able to refuse such a request under the penalty of showing his real intentions to the peoples?

"Yes, France can do that immediately. It would contribute by that very act to creating favorable conditions for the success of the European meeting anticipated one year from now in Madrid on the extension of the Helsinki agreement.

"At the same time, those decisions by NATO do nothing in my opinion but strengthen the immediacy of the proposal that I submitted to the president of the republic: to ask the French Government to immediately initiate steps for the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual security. The absence of a treaty in good and due form between our countries, which no conflict has pitted against each other for many generations, is abnormal. Many other countries, including member states of NATO, such as Federal Germany, have concluded treaties with the Soviet Union. The conclusion of a treaty of mutual security would reinforce--and this is not unimportant in Europe given the present circumstances--the character of a good example which the relations between France and the Soviet Union should have.

"By making these proposals, we are faithful to a certain idea of France, to which you prefer the idea of subordination. We are faithful to the common program of the left, which made the struggle for disarmament and European security a great objective of the French policy of independence and peace. And we are faithful to the cause of the future of the human race as we ask that a part of the assets freed by the reduction of armaments be applied to working against underdevelopment and against the hunger which affects so many men, women and children in the world. It is against those great gains that your policy turns its back. Those are the aims that we shall affirm as we censure the government.

Against All Alignment

"In an attempt to mask your all too real alignment on Washington and Bonn, several days ago you unleashed a campaign full of contradictions designed to poison and manipulate. You thought that you could do a big job in that way: very simply, to accuse all those who stand up today to defend the security of our country and the peace of the world to be themselves 'following the Moscow line'. That is the level to which you have descended, to drag out that old stupidity which all the spokesmen of the French bourgeoisie have been repeating inexhaustibly for nearly 16 years.

"However, if it is sufficient to say 'no' to the installation of the new American rockets and against the armaments race to be a Soviet agent, then all of the communist parties of Europe, the leaders of Austria and Finland, the socialist prime minister of Denmark and most of the parties in that country, the socialist party in power in Norway, the socialists, the pacifists, the churches, many members of the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party and the majority of the Parliament in the Netherlands, the president of the Labour Party in Britain, the West German Young Socialists, the Flemish Socialist Party and the Walloon and Flemish federalist parties, eleven of the principal Italian Christian organizations, including Catholic Action, the president of International Pax Christi, Paul Warnke, the former American SALT negotiator, and the former democratic candidate for the presidency, Senator McGovern; all of those people have sold out to the Soviet Union!

"If that continues, we will soon hear over the radio and on national television that the Pope, whose position is known, is an agent of Moscow!

"Having stated that, let's go deeper into things.

"To qualify our attitude as an 'alignment on the Soviet Union' is a pure and simple absurdity. Any idea of alignment or reversals of alliances is completely foreign to our policy. We do not propose either that France leave the Atlantic Alliance nor, with even stronger reasons, that it become a member of the Warsaw Pact! Completely to the contrary, we declare ourselves in favor of a true system of collective security, of going beyond blocs and of their simultaneous dissolution.

"Really, it is the NATO decision that you are approving which is leading to reinforcing the policy of blocs and of their mutual opposition, to alienating the independence of our country and its ability to play the original role that it can and should play.

"While combating the decision of NATO and your attitude in that regard, the French Communist Party at the same time opposes all alignments for France; it struggles for a strong and living France, sovereign and present in Europe and in the world at the service of peace and the security of the nations.

Important Fact for Country

"Ladies and Gentlemen of the Chamber of Deputies.

"Every vote in our assembly is important, but we know very well that some of those votes are major events marking the life of our country. The one that you will express is one of them.

"It's a question of peace.

"It's a question of French independence and sovereignty.

"It's a question of the possibility for our country to play the role that it should play in Europe.

"We are witnessing today the first reply of our people to the German-American decision. In our opinion, this is the point of departure of a vast national movement which, bearing witness in our country of the universal reprobation aroused by the NATO decisions, can check them. In order to become irresistible, that movement must still grow and be reinforced. In order to reach the goal we are open to all united efforts. It is imperative. It is urgent.

"Your responsibility is great. The question that is before us is profoundly concerned with the future of our country and the future of humanity.

"Beyond the political twisting and turning and beyond the habitual divisions, I am calling upon each one of you to place France's action in the framework of loyalty to its most noble traditions: to the service of world peace, to the service of the combat to enable humanity to avoid an atomic holocaust.

"I ask you to vote for the motion of censure that has been filed by the Communist group.

Account of Vote

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 21 Dec 79 p 4

[Article by Michel Strulovici]

The motion of censure condemning the French Government's acceptance of American atomic missiles in Europe got 86 votes yesterday. . . Only the Communist deputies voted for it. This is a new and serious step in the renewal of the armaments race.

Yesterday's session permitted a clear appreciation of the intentions of both sides.

Georges Marchais defended the Communist group's motion of censure. The few deputies of the right who were present at the session tried on several occasions to interrupt him. Particularly when he exposed the responsibility of the United States and the FRG for the growing gravity of the situation. Also when he cited the numerous organizations, especially Christian organizations which, in Europe, are struggling against the siting of the U.S. missiles.

Francois Mitterrand's speech sparkled with Atlanticism and anticommunism. He was the only speaker other than the prime minister who spoke against the censure motion, and we must not be astonished that he received the applause of the right at several points.

His arguments recalled without any doubt the period when the first secretary belonged to the governments of the Fourth Republic, which was so docile toward the United States.

Georges Marchais also caught the first secretary of the Socialist Party flagrantly falsifying. In effect, he accused Marchais of having distorted a quotation from the common program; Georges Marchais was supposed to have left out the word "simultaneous" from the "simultaneous dissolution of the blocs." The secretary general of the PCF [French Communist Party] made the observation that it was of no importance.

The peroration of the first secretary on his rejection "of the Atlantic entrenchment and of the Soviet entrenchment" was applauded by the right and by the Socialist deputies. Observing in Francois Mitterrand's words some topics that are particularly dear to them, the rightist deputies did not fail to salute those who "had returned to the fold" in this way.

The prime minister had no difficulty in appearing afterward as less of an Atlanticist.

Mr Barre undertook to answer Georges Marchais' arguments. The numerous ministers present on the government benches gave evidence to how seriously the Communist censure motion was taken, and how strongly it echoed throughout the country.

It must be observed that the prime minister calls the decision of the USSR to retire its troops from the GDR [German Democratic Republic] as "positive. As of this moment it is a unilateral act" he observed. And he emphasized that he "was seeking to broaden the areas of agreement between the French positions and those of the Warsaw Pact countries."

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PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON'S WORK, EQUIPMENT DISCUSSED

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-31 Jan 80 pp 34-37

[Text] There was a time when the 33rd Reconnaissance Squadron distinguished itself each year by winning the "Royal Flush," the competition in which the various NATO air forces in Europe opposed each other. Today France, no longer within the integrated allied command, no longer participates but the 33rd has not lost its touch, as was again demonstrated during the last wide-scope inter-armed forces exercise, "Saone 79."

Reconnaissance has recourse to a large arsenal of equipment, but that is not all there is to it--far from it. Like aerial combat reconnaissance is an art. It is not enough to be a good pilot, to know how to find objectives, to fly over them and photograph them. It is necessary in addition to be well acquainted with the organization of enemy forces, their equipment, indeed even of their habits, and to join to that a certain flair which makes all the difference. This, no doubt, is what led a general once to define a reconnaissance pilot as "an intelligent fighter pilot," a statement taken on the spot as fighting words by fighter pilots, which has remained famous since.

Nearly all the pilots who arrive at the 33rd Reconnaissance Squadron do so upon graduation from the Fighter School and spend a major portion of their careers there. At present, for example, in the squadron's ranks there are only two former fighter pilots. This is the most direct manifestation of the specific nature of the mission.

After arrival at Strasbourg, where the 33rd Squadron is stationed the young pilots first accumulate 200 hours of flying in 14 months before becoming operational pilots capable of reconnaissance missions under simple conditions. Normally, 14 months later they become assistant patrol chiefs. The pilots arriving at Strasbourg, who have already been trained, need only 8 to 9 months before being able to fulfill the mission. But it takes 3 or 4 years from the beginning before a reconnaissance pilot attains the peak of his form.

Learning to see is not a simple thing. "It is necessary to destroy the myth of the reconnaissance pilot as a pilot-photographer," is often repeated at Strasbourg. "The 33rd gathers information, not photographs." Transmission delays are a prime factor in the matter, from which is derived the concern to work in real time aboard the aircraft. To achieve that result the pilots must learn to recognize the silhouettes of all enemy equipment: Aircraft, tanks, various armour, vehicles of all kinds, radar, and so forth, and the organization of enemy forces. Thus, if two tanks are spotted it can be concluded that there are at least three of them; if four are seen, eight others are hidden. It is this sort of instantaneous deduction which is the whole worth of a reconnaissance pilot; that is what requires a long apprenticeship and good training.

At present the pilots fly, on average, 180 hours annually, which is equivalent to 20 hours per month for the pilots on duty, or practically one flight daily, according to the experts this is the minimum acceptable.

Soon the F-1

The 33rd Squadron is now flying obsolescing airplanes. It was in 1963 that the Mirage IIIR replaced the RF-84F; two wings, the 1/33 and 2/33, are still so equipped. In 1968 a reconnaissance version of the Mirage IIIE, the Mirage IIIRD entered service; the latter, in contrast with the R version, has facilities for self-defense (air-air sight), a Doppler navigational system which gives it some all-weather capability, and carries more fuel. There are 15 units of the Mirage IIIRD, with eleven of which the 3/33 wing is equipped; the latter's complement is completed with four Mirage IIIR airplanes, which are kept under cocoon.

While it is planned to retain the IIIRD airplanes until 1990 the IIIR are going to be replaced, starting in 1982, with a specialized version of the F-1, fitted with essentially the same navigational equipment of the Mirage 2000. The F-1 aircraft, which can be refueled in flight, will have an inertial platform, a Cyrano IV radar, internal counter-measures, an Omera 40 camera, and a Super-Cyclope infrared system mounted in place of a cannon. In addition it can carry a modular pod allowing seven different configuration combining the employment of television equipment of the Atibs type, an FLIR, and conventional cameras.

Later, in the beginning of the 1990 decade the 3/33 in its turn is to be re-equipped; very probably with a specialized version of the Mirage 2000.

The information mission depends as much upon the quality of the sensors in operation as upon that of the aircraft. The most important among them is obviously the pilot. He has the advantage of being very flexible and intelligent, which enables him to work in real time, but he has limitations. It must not be forgotten that missions can proceed at 100 meters altitude and at speeds on the order of 200 meters per second (720 kilometers per hour), whence the importance of cameras, and especially at night or under conditions of poor visibility, of infrared sensors and radars with lateral antennas.

Conventional cameras remain the means most employed. Upon the Mirage III they are grouped upon air interchangeable support in the nose of the airplane. At low altitudes cameras of 100-millimeter and 200-millimeter focal length are used while to effect coverage at high altitude a 600-millimeter focal length camera is used. That camera with oblique line of sight makes it possible to stand 20 kilometers off the objective; unfortunately, considering the average visibility in the central European sector this type of operation is rarely possible but it is of use in external theaters of operation.

The low-altitude assembly can to advantage be replaced by a single camera with a panoramic field, the Omers 40, which provides horizon to horizon pictures at the rate of 10 per second and makes it possible to compensate for possible pilot navigational error (or to localize a moving object).

Upon replacing the cannon chassis with a flair cartridge launching unit it is possible to take vertical photographs at night but the method, for lack of discretion, is seldom used.

By night it is preferred to use the Cyclope infrared detector developed by SAT. This equipment is mounted in the forward part of a 1,100-liter tank. The data (which are temperature differences) are stored upon tape by a recorder housed behind the sensor.

The Cyclope detects temperature differences on the order of $3/10$ degree and yields extremely interesting results. During the "Saone 79" exercise all the encampments were discovered at night by means of it. But the results depend upon meteorological conditions, rain, and fog. Using the Cyclope requires passing vertically over the objective with wings level. At 1,000 feet (300 meters) altitude coverage is on the order of 1,000 meters, whence the necessity for precise navigation. Such conditions of use therefore demand thorough training.

After landing, the data on the magnetic tape is transcribed onto photographic film.

The use of radar wavelengths enables atmospheric problems to be avoided and permits operation above the layer. For a short time, now, the Mirage IIIRD of the 3/33 wing have been able to exploit their all-weather capabilities, thanks to a radar with lateral antenna developed by EMI. The 3-meter long antenna and the electronics are housed in a combination radar/Cyclope "can." At 6,000 feet (1,800 meters) the EMI radar covers 5 nautical miles on each side of the aircraft. It enables two functions to be fulfilled: cartography and detection of moving echoes. The separation capability is 15 meters by 15 meters. Its characteristics raise it out of the purely tactical scope and approach that of strategic reconnaissance.

Matter of Interpretation

Less well known because less spectacular, the work of interpretation is none the less fundamental.

The 1/33 and 2/33 wings each have a mobile highway photographic section while a section capable of being transported by air in a Transall (two trailers, each requiring a C-160) is associated with the 3/33. The sections are completely self-sufficient except as far as water is concerned (they consume 3,000 to 4,000 liters per day).

The development of film is not the whole story--far from it. In practice the multiplicity of data sources--pilots, photographs, thermographs, and radar images--necessitates interpretation and correlation of facts in order to elaborate, in the end, the synthesis needed by the command. On the other hand the main value of that synthesis lies in the rapidity with which it is produced. That is why there has been designed an automated data processing system enabling both the time and the volume necessary for their exploitation to be reduced. This system has been designated the Patricia, an approximate acronym derived from "automatic processing of camera, infrared, and radar with lateral antenna data."

It is a system arranged around a SINTRA computer and its satellites, and selection and interpretation consoles.

Exploitation of a reconnaissance mission by means of the system comprises three phases: preparation, selection, and interpretation.

During preparation the camera and radar films are developed in auxiliary Augerau 160 equipment, which is compatible with the Patricia. At the same time the infrared observations are transferred onto film and follow the same circuit. All of these films then pass to a selection console.

During the second phase the operator controls the simultaneous unveiling of all the films dealing with the same subject (up to five). They are automatically synchronized with the photograph coordinates: the route of the aircraft is shown by the movement of a map, 1/500,000 scale, its position represented by a cross upon a screen. The flight data, from a cassette recorded aboard the aircraft, comprise latitude, longitudes, altitude, roll, heading, sensor used, number of pictures taken, and the time.

The negatives considered to be of interest are marked, cut, and passed to the interpretation console.

Thanks to the computer the interpretation officer has available:


automatic localization of the objective upon a 1/500,000 map;

immediate access to microfilm photo-archives [the course of] of objectives which permits comparison, in the course of time, with successive missions;

and direct measurement readings--calculated from the photographs (volume, distance, dimensions, and so forth) and transformation of coordinates.

The interpretation report is typed progressively as it is elaborated. It is simultaneously inscribed upon a rapid printer in the form of perforated type which can be put directly into the telecommunications network of the armed forces.

Thus a mission is fully exploited and the information available to the general staff in from 20 to 30 minutes after the aircraft has landed. Manual exploitation of the same mission would require from 50 minutes to 2 hours.



The shoemaker's last is not always the poorest, as is attested by the view of Airbase 124 at Strasbourg, showing the aircraft of the 3/33 wing parked under shelter. The other two wings are installed at the other end of the base.

11706
CSO: 3100

AIR FORCE F-1 WEAPONS SYSTEM NOW COMPLETE

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-31 Jan 80 p 42

[Text] The Super 530 officially went into service in the middle of December with the 12th Fighter Squadron stationed at Cambrai. One is tempted to say "at last" because this air-air high level differential missile had been planned, at the inception of the program 12 years ago, to constitute the main armament of the Mirage F-1C in its air defense mission. Now, the F-1 aircraft, in service since 1973, today have accumulated more than 100,000 flying hours with the various units of the Air Force Defense Command (the 30th Fighter Squadron at Reims, the 50th Fighter Squadron at Orange, and the 12th Fighter Squadron at Cambrai). This delay of several years has been principally due to budgetary contingencies.

The objective of the Super 530 programs was the interception, and attack upon, aircraft flying at high speed at very high altitude. That objective is amply achieved by the missile now in service, since it enables the F-1 in interception to destroy aircraft flying at Mach 2.5 and more at altitudes on the order of 70,000 to 75,000 feet.

The quite original characteristics of the Super 530 result from the interception conditions imposed upon the missile by targets capable of avoidance with large load factors and flying at altitudes quite different from that of the interceptor. At the aerodynamic level this has resulted in a missile with cruciform wings of small span but very great depth, a combination of little bulk, allowing release limits greater than those of controversial wings and making the missile employable in a wide range of incident angles. The maneuvering surfaces provide piloting for the missile. Their span is greater than that of the wings and they play an important part in the life from which is derived their effectiveness in pitch and yaw. Roll is countered by a differential steering gear.

At the propulsion level, the altitude differential and interception altitudes planned have resulted in a semi-structural propulsor with total impulse greater than 19,000 decanewtons at 20°C. The charge, of a "butalane" type composite, is shaped so that combustion provides a two-level thrust curve--an acceleration phase and a cruising phase. In practice this is manifested

by acceleration upon launching which takes the missile to a velocity 700 meters per second greater than that of the aircraft in a few seconds (Mach 4 with an aircraft flying at Mach 1.5). The cruising phase lasts for 20 seconds; the level differential can be as great as 10,000 meters.

Last, to minimize flight time and delays in detecting perturbations tending to make it deviate from its trajectory the missile is guided by proportional navigation in accordance with a formula which adapts to significant velocity variations observed during the propelled phase.

Realization of that formula, which assures that the load factor assumed by the missile is subject to the angular velocity of the missile-target line is effected in the following manner: the semi-active self-guidance unit (associated with the on-board Cyrano 4 radar) measures the angular velocity of the missile-target line and elaborates corresponding guidance commands. While the piloting system makes the missile's load factor subject to such command, so providing stability.

Physically, the missile which measures 3.58 meters and weighs 245 kilograms is divided into four sections: self-guidance, armament (charge of 30 kilograms with proximity fuse assuring explosion in the event of passing within at least 15 meters of the target, with safety system), propulsor, and equipment (around the nozzle).

The firing domain of the Super 530 permits high altitude interceptions with short return flight. By way of example, against an enemy flying at 16,600 meters and Mach 1.85 it takes 286 kilometers and 7 minutes 30 seconds to assure destruction: ascend at Mach 1.4 and fire: the interceptor has then traveled 154 kilometers.

It is this gain in the return flight, about 245 [kilometers?] compared with the F-1 armed with the Matra 530 which is very important because it increases the advance warning to the air defense and in case of conflict would permit it to need only the national radar detection network, which at present exchanges information with the NATO network, on the one hand, and with that of the Spaniards, on the other. The entrance into service of the Super 532 actually increases the value of the forward fields at Reims and Cambrai and the forward fields of the Tactical Air Force.

The fact remains that since 1968, when the Super 530 program was officially decided upon, the threat has evolved. It remains at high altitude but has considerably increased at low and very low altitudes. In this domain the present Super 530 has some capabilities which are manifested by the ability to effect firings without altitude differential up to 2,000 to 3,000 feet (after remodeling the Cyrano 4 radars). For further improvement the radar-self guidance couple must be revised. In fact, the radar must be changed, whence the desire of the Air Force to have available on the Mirage 2,000 a Doppler impulse radar (RD1) whose low altitude detection capabilities should be excellent.

To finish off the demonstration those invited to the ceremonial presentation of the Super 530 at Cambrai last 18 December were able to follow, directly, an interception mission illustrating the missile's high altitude, high speed, and high level differential capabilities.

The target was a Mirage IV of the Strategic Air Arm flying at Mach 2 at 50,000 feet. Following its detection by the Air Defense radar network a patrol of two F-1 aircraft took off from Cambrai at 0940 hours. At 0947 the target was over Saint-Malo and approached the southwest-northeast supersonic axis of the coast of Brittany and Normandy. The patrol climbed at heading 300, then 270 and 250 so as to intercept head on the indications from the Coastal Defense Command at Doullens. Contact with the on-board radar was obtained at 25 nautical miles to the south at 20,000 feet higher by the leader. The target commenced evasive action to the right. The leader established radar coupling at 12 nautical miles and immediately the alarm sounded, indicating coupling with the self-guidance and readiness for firing. He fired.

Alongside, the teammate toward whom the Mirage IV had fallen back in attempting evasion also established simultaneous radar coupling with his missile. He also fired.

The Mirage IV was considered to have been destroyed; the mission ended at 0951 hours.

11706

CSO: 3100

PCI RUBBI'S VIEWS ON EUROPEAN ROLE IN DETENTE

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 18 Jan 80 p 3

[Text] Will the Europe of the Nine, in the face of the serious and progressive deterioration of the international balance of power, which is increasingly precarious and by now clearly broken up into a few delicate areas, the latest of which is Central Asia, as a consequence of the Iranian situation and of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, be capable of advancing proposals and initiatives which are able to repair the torn fabric of dialog and detente?

The answer to this question will tell us whether the proclaimed aspiration toward the political construction of Common Market Europe, so as to be able to act autonomously on the continent and throughout the world, is supported by an effective will to move in that direction. The PCI clearly expressed this will in the resolution by its leadership on the 11th of last month and in the motion which its European deputies presented in the debate which is taking place in Strasbourg as we go to press.

In the face of the new conflicts which are being added to all those which are still dangerously unresolved, the quantitative and qualitative acceleration of nuclear weapons, the tensions which feed on the threat of retaliation and the freezing of treaties essential to detente and arms limitation, the most important of which is SALT 2, the increasingly impending danger of a return to the Cold War on our continent, and in the entire world, the nine countries of the Common Market are being called upon to take action on their own initiative, autonomously, toward recreating the conditions for negotiation and bargaining, to save and relaunch international detente on more secure bases.

The objection we have been hearing recently is that, by acting in that way, a crack would be opened between the United States and their Atlantic allies and the Hon Forlani reminded us last Sunday that our first duty is to reinforce our ties with the United States. But what is being discussed, it is appropriate to confirm once again, is not the political and military alliances which our country and other European countries have unilaterally

contracted with the United States and which nobody is asking anyone to renounce: what is at issue is the Common Market as a new element in international relations and its capacity to provide itself with a policy of its own, which would allow it to intervene, positively and constructively, as the effective protagonist in the major unresolved questions throughout the world. A Europe subjugated to the policy of the blocs and to the logic of their mutual opposition would only have a future based on subordination.

The Europe of the Nine has, therefore, a single position and a single initiative to develop on the questions which appear today so dramatically placed on the agenda, and which concern the fate of security of detente, of peace, in various areas of the globe and of the entire world, or its role will be simply to limit itself to supporting the prescribed measures of retaliation requested by the United States: from the postponement of SALT 2, to the embargo on grain shipments, to the proposal to boycott the upcoming Olympics.

Our opinion is that Common Market Europe, its institutions, its most responsible political and social forces have right now, in the difficult times we are going through, a great and irreplaceable role in mending the East-West dialog; in helping to advance the North-South dialog, in collaboration with all the progressive national forces of the Mediterranean area and the Third World; in the political composition of current conflicts; in creating the conditions to make it possible to make a new proposal for negotiations on new missiles in Europe and on conventional weapons, to guarantee the balance at the lowest level between the two blocs and reciprocal and collective security.

It is on these questions, in the exercising of a political choice which would save detente and the path toward dialog and negotiation, that the Europe of the Nine is being called upon to show evidence of an effective capacity and will for political autonomy, indispensable in its interest and in the general interest of world peace. If one really wants to act on behalf of a new and more guaranteed world balance of power, within which Western Europe would have to have the role which belongs to it, this is an important opportunity which must not be lost; and the forces are not lacking to advance resolutely along this road.

8956

CSO: 3104

PARLIAMENTARIANS DO NOT PLAY MAJOR ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 1 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by Andreas Unterberger: "Intruders Into Kreisky's Preserve-- Foreign Policy Spokesmen Caught Between Their Parties and Joint Policy"]

[Text] While the shots fired in Afghanistan in the last few weeks were heard around the world, the Austrian Foreign Policy Council, the most important body in this country for dealing with international questions, fires nothing but paper pellets. At least that is the diagnosis of Norbert Steger, the top Liberal foreign policy man.

It is an apt diagnosis for the--to put it mildly--nonexistent relationship of the Austrian parties toward foreign policy. Or, to put it another way, Austrian domestic policy, still spoiled from better times, is not equipped for a new decade dominated by international affairs. A few good speeches do not make a parliamentary foreign policy.

For a good many years all foreign policy debates in parliament have taken place without the person who really makes Austrian foreign policy. You have an opposition in foreign political agony for weeks on end because it is impossible to reach a decision for or against a vote of no confidence against the foreign minister. You have a situation where of all things an argument between two foreign policy experts leads to the most violent eruption in the People's Party in parliament in a long time. You have a setup which allows the foreign policy spokesmen of all three parties to devote only a fraction of their time to Austrian foreign policy. And, in contrast with many other parliaments, the Foreign Policy Committee does not have the task to discuss the policy being conducted by Austria but is only responsible for dealing with proposed legislation and resolutions.

Fischer Often to the Rescue

The Socialists have a somewhat easier time than the rest. As everywhere else, they can lean on the ministry. In parliament itself, however, the chairman of the party contingent, Heinz Fischer, has had to come to the rescue more and more frequently. As is the case generally below the level

which Bruno Kreisky has made taboo as his own preserve, the axis between Fischer and Reitbauer (general secretary in the Foreign Office) is far more powerful than the formal axis between the foreign minister and the spokesman on foreign affairs. Fritz Marsch, something of a surprise candidate of Bruno Kreisky's to succeed Czernetz last summer, is described by his colleagues in the opposition with pointed politeness: "He tries hard and is gradually familiarizing himself with the job."

Marsch himself, as far as his work is concerned, time and again stresses the joint policy and the shower of information which pours down on the opposition in the form of foreign policy reports, advice, the ambassadors' reports which "despite abuse" continue to be passed to deputies, and recently also regular talks between the foreign minister and the spokesmen. All the joint policy notwithstanding, Marsh cannot suppress a jibe against the People's Party, saying: "Before Steiner, it was not all that easy, because who was then the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] foreign policy spokesman?" What with so much joint policy, it is also clear that, as far as Marsch is concerned, there exist differences with the other parties "only in nuances and in tone."

The central secretary also does not want to hear about internal conflicts in his party. The Waterloo suffered by the Socialists in the personnel representative elections in the Foreign Office (they almost slipped back to third place) is not seen by Marsch by any means as a vote of no confidence against the minister—who last summer did not exactly treat the personnel representatives with kid gloves and for the first time had people talk about the personnel policy of the ministry—but as "proof that we are not conducting any party policy among the officials." He does not want to comment on the question in which he himself found himself in the crossfire of the opposition when he came up with erroneous information in connection with the Cuban affair. He says: "It is not my job to inform parliament."

Ettmayer Scrapes Starting Blocks

If, despite Marsch's not particularly exciting foreign policy image, there is no competition anywhere against him among the Socialist Party in parliament, no matter from what angle one may look at him (and, "because they are sorry for him," the opposition refrains from shouting objections when the Lower Austrian Hesele has the floor), the situation is entirely different in the OeVP. Despite the fact that in the person of Ludwig Steiner the party in parliament especially adorned itself with an expert of its own from the Political Department of the Foreign Office, Wendelin Ettmayer is scraping so hard against the starting blocks that he is threatening to get stuck in them.

A rather emotional appearance by Ettmayer provoked a similarly emotional reaction by the People's Party in parliament, which shows that the

ambitious backbencher is not exactly popular. Steiner, who now says in paternally appeasing tones that "the matter with Wendelin is sure to settle down yet," had clearly protested about the time and uncoordinated statements of an Ettmayer press conference. Heinz Fischer in parliament lost no time, and enjoyed rubbing salt in the Steiner-Ettmayer wound. Despite a verbal aggressiveness which puts off many people, the young Mock protege can take some credit for his work in implementing a big foreign policy poll and for having shown great industry in questions put in parliament.

Both friend and foe acknowledge Steiner's foreign political abilities and the effectiveness of his analyses. On the other hand, his stands in parliament have caused only mild enthusiasm in his own party. In his attitude too, the Tirolean has not quite managed the leap from diplomat with decades of experience to party politician. When Steiner says "we," he still often means his colleagues in the Foreign Office and not those in the People's Party. Although he is the only "full time" foreign policy spokesman, he can only devote part of his time to Austrian foreign policy. Having found a desk in parliament after a long wait and finally, after an even longer wait, having definitely established himself, complete with assistant, on the premises of the European Democratic Union, he now has to take more and more trips abroad on behalf of the Council of Europe or his party. Particularly the European Parliament will keep Steiner busy--provided the party finally sees its way clear to nominate him for constant contacts with the sister group in the European Parliament.

Behind the scenes, however, former Foreign Minister Toncic is also fighting for that job. The word is, however, that the majority of the party does not trust Toncic to be particularly effective. And the probably inevitable result as far as the OeVP is concerned is that the only capable foreign policy man is featured on the programs of many kermesses. And in Vienna Ettmayer or also Ermacora hold foreign politically significant press conferences.

The quickest to learn parliamentary foreign policy or foreign policy parliamentary business was Liberal Norbert Steger. Yet here too the good fortune is very limited: Steger will probably become Liberal Party chairman and therefore abandon the job again to a large extent in the fall. (He mentions the names of Haider and Frischenschlager.)

'They Are All on a First-Name Basis With One Another'

The lawyer, who like Marsch can mainly cite student activities as standard qualification, takes the foreign policy activity to task most severely, saying: "I do not think it is right that in parliament only people from the Foreign Office (Steiner, Mock, Hesele, Ettmayer) engage in it," any more than only officers should make defense policy, since they would all take almost the same stand. "They are all on a first-name basis with one another. They engage in much bigger skirmishes toward the outside than actually reflects disagreement among them."

There is another resemblance between Marsch and Steger: both surprisingly clearly entertain hopes for political changes in the Eastern bloc. Steger's European stands certainly are completely different. There he dreams boldly --and unrealistically--of full Austrian membership in the European Community, hoping that Moscow might be interested in it "if we entertain good relations with it at the same time. Austria could be a gate to the EEC as it were."

And again the two are in agreement in last year's key foreign policy question--the rejection of People's Party wishes for a doctrine. It would rob Austrian policy of flexibility. And, according to Marsch, the OeVP after all also had something in mind in 1955 when it purposely made the neutrality law only two sentences long. Both March and Steger, however, admit that a doctrine would at least accomplish one thing: foreign policy would be discussed more. Apparently they do not think all that much of the need for a small country to have a predictable and dependable policy in a critical time.

8790

CSC: 3103

PEOPLE'S PARTY DISCUSSES INTERNAL REFORMS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 6 Feb 80 p 4

[Article by gr.: "Reform Discussion in OEVF. Results of a Poll."

[Text] Vienna, 4 February. The Austrian People's Party (OEVP) has in the period since its defeat last May devoted but little time to the business of an opposition party. Once again, it was primarily preoccupied with itself. Once again, reform discussion is keeping it in suspense. For more than 20 years such things have been the inevitable features of internal crises following political defeats, and the subsequent head-rollings within the party leadership.

Badly Needed Tightening

In several ways, however, the latest discussion differs from previous ones. No "reforming circles" have brought it into the party; it was initiated purposely by Josef Taus, at the time still officiating party chairman. He had assumed the position that without an internal tightening of its structure the party would have no chance of stopping the process of decline that had been apparent for decades from election results, nor could it hope to gather itself and offer resistance to the socialists, who had in the meantime become overwhelming. Also, the discussion is less superficial, and the "base" has been included more than ever before.

According to a multitiered program discussions were held in 2,200 of the country's 2,300 parishes from September to December 1979, in which party officials discussed with some 120,000 participants changes that should be made in the party organization, and questions that should have priority in the political work. Results of these discussions, as far as they applied to structural reforms, were consolidated into a questionnaire of 10 points, and submitted between 18 and 27 January to the party membership for a basic referendum. Before the OEVP no party and no interest group in the country had dared to do something like that. The poll, according to the results presented last week by the party leadership, was unexpectedly successful as far as participation went. The results themselves are, however, ambiguous; in any case, they cause no real joy to the party's central office.

Skepsis Toward the Central Office

A total of 836,475 ballots had been distributed for the referendum. This, to be sure, does not mean that the party has that many registered members, because there are double memberships, and within the farmers' federation there are also family memberships. But subtracting these, the assumption can be made that the People's Party's membership does not lag behind that of the Socialist Party (SPOE), which has just put its membership at 720,000. More than 412,500 valid ballots were returned. This indicates a participation of more than 56.5 percent. The participation was greatest in Burgenland with more than 79 percent, smallest--as could be expected--in Vienna with 35.7, and, strangely, in Vorarlberg (where the People's Party dominates as completely as do the socialists in Vienna) with 44 percent. Abstentions remained under 5 percent on the average. The strong participation by far superseded the expectations of the party administration. Undoubtedly also the political competitors of the OEVP and public opinion were also surprised. It can be assumed that the party apparatus is more effective than commonly assumed.

Ten questions were presented on the ballot. Against the plans of the former party chairman Taus, who was more oriented toward centralization, more than four-fifths of the OEVP members advocated the maintaining the six organizational sectors (worker and employee, farmer, and business federations, women's movement, young OEVP and the senior federation), while favoring a "simultaneous strengthening of the priority of the entire party." There seems to be but moderate enthusiasm for a strong central function in the party, underscored by an admittedly narrow defeat of the last of the 10 questions by 51 percent: that question involved the party leadership's proposal for a 5 schilling monthly surcharge on membership fees paid to the federations, so that the coffers of the central organization in Vienna could be filled and its dependence on subsidies from province organizations and on donation of third parties could be reduced. The disappointment in the headquarters on Kaerntnerstrasse is great, even though a different result could hardly be expected. On the levels below the federal party the federations and their organizations comprise the party, as this result proves.

For an Increased Participation

To be sure, they did not escape unscathed. With a majority of 80 percent party members demanded that in the future the deputy party leaders and the members of the party leadership on all levels should be elected directly by the respective party conferences. Up to now the presidents of the federation, for example, have automatically been deputies of their respective party chairman, and party leadership was elected only indirectly. Moreover, party functionaries on all levels will have to show provable achievements, such as discussion sessions, visits to homes and factories. An accumulation of offices is to be made more difficult on hand of more stringent requirements in the party statutes. There is apparent dissatisfaction within the OEVP with the Austrian system of party list elections

and the associated inner circle practices of candidate selection. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the question involving the party's support for personal elections was approved by 88 percent, by far the most significant majority of any question. But members demand more participation also in internal party questions--as few as ten percent of the members should be able to cause a membership referendum to be held in the federal party or in one of its province organizations. The wish was also expressed that work within the OEVP should in the future include practical social work and neighborhood aid functions. The next scheduled party federal congress will have to come to grips with the results of the referendum at Salzburg on 29 February.

9240

CS0: 3103

MILITARY DEFENSE PLAN FACES BUDGETARY PROBLEMS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 2 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by C.L.B.]

[Text] Jose Desmarets, minister of national defense [ND], in a lecture delivered from the tribune of the "Mars and Mercury" Club, has just dealt with the entire range of Belgian military problems considered in their economic, financial and technical aspects, with chief emphasis being placed on the role played by international political factors.

In particular, he denied emphatically the conclusions drawn in a recent study from GRIP [Research and Information Group on Peace] on "20 years of Belgian military expenditures" (cf 31 January editions). "They are invalid," the minister said, "all the more so in that the author only uses sources which suit his purpose."

Desmarets' proof began by psychological preparation, and was followed by material elements, facts and figures.

The threats having been, in this manner, evoked, in Asia and Africa as well as in Europe, the following affirmation surfaced: "Freedom has no price tag. What we refuse to pay for from our pockets, we wind up being obliged to pay for in our blood. Heroism is a luxury which a little courage makes it possible to dispense with." Then, in the same perspective: "For a heavier financial burden, a neutral country only has at its disposal its own means of defense. Belgium, on the other hand, has the advantage of the entire range of means of the Alliance it has concluded."

It must be borne in mind that "defense expenditures" in Belgium include, "in addition to the National Defense budget proper, that of the gendarmerie, and a portion of expenditures included in the budgets for pensions, Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Communications, Finance, National Education, Public Works, and Justice." The "share of the ND budget in the aggregate is in regression: 77 percent in 1971, 72 percent in 1978." Further, "the portion of the ND budget has constantly gone down in the state budget: 15 percent in 1957, 12 percent in 1960, 9 percent in 1969, 6.5 percent today."

The ND budget (which also includes compensation for the militia, pensions for the military and gendarmes, etc) has a smaller growth rate than that of the state, in absolute figures: in 1976, 16 percent compared with 24 percent; in 1980, it will be 6 percent compared with 9 percent.

Participation in an alliance obviously implies obligations which must be carried over into financial efforts.

"Within the NATO framework, the Belgian Armed Forces have specific missions to carry out. The latter involve three types of needs: manual labor, troop strength, or more generally personnel; the supplying of fuel, of munitions, of spare parts and the performance of services, that is to say, whatever is necessary for the formation of personnel and the functioning of units; combat material, equipment, weapons, buildings, and installations which must be regularly renovated or adapted."

Under the category of "personnel expenditures," ND disbursements in 1978 amounted to nearly 26 billion in remunerations paid in Belgium to more than 90,000 people, career soldiers, civilian reserves and temporary contractors, the militia."

Expenditures on reequipment and infrastructure often fuel controversy, purchase of military hardware, construction in Belgium or for NATO.

"It is," Desmarets said, "capital expenditures which have the strongest impact on the country's economy: durable goods which make possible, generally speaking, mass production and whose volume often makes possible the enlargement of existing industries or the creation of new industries. Calls are made on modern techniques and on branches of advanced technology with impulsion given to our research and experience acquired for our production."

Finally, the minister announced that NATO plans, presently, to carry out large infrastructure project work on Belgian territory: on behalf of SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters for the Allied Forces in Europe], estimated at 1.2 billion, the market order procedure has already begun; on behalf of NATO, estimated at 5 to 7 billion, the procedure has not yet begun.

And, in order to situate our expenditures in the "major material" program, in 1978, over 9 billion of our "disbursements" were earmarked for aeronautics, over 7 billion for machines, over 3 billion for construction, and more than 2 billion for petroleum products.

9330
CSO: 3100

TURKISH CYPRIOT OFFICIAL SCORES STATEMENT BY MIKHAILIDIS

TA241817 Bayrak Radio [clandestine] in English to Cyprus 1730 GMT 24 Feb 80
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[Text] The president of the Legislative Assembly, Mr Korhan, has replied to a statement by the president of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, Mr Mikhailidis at Avgorou yesterday. In his statement, Mr Mikhailidis had said that the Greek Cypriot side could not accept the renunciation of its sovereign rights as a condition for the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

In his reply Mr Korhan said that Cyprus' sovereignty could be valid when the two ethnic communities in the island joined together in running the state. He stressed that it was the Greek Cypriot leadership which separated the two communities by armed forces and that this fact should be acknowledged by the Greek Cypriot side before joint sovereignty could be established. Mr Korhan said that Mr Mikhailidis was wrong in thinking that Greek Cypriots would be able to safeguard at the conference table the sovereign rights which they had never possessed by themselves. He warned the house president that the Turkish Cypriots could not be expected to respect or trust those who denied the aggression of any crimes committed against the Turkish Cypriots from 1963 to 1974. He added that there could be no agreement between the two sides so long as the Greek Cypriots, who had committed armed aggression against the Turkish Cypriot community for 11 years in order to destroy joint sovereignty and the independence of Cyprus, insisted on claiming that the Cyprus problem was created in 1974. Mr Korhan also said that continued reference by the Greek Cypriot leadership to the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus as an invading force was an indication of the Greek Cypriot intentions to take Cyprus back to the situation existing before 1974. He emphasized once again that Turkish troops had come to Cyprus in order to prevent the union of Cyprus with Greece.

Referring to the speech made by the president of the Turkish Senate, Mr Caglayangil, during a meeting of the Legislative Assembly to mark the 5th anniversary of the federated state, Mr Korhan said that the continued misinterpretation by Mr Caglayangil's remarks indicated the insincerity of Mr Mikhailidis.

ANTI-EEC LEADERS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FRUSTRATED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Jan 80 p 8

[Commentary by Kjell Kjolbye]

[Text] After 6 months in the new European Parliament, members of the People's Movement now feel frustrated. Else Hammerich and Jorgen Bogh both took stock of the situation at the end of the year and they strongly criticized the ludicrous and indifferent European Parliament, which they do not even consider a democratic organ.

Else Hammerich, the movement's figurehead, is so convinced she is right that she has already announced she will not run for reelection in 1984. "A life of luxury, void of obligation, in a sandbox;" those are the words of the high school teacher and the ecclesiastical dean, who in their bids for election to the European Parliament 7 June last year vowed to devote all their energies to fight the EEC cooperation from within. They would be a listening post for "the Danish people" and, at the same time, make sure there would be some gravel in the EEC machinery.

Election Promises

But much has happened since the heated election campaign, in which the People's Movement Against the EEC told the Danish voters what it was or was not going to do in the European Parliament. Basically, they were not going to vote and would not "get involved in parliamentary cooperation with political groups within the European Parliament." It has been difficult to abide by these two dominant election promises. The last 6 months provide numerous examples of that. Already at the opening of the fall session, the movement's four members violated election promise number one when they entered into cooperation with Dutchmen and Italians in "The Group For Technical Cooperation." The fact that they have been taken advantage of by the other members of the group has been publicly ignored by the People's Movement Against the EEC.

When it voted against the EEC budget at the end of the first 6 months, the movement violated another election promise. In the newly elected parliament's most important and far-reaching vote, they broke their promise as they participated in the voting process with total conviction.

No "Luxury"

Lately the People's Movement has made much of the "luxury" it claims surrounds the members of the European Parliament and Else Hammerich has strongly objected to the fact that Parliament, as she says, decided at the beginning of the session to appropriate more money for itself. She said it was difficult to oppose the decision and told "Radioavisen's" listeners that it was impossible to avoid and that she was forced to accept the EEC money. Essentially, the issue last summer was not a matter of more money for the parliamentarians. Rather, Parliament wanted to make sure there would be sufficient secretarial help, similar to what is available to Danish parliamentarians, and not even EEC opponents were against the administrative aid. Money will not be released until a person is actually hired and the arrangement is optional. Individual members can decide for themselves whether they want secretarial help beyond that provided through the different parliamentary groups.

Convenient Savings

Travel compensation in connection with parliamentary meetings is another matter that frequently comes up in the Danish debate. Members of the People's Movement are not concealing the fact they have been overcompensated each time and, according to their reports, have turned the excess money over to the People's Movement Against the EEC. The surplus is not the result of personal thrift, but rather due to the fact that Danish market opponents are being picked up by official parliamentary cars at the Frankfurt airport and transported free of charge directly to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where the new parliament has held all its meetings. Jorgen Bogh reported that this arrangement yields a regular travel expense surplus of 1,200 kroner per person. There has been talk about a common travel arrangement for members of the European Parliament who can be picked up at airports in the area of Strasbourg and Luxembourg. Other Danish members elect to fly directly to the city in which the meetings are held and their expenses equal the travel allowance.

Convinced She Is Right

So far it is only the 43-year old Else Hammerich, the movement's leading candidate, who, 54 months prior to the next election, is convinced she is right and says she is not running again. Dean Jorgen Bogh will be 67 years old by the time of the next parliamentary election and he might decide not to run, but he has not yet taken a position on the matter.

The 43-year old Sven Skovmand and the 32-year old Jens Peter Bonde, who formerly worked together in the Radical Liberal Party, have not yet found the opportunity to decide what they want to do about the 1984 election. Skovmand, formerly a member of the Danish Parliament, ran again last year as a radical from Arhus county and he did announce prior to the election that if he won a seat in the Danish Parliament again he would give up his mandate in the European Parliament. In that case, Victor Andreasen, former spokesman for EXTRA BLADET, would have gotten Skovmand's seat in the European Parliament.

Greatly Divided

Even though the four EEC opponents are united in their opposition to the EEC, they are greatly divided on other issues. There are wide differences between Skovmand's radical position and Bogh's rootless social democratic orientation as well as Else Hammerich's sympathy with the Communist movement and Jens Peter Bonde's affiliation with the Communist Party of Denmark. And, in politics, no one controls the future--even if some of the four choose to join "Out of the EEC" movement again in 4 years. It is the election committee which in the final analysis determines the choice of candidates and then the voters have their say. Jens Peter Bonde secured his mandate in 1979 by getting a larger personal vote than a number of the candidates who had been nominated before him.

No Hearing

The aim of the four is "to get Denmark out of the EEC" and, as long as we are members, there will be a relentless struggle. Else Hammerich said prior to the election last June that she would not propose anything that might improve the cooperation within the EEC--even if this meant a development in the direction she would otherwise prefer. EEC opponents maintain that the struggle against the EEC must be fought in Denmark.

They acknowledge that the European Parliament is not the place to be heard. A majority of the European parliament members have taken note of the Danish market opponents' point of view, but those who have argued on their behalf have not carried enough weight to set the tone for any of the debates in the new parliament.

The People's Movement has only aroused interest and created a stir in Denmark, where they also found it exciting when shortly after the election the four announced they would form a collective front at the parliamentary meetings.

The People's Movement Against the EEC is now going into the eighties having 6 months personal experience with the European Parliament. Initially, their main opposition concerned the organizational structure, with the result that only 10 members would be required to form a group, as had been the case in the past. Thus the market opponents won a point and they are still part of the 10-member technical cooperation group.

Frustration

The four's primary responsibility in the future will be to preserve the cabinet ministers' veto power. In principle, the movement wants the EEC governed by ministers as long as it has to live with the idea of European cooperation. The four EEC opponents see nothing positive in holding major debates in the European Parliament and feel that the authority which parliamentary members have in the area of the budget, for example, should be completely revoked.

It has become the lot of the People's Movement to devote all of its energies to an organization it despises more than anything else. The next few years will tell whether the frustration will outweigh their idealism to the point where others will follow the lead of the movement's first lady and announce their retreat.

HOSTILITY TOWARD GREENLAND GROWS IN DANISH SOCIETY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Jan 80 p 9

[Article by Mads Lidegaard]

[Text] Mads Lidegaard writes about the growing negative attitude toward Greenland--answers, for example, the assertion that the Greenlanders are parasites on Danish society.

Mads Lidegaard, Cand.Theol. 1950, teacher's college teacher and clergyman in Greenland 1953-1965, teacher at Krogstrup University since 1966, has published several books about Greenland.

During the last few years, at schools and meeting places around the country, I have been able to detect a growing negative attitude toward Greenland and the Greenlanders--quite different from the almost unanimous good will that prevailed throughout the 1950's and 1960's among almost all parts of the Danish population. Just before Christmas we witnessed this negative manifestation on the Folketing rostrum in the form of a statement by the Progressive Party, and painful as it was, it was nevertheless an expression of the fact that these tendencies can become dangerous and acquire political relevance.

And the problem is not solved by telling the presumptuous speaker to sit down, as was done in the Folketing, for the ideas live on and can really be eradicated only if those who hold them realize that they are based on misunderstandings and false information. As a contribution to making that comprehension prevail, I shall comment below on some of the most frequently heard negative assertions about Greenland.

The Greenlanders are parasites on Danish society.

For 230 years Greenland was a Danish colony. It was Denmark that decided on the Greenlanders' behalf what should be done in Greenland--we kept the population economically and culturally isolated from the development that was taking place in other parts of the world, e.g. in Denmark itself. The

Greenlanders thus dropped so far behind, through no fault of their own, that only a great effort with extensive help from outside could offer hope of overcoming the handicap that had been created. Both the colonization and its many consequences were forced upon the Greenlanders by us. So we cannot at the same time go and upbraid the Greenlanders because it is now costing something to make up for some of those consequences.

We cannot be responsible for what our forefathers did.

The standard of living that we enjoy today is based on an infrastructure that has been created by centuries of investments by our forefathers--partly by virtue of the wealth that they were able to bring home from the colonies. It is very hypocritical to profit by that every day of our lives and at the same time to deny any responsibility for what this prosperity may have cost the peoples of the colonies. In the general law of inheritance there is called accepting an inheritance *with its incumbrances*. The debts go with it if one accepts the inheritance. That principle should prevail in international relations as well.

Nor should it be forgotten that the large amounts of aid granted to Greenland in recent decades have largely come back to Denmark and to Danes. They have participated in stimulating the Danish economy. Masses of Danish individuals and firms have lived high on the Greenland appropriations, and if you want to talk about parasites, you could with equal justification say that many Danes have lived as parasites on the Greenland grants and maintained an excellent standard of living for themselves from that source. This is not to reproach the Danes in question; they have been playing according to the rules. But if the whole thing has cost so much, that is in no small part due to the fact that the Danes have been well paid for their efforts.

The Greenlanders are ungrateful when they now suddenly want to be on their own.

To begin with, a much clearer distinction should be made than often is between the home rule Greenland has now gotten and the self-rule most other colonies have pushed through. Home rule means precisely that the Greenlanders remain within the kingdom; viewed in this light it is thus an effort to create a lasting arrangement for the future, which can ensure that the two countries will be closely associated permanently.

In the second place, home rule itself is a step away from "parasitism," an attempt to stand on their own feet and take over the responsibility themselves for their problems and their society, including economic problems. Nobody can thrive in the long run in total dependence on others; that is disgraceful and humiliating. Viewed in this light, it is a healthy sign that the Greenlanders wish to take over the responsibility. It would be more disturbing if they could continue to resign themselves to that dependence. To that extent we should be glad the Greenlanders have

enough human dignity and pride left that they dare go out into the world on their own instead of continuing to keep warm under Mother Denmark's sheltering skirts.

And lastly, Greenland today is full of many big problems, including human problems. The economic and technical problems we can perhaps help to solve and have done so. The others can only be solved by the Greenlanders themselves. Just as a person cannot develop another person, a nation cannot develop another nation. That has to be done by a nation itself. Nobody can feel responsible for his own problems until he *gets* that responsibility. If the Greenlanders are to be responsible for their own problems and able to solve them, the first prerequisite is for them to have the responsibility turned over to them. That is precisely what they have wanted through home rule.

But the prerequisite for the Greenlanders to begin to solve all the human problems is that Denmark continue to acknowledge an economic responsibility. Otherwise Greenland will end in an economic chaos that will frustrate any hope of a rational development.

The Greenlanders repay our generosity with Danophobia.

A great deal has been written about Danophobia in Greenland in recent years. But again it is very necessary to make a distinction. That can perhaps best be illustrated by a little experience I had in the Faeroes a few years ago. I was sitting and leafing through a Faeroese songbook and came to a song that was an unconcealed expression of homage and love for Denmark and the Danes. Great was my astonishment when I saw that the song was written by Jóanes Patursson, the man who lived through the fight for Faeroese self-rule and to throw the Danes out of the Faeroes. It was not the Danes he hated, it was Denmark in the rôle of guardian over the Faeroes; it was the colonial power and not Denmark he hated. And it is the same way with the Greenlanders: They hate their own dependence and consequently the Danes as the ones who make them dependent. But that, of course, does not mean that there are not a great many individuals who cannot deal with their problems in the difficult and hectic new society and who, consciously or unconsciously, blame the Danes.

The Greenlanders are unstable, irresponsible, and immoral.

In our own society we are daily witnesses of how thousands of young people grow up as social cases from the outstart--victims of a development that has left them in the lurch and has not been able to involve them in a joint responsibility for society. We are largely powerless in the face of the phenomenon and all the tragedies that it entails, in the form of narcotics, violence, and vandalism.

The development in Greenland has been much faster and more violent than here in Denmark, and for that reason its human victims are very numerous.

But that is not because the Greenlanders are that way. It is because their normal social system is crumbling and fragmented--and neither they nor we have been capable of putting a sound new one in its place.

The Greenlanders are greedy and egoistic when they demand ownership of the country's natural resources.

When so many Danes judge the Greenlanders' demand for ownership of their own mineral riches so harshly, it is because we are drawing conclusions on the basis of our own way of thinking--namely that it must be due to greed, to a mere desire to get the money themselves.

But in contrast to us, the Greenlanders have preserved a more farsighted way of thinking. They are thinking quite literally of the generations to come after them who will live in the country (in contrast, unfortunately, it must be admitted, with most Danes, who feel that if only we get hold of as much as we can in our generation, it is up to later generations to solve the problems we thus create--no matter how insoluble they are).

The Greenlanders' principal motive for demanding ownership is fear--especially fear of two things:

1) Fear that a large-scale mineral exploitation will contaminate the delicate arctic nature, because so few processes take place in the cold climate that even a slight contamination can persist for generations or centuries --in contrast to the mineral episode, which is always hectic and short-lived. To the Greenlanders it will be a real tragedy if their descendants are not in a position to base their existence on what after all is the basic industry of the country--hunting and fishing.

2) And fear that big mining projects will smash the last remnants of a Greenlandic Greenland. The last 25 years have wiped out most of it, but there is still a Greenlandic society. A big oil project or whatever it might be, with thousands or tens of thousands of foreign specialists, can all too easily nip the new Greenlandic industry in the bud and make the Greenlanders a minority in their own country. Norway can just stand a Stavanger without losing its own identity. A small society like that of Greenland cannot.

And with regard to the economy it must also be mentioned that if we take whatever resources they have in their country away from the Greenlanders in advance, we certainly cannot reproach them afterwards for not being able to support themselves.

It is too soon to give the Greenlanders home rule. They cannot handle it.

That is the classical argument that the Europeans have used all over the colonies when liberation approached. And it is rooted in a notion that when they become free they should behave as we do. That, of course, is

not what they want. The reason they want to be on their own is so that they can live according to their own principles.

It is obvious that the new Greenlandic home rule will do many stupid things, especially as seen through Danish eyes. But it is questionable whether they will be capable of doing as many stupid things as we have been responsible for in Greenland during the last 25 years. In any case they are the best judges of what they want their society to be like.

In any case it is too early to judge of that. But it is possible in any case to say this much--without being a prophet--about the coming home rule, which just took over the first big areas of government on 1 January 1980, really with surprisingly little warning:

The new society they will be building has certain preconditions that make it in advance very different from Denmark and at the same time make it a very exciting experiment:

All land in Greenland is owned by the government and cannot be owned privately.

Nearly all the means of production are owned by the government.

It is a close society. The biggest town has 10,000 inhabitants.

There are no few of our problems in Denmark that can be traced to our making opposite arrangements in these fields. Greenland has solved in advance some of the weighty social problems that are bringing us to our knees. That should give them a chance to build on that foundation an exciting society that can very easily go on to become an inspiration to us--if the Greenlanders do not somehow miss their opportunity.

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GREENLAND HOME RULE GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER EDUCATION, RADIO

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 10 Jan 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] "These are sensitive fields," said the chairman of the home rule government when culture and the schools were turned over to home rule. "They are decisive for strengthening and developing the Greenland identity.

"The next time new public fields are turned over, including the economy, I hope it can be done just as tolerantly as this."

So said Jonathan Motzfeldt, chairman of the home rule government, when he took over on behalf of the home rule government the school system, the Greenland Teachers' College, the Socio-Pedagogical School, leisure time education, the Greenland Education Association, the church, the Greenland Radio, and the South Greenland Printing Press.

The transfer took place on 2 January in a small ceremony in the Landsting hall in Nuuk, participated in by representatives of the leaders and members of the new home rule institutions, representatives of the municipality headed by Mayor Peter Thaarup Høegh, and the home rule government.

Big Bite

The [Danish] state was represented in the transfer by Torben Hede Pedersen, rigsombudsmand [national appeals officer], and in his speech he emphasized that the Greenlandic people were now taking over the responsibility for Greenlandic culture and education.

"We are assembled today, the first working day of 1980, to observe the transfer of a number of important branches of government to the Greenland home rule government," he said, and characterized the many branches as "a big bite of the cake."

T. Hede Pedersen emphasized that the home rule government is taking over a well-functioning staff and an administration that is not hidebound.

He concluded the transfer by wishing the home rule government good luck, although, as he said, "it is with regret that I say farewell to these departments."

Sensitive Areas

In his acceptance speech Jonathan Motzfeldt said that the home rule government has now taken over certain areas that from the very beginning of the idea of home rule have been "sensitive areas."

"They are decisive for strengthening and developing the Greenland identity," said the chairman, who was glad and proud to celebrate the official transfer.

"The transfer is a result of joint efforts," he said. "We have negotiated, and there were often very hard negotiations, but that guarantees that we have achieved the best possible result."

The chairman of the home rule government emphasized that he was still counting on the support of the Danish state, and he took Torben Hede Pedersen's speech as a promise.

Lastly, Jonathan Motzfeldt expressed his pleasure that the state personnel are now continuing under home rule. He could not promise that the work would be easier, but he expressed hope for good collaboration and welcomed all employees to the home rule government.

Farewell to the State

Thue Christiansen, home rule commissioner for culture and schools, did not take part in the ceremony because of illness, but his vice director, Aqugssiaq Møller, brought greetings from him and thanked the state for good treatment.

At the same time Aqugssiaq Møller called attention to the fact that his branch has acquired a new name.

"We are now called the Directorate of Culture and Education, and if we have difficulty on the telephone tomorrow remembering the new name, we will soon learn it."

Aqigssiaq Møller closed the transfer ceremony by saying farewell to the state as he shook hands with Hede Pedersen, and good day to the home rule government, giving his hand to Jonathan Motzfeldt.

GOF Not Employed

While all the state employees got new letters of appointment from the home rule government, employees of GOF [Greenland Education Association] were not yet transferred to the home rule government when the official transfer took place.

"We have not yet received our letters of appointment from the home rule government," department head Hans Pavia Rosing told AG [GRØNLANDSPOSTEN]. The reason is that the GOF has been a private organization heretofore, and Aqigssiaq Møller tells AG that this is a mere formality that will be straightened out in the course of a few days.

As for the practical consequences for the school, Aqigssiaq Møller says that apart from the promotions that the school pupils got after the July holidays, the main thing being pushed is establishment of school boards and regional teachers' councils. In the course of January or February there will be school board elections for all schools, including rural ones.

For such institutions as the Greenland Teachers' College and Greenland Radio, the transfer means immediately an administrative change permitting them to keep their own accounts to a greater extent, and Rector Ingmar Egede says that this will mean increased revenues.

Dean Jens Christian Chemnitz tells AG that the consequences for the church cannot be known until election of a new church board has been held in connection with the ordination of the vice bishop in February.

"But everybody can see the church's transfer to home rule, when we fly a flag. The church no longer flies the swallow-tail flag," the dean says.

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SCHOOLS TO PROVIDE MORE GREENLANDIC INSTRUCTION

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 10 Jan 80 p 8

[Text] The new Landsting decree on the primary school comes into effect 1 January 1980. Jakob Janussen, chief clerk of the Secretariat for culture and public instruction, tells briefly here about the new school law.

"In 1967 the Folketing passed a school law that has since been the subject of a lively debate regarding its suitability in Greenland. Attempts have been made for many years to get it adapted to Greenland conditions, but after a great deal of discussion in the home rule commission and finally after a debate in the Landsting, the new school law took shape, which was signed as Landsting Decree No 6 Concerning the Primary School of 16 October 1979.

"It should be mentioned as an important provision that compulsory school attendance is to be for 9 years as against the present 7 years. These 9 years include the present kindergarten classes, the present kindergarten being called first grade and the present first grade becoming the second grade. So that people would quickly get acquainted with this nomenclature, the chief school inspector announced at a recent meeting that the new names will be put into effect immediately, i.e. beginning 1 January 1980. All classes at all schools in Greenland thus move up one grade of the 9 years. Some parents will undoubtedly be surprised when their first-grade school children start school in the second grade in the fall.

"The 9 years of compulsory school attendance is divided into several parts. The first three grades will be called Infant School. The remaining 6 years, from fourth grade to ninth grade inclusive, will be called Primary School. Pupils can go on from there to the 10th and 11th grades in the Continuation School, and the 12th and 13th grades in the Curriculum School. In the curriculum school various subjects can be chosen with a view to a later vocational education.

Municipal Responsibility

"The individual municipality now has responsibility for the school and the instruction. In that connection the municipal government will now set up

a culture and education committee, which will supervise the school and the instruction. The committee will consist solely of members of the municipal council. The municipal culture and education committee will cooperate with a school board consisting of one member of the municipal council chosen by the municipal council itself and a few members selected by parents of children attending school. The school board will generally have three to five members, but the number can be increased if it becomes necessary. Each school will have its school board. The present parents' representatives will be dropped.

Teachers

"There is always a shortage of Greenlandic teachers, and the Landsting and the union of municipalities are agreed that teachers shall be hired centrally by the Secretariat for Culture and Education, which also assigns teachers to the various schools, naturally going along with the teachers' preferences as far as possible as to where they would rather be. In hiring school inspectors and deputy school inspectors the municipalities' responsibility consists in the municipal council's ranking three applicants, putting down as number 1 the one they would most like to have; if they cannot get him, perhaps they will get the one they have put down as number 2, and so on.

"It should be noted as an important change that the school system, which has hitherto been under the administration of the state, is now going to the municipalities. The municipalities' responsibility has now become much greater, since it is they who will elect their municipal council members."

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GREENLAND MINISTER HANSEN DISCUSSES EC, URANIUM MINING ISSUES

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 10 Jan 80 pp 16, 17

[Interview with Jørgen Peder Hansen, minister of Greenland affairs]

[Text] The reappointed Greenland minister talks about the future of the ministry, Greenland's relationship to the EC, the uranium problem, ownership of Greenland, and other matters.

The Ministry of Greenland Affairs will not be abolished, but the state administration will adapt to the new situation that has arisen with the home rule government's taking over important public functions in Greenland. Jørgen Peder Hansen, who said a few years ago that he was the last Greenland minister in history, is still in office after the new government formation, and he has been given the Ministry of Church Affairs to run side by side with the Ministry of Greenland Affairs. And he is mighty pleased about it, he says.

He gets the strength to manage the two ministries by living like a viking. In part. In any case, there is talk about his morning plunges in the Sound and the Belts, summer and winter.

[Question] Do you still go in the water?

[Answer] No, a minister doesn't go in the water,* of course. But I do frequently go for a swim, and I mean to go on doing that even if there are little icebergs floating in the Sound.

Minister's Job

[Question] How are we really to understand that "last Greenland minister" remark?

[Answer] Well, I said that before home rule was a reality, in a discussion of the future relations between Denmark and Greenland. And what I

*In Danish the expression "to go in(to) the water" means both "to take a swim" and "to fall into a trap."

was thinking of was that the status that earlier Greenland ministers had had would be completely changed. And that has happened. I think my job today is first and foremost to cooperate in making home rule a reality, cooperate for that purpose with all the expertise the ministry has and the Greenlanders want to make use of. Beyond that I am responsible, of course, for the fields for which the state still has the responsibility.

Most Important Period of All

[Question] Then you were not thinking that the Ministry for Greenland Affairs would be abolished after the introduction of home rule?

[Answer] No, that is a decision for the head of the government. I have no influence on that. At the moment we are in a very important period of transition, when a great many functions are being transferred to Greenland. In such a period I personally do not think the forces should be weakened--and not at the political level, either. And that is what the Greenlanders were thinking, too, when it was clearly stated during the period of the home rule commission's work that the ministry should be kept, at least for a good many years.

I consider my work in the ministry as a welcome assignment. It is splendid to have a part in making home rule a reality.

[Question] But home rule has been introduced. And surely in one way or another that will have consequences for the Ministry of Greenland Affairs?

[Answer] Home rule has not only been introduced. It is in full swing. Big things are happening very fast now, and that is gratifying. In the long run there is no doubt that this will have consequences for the ministry.

[Question] But there are no present plans to scale down?

[Answer] Not beyond what we counted on at the time when the home rule bill was presented, when we estimated that the combined administrative personnel in Denmark and Greenland would be cut by about 30 percent when all the functions to be transferred in 1980 and 1981 have been transferred. That will adjust the administrative personnel to the state functions that are left, but we will constantly be on guard, of course, to see to it that the administration does not get bigger than necessary.

Lump Sum Grant

[Question] A bill concerning the first "lump sum grant" has been discussed in the Folketing. Now is the lump sum grant arrangement an adequate guarantee that the Greenlanders can maintain the necessary activity in all public fields and avoid economic starvation in some fields?

[Answer] Not everything will be the same in Greenland as it has been. The intention is precisely that things shall be done in a more Greenlandic way.

That is implied in the principle of the lump sum grant. The lump sum grant embraces the previous items in the finance bill concerning Greenland. As the various public fields are turned over to Greenland, e.g. the church, the educational system, etc., in the appropriation law they become part of the lump sum grant. Then they can set their own priorities. They do not have to use the amount in the same way as it was used earlier.

Safety Valve

There is also a safety valve built into the system, which deals with the level of price and wage increases during the 3-year period covered by the appropriations. The adjustment is done on the basis of what is called the gross factor income, a somewhat complicated quantity to explain here. But I will say generally that I consider the arrangement as extraordinarily satisfying to Greenland, especially when we take into consideration the fact that it was agreed upon in a period when we are having the greatest difficulties in Denmark with our economy.

[Question] But does it cover the level of expansion of activity if that should prove necessary in one or more of the fields that are being turned over to the home rule government?

[Answer] No, there is no question of that. Nor of the opposite either. The aim has been to give the Greenland public an economically stable period of transition.

"Enormously Difficult"

[Question] Now if a very important and necessary project turns up that cannot be financed with the lump sum grant, can Greenland expect a grant in addition to the lump sum grant?

[Answer] It has always been true in the ministry that if very urgent tasks crowded in on us we could handle the problem, either by a special appropriation or by a little shifting around in existing appropriations. But I will say frankly that I would consider it enormously difficult in coming years to get extra appropriations in addition to the lump sum grant. Such a situation must surely be dealt with by, for example, adjusting the priorities of certain functions.

Uranium and Veto Right

[Question] On another subject, uranium. Voices have been raised to the effect that Greenland has lost its veto right in the new governmental arrangement for raw materials because such far-reaching decisions have been reached and so many millions invested that the project must go on.

[Answer] I do not know who has said that. What we have done so far has been done in close agreement with Greenlandic views in both Atassut ["Mutual Cooperation"] and Siumut ["Forward"]. Nothing is done in that field without the joint council's coming into the picture.

Greenland and EC

[Question] Have there been any changes since the formation of the new government with regard to the question of Greenland and the EC?

[Answer] I want to nail it down with a 7-inch nail that the policy that I have stood for in this field on behalf of the government for nearly 5 years is quite unchanged. Not one jot or tittle has been altered in the government's position: Greenland must find its own way out of its relationship to the EC, and I will not enter into the internal Greenlandic debate on the subject. If Greenland wants to withdraw from the EC, the Danish government will not put obstacles in its way.

EC Money Will Not Be Made Good

[Question] If that proves to be the case, will you as minister advocate Denmark's covering the amount that Greenland must fail to get from the EC because of withdrawing?

[Answer] It has been the Greenlanders' unanimous desire throughout that all contributions should be *on top of* the Danish appropriations for Greenland. That being the case, Greenland will naturally lose the amount it would have gotten from the EC, in case of a withdrawal from the EC.

[Question] But won't it be hard to settle on a contribution from the EC and and say that precisely that amount was "on top"?

[Answer] No, that is not hard at all. We have a very clear method of budgeting, which shows exactly what amount has been transferred year by year from the EC to Greenland above the normal Greenland appropriation. If Greenland gets out of the EC, Denmark will not receive these amounts any longer, and therefore Greenland can no longer get those amounts, either. There is no reason to ride more than one horse in this matter.

No Comment

[Question] The question of the right of ownership of the Greenland subsoil can be expected to be taken up by the Greenland politicians within the foreseeable future. That was promised by Lars Emil Johansen, for instance, before the first Landsting election. What is your comment on that?

[Answer] I have no comments to make on statements made in internal political debate in Greenland.

But I should like to say that as minister I am trying to bring to life the home rule arrangement that has been agreed upon in every particular. I consider it as a single whole, and it seems to me that it should have a chance to stand its test in the face of the demands of reality before anybody begins to consider changes in the whole complex that home rule represents.

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JORGENSEN STRESSES ENERGY, CRISIS PACKAGE ISSUES IN SPEECH

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jan 80 p 7

[Text] The Government, Parliament and the people must make a concerted effort to solve Denmark's energy problems in the future. But, there are obstacles in our way, according to Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen:

"Firstly: We are not going to have nuclear energy as long as there is so much uncertainty and fear about its safety. Secondly: We have started to conserve energy, but not nearly enough. Thirdly: We have begun to use alternative sources of energy, but it will take a long time before these sources will make a significant contribution. Fourthly: We have gas--and we have oil in the North Sea, but they must be produced faster and in greater quantities as well as at a lower cost."

These points were emphasized as the prime minister delivered his New Year's address on radio and TV this evening.

The prime minister's speech covered the entire political arena and he commented on the recently negotiated crisis package which Parliament approved Friday before Christmas.

"In December, during the parliamentary debate, we heard much talk about an election, but fortunately, Parliament was not so inclined. I feel there is reason to acknowledge the fact that we were, indeed, able to agree and come up with some rather comprehensive legislation in a relatively short time," said the prime minister and added: "We managed to avoid adding more problems to the ones we already had. There could have been a disastrous ending."

Another fact is that significant portions of the approved legislation were absolutely necessary, according to comments that have been made so far. However, there are some things in the package that will not please everybody. That is impossible since we are trying to solve great economic problems and it is especially impossible since there are so many opposing interests among us."

The prime minister said in his speech that 1979 was not a good year for Denmark as a whole, but it was a fairly good year for most groups within the Danish society.

"During the election campaign I personally visited a large number of industries and I became aware that the pessimism, which is being expressed publicly or officially, was not there. Despite the crisis, the people were proud to manage and manage well.

And everybody--workers and officials--fully understood the problems the country is experiencing now. They were prepared to accept burdens, but felt that no one should be allowed to escape his share of the responsibility.

"I believe that attitude will help us overcome the crisis," said the prime minister.

Anker Jorgensen felt that many people are concerned about the future, fearing the new arms race throughout the world.

"I wonder if people are not feeling insecure, perhaps afraid, that many of the economic problems at home are tied to the international crisis. I believe that--but, nevertheless--we must not allow fear to paralyze us. If we are fearful about the future, we are really in trouble. We may have to and should be able to draw strength from the past," said the prime minister, referring to the fact that we managed to survive the crisis of the thirties and the period of occupation.

"We must remember that the future is not determined in advance. The future is something on which we have an influence. It is something we create. We can do much by ourselves--and we will. But we can do it better in cooperation with others. I am firmly convinced that we will survive the economic crisis we are in right now," said the prime minister.

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ELECTRONICS FIRM GETS CONTRACT FOR NATO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Jan 80 pp 1, 10

[Commentary by Birgitte Ersboll]

[Text] The courier who delivers top-secret documents around the world in a sealed brief case may now be relieved of that duty. The Danish electronic data processing company Christian Roving has now received a contract from NATO for an electronic telegram system and the exchanges that go with it, which will replace the present manual dispatch of secret military documents.

The system, which is based on the firm's CR80 data machine, is considered the safest electronic processing system in the world. Only an appointed person can get information through the system and then only as much information as has been agreed upon in advance. These orders can only be changed through a complicated security system.

The system cannot be tapped from the outside. Transmission between exchanges, which will be located in specific member countries, will be carried by optic fibers which cannot be tapped without interrupting the transmission and thus detected. It is also impossible to extract information from the system without the system registering where, how and by whom. The electronic date-processed telegram exchanges should thus be safe from eventual "moles" and Russian spies.

Utmost Degree of Safety

Civil engineer Chr. F. Roving believes that no one has ever demanded more safety in a data processing system than NATO. NATO electronic data-processing experts characterized Christian Roving's equipment as "unusually good" with respect to safety compared to about 50 other companies that also submitted bids.

Another reason the Danish company was awarded the NATO contract, which for the time being amounts to 150 million kroner, was the system's high degree of dependability, estimated at 99.999998 percent, which means the system will be out of order only 15 minutes every 8 years.

This is the largest contract ever awarded a Danish electronic data processing firm. The amount of the order, 150 million kroner, equals the company's total sales in 1979. However, the order is expected to increase considerably in the next few years. Røvsing estimates that its electronic data processing equipment deliveries to NATO will eventually be worth 250 million kroner and perhaps more.

Civil engineer Chr. F. Røvsing once said that "the simplest way to obtain an order would be to submit bids internationally." However, it was not that simple for his company to get the largest contract ever awarded a Danish electronic data processing firm.

The order, which was confirmed via teleprinter exchange from NATO headquarters in Brussels Friday, amounts to 150 million kroner. However, the order is expected to increase considerably in the years to come so that NATO may purchase electronic data processing equipment worth approximately 250 million kroner from Røvsing--and perhaps more.

Christian Røvsing Inc. will build 12 electronic data processing exchanges for NATO. The system consists of more than 150 of the firm's CR80 data machines. Communications between telegram exchanges (there will eventually be one exchange in each of the member countries) will go through a special European data network, which also features the CR80 data machines.

Competing With 30 Companies

This order was the result of several years' intensive planning and it was obtained on the basis of tough international competition. Altogether, more than 50 companies had requested permission to bid on the system. The invitation to bid was issued in the summer of 1978 and the Danish firm submitted its bid 15 January 1979. The paperwork in connection with the bid measured four to five telephone books.

Last year NATO's technical secretariat suggested to the procurement committee, which is made up of government officials from the various member nations, that the contract be given to the Danish firm.

This suggestion was finally accepted after NATO arranged a number of investigations of the company and paid a visit to the firm's new headquarters in Ballerup. Americans, among others, wanted to make sure it was all right to place the order with such a relatively small firm from such a small country.

To get the order, Røvsing Inc. had to compete with American electronic data-processing giants like IBM and Burroughs.

Greatest Challenge in Many Years

During the last phase of NATO's investigation of Christian Røvsing Inc. the company was supported by Danish NATO representatives in Brussels, but other-

wise the company did not receive any kind of political or organizational support--from the government, the Council on Industry or others.

"The contract represents one of the greatest engineering challenges to the Danish electronics industry in many years," Chr. F. Røvsing, the company's managing director, told BERLINGSKE.

"We are talking about a challenging technological project, which means educating many young Danes in a new technology they would otherwise not have access to. A large part of the new technology deals with the construction of transmission and registration systems and no unauthorized person would have access to such information."

The NATO contract also means that the company must expand its present capacity by 30 percent and it expects to grow that much each of the next few years. Røvsing Inc. expects to develop a new data communications project division, which will be one of the largest outside the United States, according to expectations in Ballerup.

To begin with, the company will hire about 100 employees based on the NATO contract. In addition to that contract, the company received a relatively large order for CR80 data machines from the British Department of Health and Welfare, which ordered 52 Danish electronic data processing machines for use in connection with the sick-pay system in England. The order exceeded 20 million kroner and will provide work for another 50 employees. Altogether, the firm will employ between 500 and 600 persons in 1980, compared to about 400 today.

As a result of the NATO contract, Christian Røvsing Inc. naturally hopes to get more large orders, either at home or abroad. The fact that it submitted the winning bid internationally is a good recommendation for the company as far as the world market is concerned.

Equals Annual Sales

The NATO contract, worth 150 million kroner, can also be evaluated another way. The amount roughly corresponds to the annual sales of Christian Røvsing Inc. in 1979. If the company's own expectations of this grand New Year's contract are met, the figure should quickly increase so that the yet relatively small firm could perhaps gain on Denmark's largest electronic data processing firm, IBM Denmark, which today is 10 times larger.

Christian Røvsing Inc. was established 17 years ago by the then 27-year old Chr. F. Røvsing in his father's basement. The company is perhaps best known as a subcontractor in connection with space programs and moon satellites. But, 5 years ago, Christian Røvsing Inc. decided to build its own data machine, despite the enormously tough competition. The brain behind that project was civil engineer Lars Stig Nielsen, director of the company's electronics division. He provided the basic idea for the CR80, which will now provide the basis for the company's future expansion.

BRIEFS

UNEMPLOYMENT DOWN IN 1979--Unemployment was down by 60,000 in 1979 compared to 1978. This figure was released by economists with Danish Statistics, who in their latest economic review wrote that employment rose sharply in 1979 compared with the situation in 1978. Average unemployment in 1979 was approximately 164,000 compared to 190,400 in 1978. That was a reduction of more than 26,000 full-time unemployed. The unemployment level in 1979 is comparable to that of 1977. As an explanation for the reduced unemployment, Danish Statistics cite the supplementary wage arrangement, of which about 35,000 availed themselves in 1979. In addition to that there was a tremendous increase in public jobs. It has been estimated that about two thirds of the total employment increase can be attributed to filling vacancies in the public sector. Industry only employed about 2,500 more people in 1979, while there was a drop in employment in the construction industry. Employment also seemed to drop in the retail industry, according to reports from Danish Statistics. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jan 80 p 12] 8952

CSO: 3106

SCHMIDT VOICES CONCERNS OVER AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 1 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by Kurt Becker: "The Danger Is Escalation--Both World Powers Are Acting in the Afghanistan Crisis Without a Long-Term Concept--Chancellor Calls for Crisis Management"]

[Text] In his government statement concerning the invasion of Afghanistan, Helmut Schmidt noted: "At the beginning of the new decade we are facing a critical international situation; there is no doubt but that a storm is brewing in international affairs."

No matter where the chancellor may look, dark clouds are gathering everywhere on the horizon. Since the Bundestag debate about the twin crisis in the Middle East he has restrained himself in public--not only because he still has to take it easy following his illness, but the more threatening the international conflict appears to him, the more cautious he is in expressing himself and in taking a stand.

In the quiet of confidential circles, however, Schmidt time and again in the past few weeks has analyzed the big international conflict, stressed the German share in the responsibility to maintain peace in Europe and developed the starting points of ideas on how to present a widening of the crisis and defusing it. In the course of this he has also given his opinion on the contribution German policy ought to make to a combined Western strategy--politically, economically and militarily. If one tries to trace this thinking, one arrives at a panorama of concerns of some somberness.

Concern No 1: Both world powers since the invasion of Afghanistan have been acting without a long-term concept for coping with the crisis. Only after some delay did President Carter call the Russian action the most dangerous event since World War II, despite the fact that his intelligence services had recognized the preparations for the invasion at an early stage. (In the meantime Carter has become more modest: now he says that the Afghanistan crisis just might develop into the most dangerous situation

since 1945.) And the Soviet Union did not foresee the profound consequences of its rabid action--neither the wrath and concern in the West nor the indignation in the Third World. Moreover Moscow's attitude toward Iran is not clear.

Concern No 2: As long as there are no bases for a carefully considered crisis timetable, the continuing escalation involves the danger of the statesmen losing control of the crisis. Even broadly conceived actions such as the announcement of the Carter doctrine for the region of the Gulf contain a certain risk if, as the displeasure of several countries on the Gulf indicates, these actions have not received adequate diplomatic preparation.

Concern No 3: The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 reached its climax with great speed. But when Khrushchev realized that he had fallen victim to an immense underestimation of John F. Kennedy's firmness, he drew back immediately--and Washington facilitated his withdrawal by enabling him to save face. In a quite different way, Moscow in turn might be making the wrong estimate of the U.S. President--for instance, considering Carter to be of changeable mind because in the Cuban minicrisis over the Russian combat brigade last fall he first attacked Moscow violently ("unacceptable") and then without ado was content to accept the Russians' weak explanations. Not only are the two world powers today pursuing conflicting interests in the Third World, but they no longer know how to signal their intentions to one another and correctly to estimate each other's reactions. Except for the inadequate talk in Vienna last June, there have been no personal meetings between Carter and Brezhnev. This makes it more difficult for the two statesmen to master the crisis.

Concern No 4: "The Soviet Union has moved to within a few hundred kilometers of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the oil deposits. It has gained additional political leverage against the other countries of the region." The chancellor noted this disquieting state of affairs in his government statement without taking part in the general analysis as to whether this was a primary design on Moscow's part or whether incidentally an advantage connected with the invasion--of inestimable value--had fallen its way. The possession of two large advance air bases halving the distance between the southern Soviet border and the Strait of Hormuz is a reality. The Russians have not taken any action to limit the armament of their forces in Afghanistan in such a way as to make it conform to their assurances that they merely intended to protect the new regime. Certainly the addition of two airborne divisions is not part of this.

How does the federal chancellor view the German interests in light of all these concerns?

Bonn's solidarity with the United States, as the indispensable power to protect Europe, is simply a matter of course. This solidarity includes the U.S. decision of "this far and no farther" and the U.S. desire for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It is just as important, however, to prevent, as far as possible, the tensions between the two world powers from having an effect on Europe. Here the Federal Republic, having benefited most from detente, is in particular jeopardy. This is the most important reason for Schmidt's desire for a considered joint Western crisis management. But Bonn is not pushy in this.

People who have seen the chancellor know that he is definitely opposed to trivial comparisons. He will not allow any kind of suspicion against his close cooperation with President Giscard d'Estaing. The alternative of the sixties--Paris or Washington--was not a real alternative even then. It certainly is not today. The question is not a German-French position opposing President Carter's but an attempt to sort out European interests and possibilities of foreign political operations. Early next week Schmidt and Giscard will meet for their routine conference in Paris. Even now there are signs that Paris is aiming at a European coordination of reactions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

If Helmut Schmidt had his way, there would be a firmly established effective joint Western crisis management by the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic. Such a group of four would be the mirror image of the summit conference held in Guadeloupe a year ago, where for the first time a federal chancellor participated in a summit meeting dealing with international affairs. Carter, on the other hand, regards the seven-power economic summit scheduled to take place in Venice in June as the better round of consultations; it would include Japan, Canada and Italy as well.

Meanwhile the real problem lies elsewhere. The question is: What in fact would have to be the nature of a combined Western strategy aimed at curbing the Soviet advance in the Third World?

According to the chancellor's ideas, such a strategy requires that the White House not worsen the Iranian crisis by applying all the sanctions that have been given consideration. The Russians must not be given a pretense for intervening in Iran, and U.S. military intervention would entail Soviet intervention. What is vital in the U.S. policy concerning Iran is not to make it more difficult for the Islamic countries, and the Third World countries altogether, to show the kind of solidarity with the West that it was possible to achieve in the United Nations in the case of the resolution of Afghanistan. There is no longer any talk of a sea blockade. This and Carter's return to an extremely cautious and patient policy toward Tehran is regarded by some European statesmen as having been brought about by them, as a result of urgent recommendations made to Carter by telephone or through diplomatic channels.

The priority of a policy of containment appears insured for the time being. As for extemporaneous sanctions against the Soviet Union, the U.S. quiver

actually appears to have been largely emptied. A grain embargo, a boycott of the Olympics, a ban on the export of sophisticated technological equipment, the tabling of the ratification of SALT II--such ammunition can be used only once. The Europeans have pledged not to take unscrupulous advantage of the economic measures and not to substitute deliveries of their own.

The emphasis of the policy of containment, in the chancellor's view, should be on the Islamic countries of the Third World, without whose participation the project would be doomed to failure anyway. But Turkey and Yugoslavia should be included as well. The Bonn contribution in the form of material efforts and political proposals concerning a Western strategy of stabilization comprises a number of items:

1. The European Community should conclude agreements for closer cooperation with several Gulf states, from Saudi Arabia to Iraq.
2. Further rapprochement between Cairo and Jerusalem should be supported strongly. This would, however, also have to include a solution of the Palestinian problem, so that one day it may be possible to fill the ditches between Egypt and the other Arab countries. As long as no progress is made here, many Arab countries hesitate to engage in closer political cooperation with the West. Obviously Prime Minister Begin will make this more difficult with his policy concerning settlements on the western bank of the Jordan. Anyway--contrary to the past--the Americans today put great store by European support of their attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.
3. The revived German managing role in providing aid to bankrupt but geostrategically important Turkey within the OECD will entail greater financial sacrifices on the part of Bonn. The 1979 payment--DM 680 million for economic and military aid--is to be exceeded substantially this year.
4. Bonn will take part in the stabilization of Pakistan, where the United States is assuming the main burden with economic aid and armament deliveries, with a moratorium on debts and development aid.
5. Through a treaty which has long been in the process of negotiation and which will now be speeded to conclusion, economic cooperation is to be increased between the European Community and Yugoslavia.

To what extent will the division of labor between Washington and Bonn also extend to the military sphere? So far the federal chancellor has been silent on this. He does not want to touch the restrictions on the export of arms to countries that are not members of the Western alliance. For the time being he leaves unanswered the question as to whether Great Britain's increased naval presence in the Mediterranean and east of Suez entails new tasks for the FRG navy in the North Sea, requiring the building of an additional two frigates. He does realize one thing, however: if

the drawing up of U.S. reserves of intervention causes gaps in central Europe, it will hardly be possible to avoid replenishment by soldiers of the FRG armed forces.

And what kind of policy should Bonn conduct henceforth vis-s-vis the Soviet Union? An important maxim of West German diplomacy can be reduced to the following formula: Indivisibility of detente must not mean that tensions should be caused in places where there aren't any as yet--for instance, in Europe. No West German politician can favor a policy disregarding the existence of the Eastern treaties. This includes not breaking off contacts with Moscow. Despite the fact that some long-planned mutual visits have already fallen victim to the cooling of relations, the chancellor regards contacts at the highest level as important and helpful. His trip to Moscow continues to be on his schedule, and his meeting with Honecker is to take place as soon as possible, before a new reason might be found for imposing an embargo on talks on the Eastern bloc.

There is no way of predicting what will be the future of attempts to reach agreements about arms limitation and disarmament in negotiations with the East. Bonn's interest in an agreement about medium-range weapons continues to be as great as before--in fact, if anything, has increased. The desire for a mutual reduction of forces (MBFR) continues.

Alongside this it is difficult to determine how detente in Europe can be reconciled with continuing tension elsewhere. Between 1972 and 1978, Brezhnev three times acknowledged the Western principle of the indivisibility of peace--in joint declarations with Nixon, Giscard and Schmidt. The Russian doctrine of supporting national liberation movements everywhere in the world contradicted particularly the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev agreement, which stated: "The United States and the USSR consider it to be of the greatest importance to prevent the arising of situations that might lead to a dangerous deterioration of their relations. Both sides acknowledge that efforts directly or indirectly to achieve a unilateral advantage at the expense of the other side do not accord with these aims." Will it be possible in the future to pin down Moscow to acknowledge this business basis of any detente? And can a speeded policy of containment by the West toward the Soviet Union exercise any leverage--or does it accomplish the opposite?

In the area of armament limitation the chancellor has been an imaginative thinker these past 20 years. It is particularly to his credit that the NATO followup armament decision was combined with an offer of negotiation to Moscow. Before this decision, profound doubts had got settled among the Russians as to whether the Western alliance would actually manage to come up with it. Only at a late stage did they react with a violent propaganda campaign. They had been seduced into their original optimism by the fact that the Americans--an agreement at the summit of four in Guadeloupe notwithstanding--did not talk about medium-range weapons

during the SALT talks and, above all, by the fact that Carter during his Vienna talk with Brezhnev did not mention the subject at all.

In the end the Russians reached the quick conclusion that Schmidt had been the real instigator of the Brussels followup armament decision. Had he not already in his 1977 London speech, and 7 months later, described the Soviet superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons as a threat to detente? The Soviet interpretation, anyway, is that he is behind the whole followup armament. The chancellor does not rule out the possibility that this untenable assertion will have its effect. Nevertheless he adheres to the proposition of protecting the network of West-East cooperation created over the past 10 years from irreparable harm and of guarding the disarmament dialog against petering out.

Giscard's judgment confirms the chancellor in this intention. A division-of-labor strategy by the West enables him to put it into diplomatic practice. Yet, according to people who have talked with the chancellor, he is determined--some suspicion to the contrary notwithstanding--not to develop a separate policy of detente from this in which the Europeans would try to uncouple themselves from the overall strategic situation or from U.S. interests. This would contradict the declared solidarity with the United States.

A functioning crisis management in any case would make impossible any policy of going it alone and any short-term reactions on either side of the Atlantic. What Schmidt wants is to channel the various interests and political means into a joint strategy in order to make the Soviets cease and desist. He considers it a priority task to prevent further escalation and to defuse the crisis in the end.

8790

CSO: 3103

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN BOELLING ON VANCE VISIT TO BONN

DW221035 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany
0617 GMT 21 Feb 80 DW

[Interview with FRG Government spokesman Claus Boelling, chief of the Government Press and Information Office, by reporter Heribert Schwan; place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Carter's ultimatum to the Soviet Union has run out. We know since yesterday that a boycott of the Olympic games in Moscow is irreversible for America. It was learned yesterday after the visit of Secretary of State Vance to Bonn that agreement existed between the governments in matters of Afghanistan. On what point does this agreement exist?

[Answer] Agreement is illustrated very much by the fact that we agree with the United States and other allies of the European community that the West should not give improvised answers to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but that the West needs an overall concept with America as the leading power at the center of things, a concept meant to have lasting effects. The Soviet Union must naturally leave Afghanistan--which it invaded in violation of international law--but we will not abandon the principles of detente; on the contrary, we will try to bring about a return by Soviet Union to the principle of detente policy. That is the balance. It has been violated. It has been shifted in a dangerous way. The West is thinking about it now. First important results have been achieved between us and the United States on how the Soviet Union could be prompted to take part in detente policy. We know that it has been damaged, but its bases have not been destroyed.

[Question] You speak of a general complex, of concrete results. Can we have some details?

[Answer] You know yourself that this was a phase in the German-American and general Western process of forming an opinion. The federal chancellor will meet the American President in 2 weeks. But the Federal Foreign Minister Mr Genscher and Secretary of State Vance said yesterday in Bonn that we have a division of labor in the Western alliance. We will give new economic assistance to Turkey--and one must really not underrate this, we

will contribute to a stabilization in the gulf region by activating our relations with the states there. Of course this does not mean military measures, measures which have been carelessly suggested by the opposition. We will take part--we have been doing this for many years already--in development aid for Pakistan. One should not believe that this division of labor indicates that every measure that has been considered sensible by the crisis management will be identical. Every Western state, every member of the alliance will do what promises to be most effective and efficient.

[Question] But would not Bonn's assistance program for Turkey have been due anyway? Even without Afghanistan the West could not have dodged helping Turkey.

[Answer] Well, I believe this is not quite correct. Granted, Turkey was in an extremely difficult economic situation last year and in all past years. Since Turkey is located on the southeastern flank of NATO, all members of NATO have been interested in coming to the aid of Turkey. Developments since Afghanistan, however, have even enhanced this need. In this respect we are taking on the role of not simply raising money but of actually doing something, and we are among those who have done the most to date. The mission of Federal Finance Minister Matthoefer was very positive. We must keep in mind that others in that region must also be considered so that a zone of security can be established there. You know that we have been granting military aid to Greece for many years. We are interested in seeing the conflict overcome which erupts time and again between Greece and Turkey, because this tension between Athens and Ankara constitutes a factor of insecurity. This is why the chancellor was happy to hear that the talks between Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Minister Matthoefer took a very positive course.

[Question] My next cue is Pakistan. Some people are getting sick of the idea that the Federal Government jointly with the United States is granting economic, humanitarian and even military aid to a dictatorial system there. This constantly reminds people of the shah system, the shah regime.

[Answer] Surely I am not saying anything new if I state that we cannot pick the political character of the governments with which we cooperate, that it definitely would be nonsensical to help only those living up to the ideas which we Germans have about democracy or which the Americans and the British have developed over centuries. Our development aid is aimed at improving the infrastructure in these countries and at helping the people obtain a better standard of living. If we were to apply criteria such as those which some tourists would like to prescribe for us, the classical democracies soon would be all by themselves. What matters to us is that these countries pursue a course of independence. We are not linking our development aid with any political conditions, nor do we impose any requirements. I should not fail to mention the fact that we are interested, of course, in seeing democracy, the development toward democracy, get a proper chance in the countries of the Third World.

[Question] News reports yesterday said that the chancellor and the foreign minister had promised their American guest, Vance, a boycott by Bonn. This has been neither confirmed nor denied so far. The chancellor himself said last night in his statement to the foreign correspondents that we will take our time. The Federal Government hopes that Moscow's policy toward Afghanistan might change by 20 May--and there is indeed some time left until then. In short: Can I have a denial from you pertaining to yesterday's reports?

[Answer] This report is wrong in substance. No such promise has been made. Yet the Americans are perfectly aware, of course, that if developments actually take such a turn that these games will not take place, we will be at the side of the United States. Yet the concept of solidarity should not be used in such an inflationary [as heard] way. This solidarity is beyond any doubt anyway. It is nonsensical to stage a race now between the government and the opposition, for domestic reasons or for reasons of election politics--a race which the opposition de facto has already begun--just to answer the question: Who is the better American? We are a bit more American: After all, Washington is not Byzantium. Hence there should not be any competition in Byzantinism. [DW221051] The U.S. secretary of state has accepted our position. Jointly with our allies in the European community we advocate the view that there might yet be a chance here. It will be determined in a political-diplomatic way. It is a foregone conclusion, however, that the Americans, the way they understand alliance partnership, have always been aware that this partnership does not express itself in approval of everything. This has happened throughout their history. It is one of the supreme qualities of the United States that unlike other alliance systems it does not want any yes men in its alliances, but rather partners which contribute their own concepts, their own political ideas, toward a Western concept.

[Question] The Federal Government proposes to stick to detente policy. This is clearly reflected by telephone talks between Chancellor Schmidt and General Secretary Honecker. Yesterday the head of Bonn's permanent representation in East Berlin met with General Secretary Honecker. Will some new inter-German agreements emerge this year after all? Does the chancellor still have a date open for a meeting with Erich Honecker?

[Answer] Surely it should not be a matter of timing if the preconditions for such a meeting exist. It is quite possible that such a meeting will take place after all. Yet all of us know--and the chancellor and General Secretary Honecker have known this for a long time--that the world political preconditions for such a meeting must emerge before it can take place. These are not particularly favorable for such a meeting at the moment. But the telephone conversation goes to show that we hold to the inter-German policy which was initiated by this government as early as under Willy Brandt. It may well be that some things will grow more complicated. But at this time Bonn and East Berlin have found that the objective difficulties of the world political situation should not prevent us from considering, and coming to terms on, what is feasible.

COMMENTATOR CRITICIZES BONN'S LACK OF SUPPORT FOR U.S.

DW251108 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Feb 80 p 1 DW

[Editorial by Fritz Ullrich Fack: "Afghanistan Is Already Lost"]

[Text] Having a political talk with Americans these days is everything but pleasant. America feels abandoned in the Afghanistan crisis by the Europeans and particularly by the Germans. The disappointment is giving vent to its rage.

That is not astonishing. Official Bonn statements on the Afghanistan crisis are becoming more and more diffuse; the formerly at least recognizable will to assist America in this difficult situation is becoming weaker and weaker. "We expect solidarity from the United States with regard to Berlin, we will not refuse to give it with regard to the Olympic problems," said Foreign Minister Genscher 2 weeks ago. In the meantime Willy Brandt taught him in public that the Europeans ought to "independently represent" their interests in this crisis; solidarity is one thing, representation of interests another. And aimed directly at Genscher, he said: "This is not the time for protestations of loyalty that sound fine to the ear."

The American President is being unceremoniously criticized in Bonn; he is being charged with lack of coordination and unpredictability, by the chancellor as well as--strangely enough--also by the candidate for chancellor who in this way creates more and more confusion, and not only for his old friends. With regard to the alleged lack of consultation, Belgian Foreign Minister Simonet, a socialist, made a remarkable correction in the Brussels parliament: "The quality and substance of consultations by the United States," he said, "clearly demonstrate the will to fully inform the European allies and ask them for their advice." He supported that with details about the extent and the character of daily contacts in past weeks. German opposition would have reason to look into these strange discrepancies.

Leading social democrats these days are trying hard to blur the scene. It is being asserted unceremoniously that the whole Olympic spectacle is being set up by the American President, who is riding on a patriotic wave, mainly for election purposes. America, which is not doing much itself, is trying

to use its allies for that purpose. It is being intentionally ignored--and one can always count on the short memory of the public--that in this election year Carter has discontinued extensive grain supplies for the Soviet Union, that he has issued an export ban on highly technological equipment, that he has curtailed Soviet fishery rights in American waters and that he has stopped the opening of consulates in Kiev and New York.

Meanwhile, Washington has also extended the embargo on the exports of fertilizers (already issued) and livestock products (under preparation). To this hour the Federal Government has not even envisaged one single comparable measure. And even in matters of the Olympic games it snubbed U.S. Secretary of State Vance during his recent Bonn visit, despite Genscher's "protestations of loyalty," which has been registered with bitterness on the American side. The chancellor does not want to define his stance on the issue before 24 May.

He did come out with a statement quite rapidly ("in Moscow, too, reflection has begun") when Leonid Brezhnev at week's end launched a propaganda action on the Afghanistan question which was only poorly camouflaged as cooperativeness, namely thusly: If the United States and the neighbor states of the invaded country guarantee that "the interference from outside directed against the government and the people of Afghanistan will completely cease in all its forms" the Kremlin is prepared to start withdrawing their troops. There it is, the key to the solution of the crisis. All the United States needs to do is simply to realize at long last that it is the true causer of all revolt and resistance in Afghanistan.

It is only too obvious how things will proceed in Afghanistan. The Russians seek to chain a small, perhaps anarchic but in any event valiant and freedom-loving people. They have already had to proclaim martial law in Kabul; the Afghan army is melting away and the situation of the aggressors is becoming more difficult. To avoid losing face the Kremlin will have to bring in new troops. The indigenous puppet government continues to exist only on the bayonets of the occupation power. If the latter were to withdraw it would not live for even 3 days. Hence the country must remain occupied for many years to come, at the same time as a threat to the entire region and as a military buffer for possible [allfaelling] operations by Moscow in the neighboring oil countries.

This prognosis at the same time contains the answer to the fantastic hope of the European foreign ministers that Afghanistan might be "neutralized" in some way. This country is lost, it will become part of the Soviet bloc no matter what the rest of the world, which is predominantly powerless and inclined to adaptation anyway, may venture to do. But we do have one consolation left; it stems from Helmut Schmidt; the Russians must not be allowed another Afghanistan. If it were up to this government, detente remains the primary civic duty until then.

YOUNG SOCIALISTS MAINTAIN FOREIGN POLICY LINES

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 24 Jan 80 p 5

[Article: "Young Socialists Maintain Their Color in Election Year"]

[Text] Wednesday, 23 January 1980. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasingly critical situation on the international oil markets have not altered the Young Socialists' position. In a discussion with HANDELSBLATT Juso-chairman Gerhard Schroeder maintained his criticism of the NATO resolution on supplementary armament and expressed stinging criticism of the U.S. boycotting measures against the Soviets announced by U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Furthermore Schroeder advocated energy price controls and nationalization of utility companies.

Despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which "deserves condemnation," Schroeder affirmed his criticism of the NATO resolution to deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. NATO with its existing weapons was sufficiently strong to fulfill its mission, he said. Schroeder declared that he still believed that Western Europe was neither politically nor militarily threatened by the Warsaw Pact states. Opportunities still existed to pursue a policy of detente and agreements.

The deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe was to be rejected because the deployment was no longer a decision made by Europeans, but by Americans exclusively. The Juso-chairman appealed to the Soviets to enter into new disarmament talks.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which should be condemned, and the U.S. reaction to this move posed the danger of slipping into a new Cold War, if "we are not already in the midst of one." Schroeder called the U.S. boycotting measures against the Soviets "economically and politically simply stupid." A food boycott was always immoral, regardless of where the people affected by it lived. He also did not believe that stopping the wheat supplies would cause the desired reaction. It would only harden the fronts on both sides and even further block any opportunities to reach a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan by means of negotiations.

In a similarly sharp manner, Schroeder spoke out against boycotting the Olympic Games. He stated that those who had always criticized the Warsaw Pact states for mixing politics and sports were now about to make the same mistake. Schroeder termed the appeal to boycott the Olympics an "enormous display of theatrics" aimed more at the U.S. election campaign than at the real interests of the United States and Western Europe.

Detente Is Divisible

Playing with an economic boycott was also not a sensible thing to do. It comprised the danger of an expansion of the Afghanistan crisis to Europe. In a conflict with the Soviets, however, West European and U.S. interests differed. Whereas the Americans could afford to strain their relationship with the Soviet Union, West Europeans and the Germans, in particular, could not--especially because of Berlin. Within the framework of NATO it was therefore necessary to assert Western Europe's interest in continuing cooperation with the Soviets. The policy of detente of Europe had to be continued and its principles expanded to other areas as well. The Federal Republic had always assumed that detente was divisible.

Schroeder called it a historic lie to act as if the policy of detente in Central Europe had always depended on what was happening in other parts of the world. In this case the policy of detente had never materialized. The Soviets had pursued a detente policy when Americans were waging a "murderous war" in Vietnam. They had continued to pursue it when the French intervened in Central Africa and the Belgians intervened in the Congo.

According to Schroeder, the nuclear energy resolution of the Berlin SPD Congress can be interpreted as either a vote for a limited expansion of nuclear energy or a factual stop. In order to be fair, however, one had to say that the vote of the congress majority was a vote for a limited expansion of nuclear energy.

Schroeder continues to believe that the resolution arrived at during the congress is wrong. Expanding nuclear energy could not be justified due to the safety risks. He considered it dishonest to minimize the dangers of nuclear energy by pointing out that a dramatic situation had evolved in the field of energy. Schroeder announced that the Young Socialists would continue to fight for a modification of the resolution.

According to Schroeder, conservation of energy should not be left up to the market and the price alone. Despite a sharp rise in gasoline prices and in the price for light heating oil, the conservation targets agreed upon in Tokyo, which lagged far behind the actual necessities of conservation, had not even been met. Schroeder advocated direct intervention in the production by the state in order to improve the efficiency of electrical appliances, for instance. A conceivable catalog would comprise maximum consumption figures for electrical appliances and automobiles. In Schroeder's view, turning the free enterprise market system into an ideology is the main obstacle preventing a sensible policy of energy conservation.

State-Controlled Energy Prices

The Juso-chairman pleaded for a reshuffling of state research funds from nuclear energy to alternate technologies. He advocated nationalization of the utility companies to utilize industry-generated process heat by feeding it into the system. Schroeder accused the utility companies of undermining the declared priority of coal in the construction of new power plants.

He accused the oil companies of blaming the sheiks exclusively for rising oil and gasoline prices, but piling up large profits themselves. The energy prices should be state-controlled. It was also time to include the issue of nationalization of the oil companies in the agenda. The only problem was that nothing could actually be gained by nationalizing the German subsidiaries, particularly as the FRG would then risk being cut off from the oil flow.

According to Schroeder, the Karlsruhe congress, during which the Green Party was founded, had shown that it would be negligent to concede to the Green Party the responsibility for the entire social system. The Young Socialists should not make the mistake of wanting to become the Green Party of the SPD. They should remain Red. A policy which solely concentrated on resistance against nuclear energy would disorient the Young Socialists. It was their responsibility to take care of the young employees' interests ranging from securing peace and restraining "state-initiated repression" to improving vocational training. In this year's Bundestag election the Young Socialists would support the SPD by means of an independent campaign contribution.

9544

CSO: 3103

SPD, FDP DISAGREE ON CHANGE IN CODETERMINATION

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 11 Feb 80 pp 50-53

[Unattributed article: "Private Clubs"]

[Text] The FDP is seeking increased influence for managers in business enterprises; the Social Democrats and trade union leaders are disgruntled.

FDP General Secretary Guenter Verheugen jokingly remarks that he is very hopeful that the Bonn coalition partners will also arrive at a consensus on disputed issues: "Why shouldn't the Social Democrats learn something in the bargain?"

For some time Verheugen has had his eye on a subject with which the Social Democrats can prove their capacity to learn. In good time prior to the Bundestag election in the fall, the liberals plan to force upon their coalition partner a new confrontation in the matter of codetermination.

The FDP's view is that managers -- many of them liberal voters -- ought to have more of a voice in the corporations in the future. Their "spokesmen's committees" in the enterprises ought to be upgraded by law to a kind of lateral factory council.

The liberals would like to make this demand by their social policy spokesman, Hansheinrich Schmidt, an integral part of their election platform. The federal steering committee is scheduled to pass a corresponding resolution early in May.

"They ought to consider that very carefully," warns Helmut Rohde, chairman of the SPD's Working Group for Employee Problems. "Impertinence!" railed Metalworkers Union chief Eugen Loderer, calling it a swipe at the function of the factory council.

The liberals are apparently coolly noting the annoyance of the SPD members: Verheugen is predicting that the dispute will be a "central issue" in the next round of coalition negotiations: "We shall see whether our superiors

will take it so seriously that there might possibly be no coalition because of it."

Such jaunty remarks are of course part of every game of coalition poker, but Social Democrats like North Rhine-Westphalian Labor and Social Minister Friedhelm Farthmann fear that fundamental differences over the role of managers could very quickly become the "explosive charge for the coalition."

As far as the liberals are concerned, codetermination is chiefly an individual right, a part of freedom of the individual, not primarily an organizational privilege designed to strengthen the unions. Complains Social Democrat Farthmann, "they refuse to comprehend that individual freedom in industry ends up as the freedom to sleep under bridges."

According to existing law, the factory council does not speak for the small group of managers. From the standpoint of their function, they belong to management, the side of the industrialists -- in other words, they are the opposite numbers of the employee representatives. Consequently, they may neither be candidates for the factory council nor participate in the elections.

And the FDP does not want to change this. It would, however, like first of all to expand the executive circle with the help of a new definition; and, secondly, it would like to provide these managers with a new law that would secure for them the chance to choose their own representatives.

There are already about 250 of these spokesmen's committees in large corporations in the FRG, but heretofore they have lacked any legal basis.

The scornful opinion of Michael Kittner, legal counsel to the Metalworkers Union, is that "they are private clubs which can make nonbinding agreements on the same old closures of individual contracts."

If the FDP has its way, the clubs will be raised to the level of "factory organs." They would be given the right to conclude binding factory agreements and to protest factory council votes which also concern them.

The situation is obvious to trade union officials: The liberals are undermining the unified representation of labor interests.

The concerns of union officials and Social Democrats are not unfounded: The liberals have already shown themselves to be quite successful in their past efforts on behalf of managers.

Although the SPD succeeded once again in blocking the FDP's hopes for greater rights for managers and other high-level employees in amending the factory constitutional system in 1972, the 1976 Codetermination Law saw the breakthrough by the Free Democrats.

The SPD and the unions were forced to accept the positioning on the board of directors of a person elected by the managers. This person sits on labor's side of the table, although from the union point of view he belongs on management's side. The balance was thus shifted in favor of labor.

The trade unions suspect that the Free Democrats might succeed in expanding on this success during the next legislative session, for the ideas of the liberals are also to be found in the repertoire of the opposition in Bonn.

Only the small band of Social Committee members around Norbert Blum is working in the CDU/CSU caucus against upgrading the position of the managers. The remaining Christian Democrats -- a total of 165 deputies -- submitted in mid-December a draft law that corresponds to the letter to the conceptions of the Free Democrats.

And the CDU/CSU is bent on taking advantage of its opportunity: Philipp Jenninger, the Union's parliamentary business manager, intends to see to it that the FDP is caught in the dilemma between steadfastness on principle and loyalty to coalition well before the summer parliamentary recess.

The liberals will then have to decide during the first reading of the CDU/CSU draft whether they want to come out in parliament against opposition proposals whose content is an integral part of their election platform. The situation is embarrassing but apparently not serious.

Says party manager Verheugen, unperturbed, "the caucus itself will have to see how it gets out of this mess."

7458

CSO: 3103

MICHEL PINTON SPECULATES ON UDF'S 1981 ELECTION PROSPECTS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23 Jan 80 p 6

[Interview with UDF Delegate-at-large Michel Pinton by Daniel Sequin:
"Michel Pinton: Socialist Party Is Number One Target of UDF"—date and
place not given]

[Text] For the UDF [French Democratic Union], 1980 will be the year of truth. Two years after its creation, the Giscardist/Centrist Federation will have to present convincing evidence that it is aspiring to be more than a mere electoral cartel, more than just a machine for scraping up votes from the center-left.

UDF Delegate-at-large Michel Pinton brings the situation into focus in an interview with FIGARO.

"We are not keeping our eyes riveted on the blue line of the presidential campaign," he reassures us.

Many will not be easily persuaded of that fact because, in reaffirming the democratic-socialist calling of the UDF, Michel Pinton is obviously aspiring to hunt within the electoral preserves of the Socialist Party (PS).

If need be, Michel Rocard is willing to pay a heavy price for this competition within the rank and file of the Marais electorate.

"Rocard makes me think of those pretty stage settings that delight the eye at first glance; but then when you open a door in them, there is nothing behind it."

This is an interview which confirms the fact that the UDF now seems more concerned about crossing swords with the PS than about doing battle with the RPR. [Rally for the Republic]

[Question] On 1 February 1980, the UDF will celebrate its second anniversary. Yet, outside of the electoral battles, the UDF has hardly made its voice heard, and it is tempting to conclude from this that your federation is content with being an electoral cartel.

[Answer] Those who think that are behind the times. The UDF has long since abandoned the electoral cartel concept. In the as yet brief lifetime of our movement, one must make a distinction between two quite different periods. During the first 18 months, our time and efforts were monopolized by the electoral contests: legislative, cantonal and European. The UDF has proved itself in that domain. If we had failed, the sequel would not have been possible.

[Question] More than anything else that "sequel" has meant complete silence.

[Answer] Let's be serious! The UDF took part in all the major debates. What is more, since the beginning of the new term in September, the parties that make up the UDF have held their national sessions or congresses, and on these occasions they have expressed themselves with perfect freedom. We shall be putting the finishing touches on their deliberations at our own congress in March. That is true pluralism: unity must not stifle diversity. We are very proud of this, for in it lies our originality when compared with the other three large parties.

[Question] You have held a congress; what it did mostly was leave a bitter taste in the mouths of your friends who favor a general property tax.

[Answer] The basic theme and thrust of our 1979 congress dealt with the European elections. In presenting our Deniau Report, we were the only ones to define a precise and coherent platform. As for the general property tax, the decision to levy that depends on the Government and not on a party.

[Question] Will your congress be centered on the presidential elections this year?

[Answer] Not at all. The ideas that we shall broach are not meant for the presidential elections. For us, such elections are the concern of the candidates and the French people. It is not the business of the party to get involved. Our proposals will allow us to prepare for the other electoral deadlines. Those which clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the parties. On 22 and 23 March in Orleans, we shall not have our eyes riveted on the blue line of the presidential campaign.

[Question] Would you be more interested in the opposition's red line?

[Answer] Of course! For 18 months we have been too constrained to shield ourselves from certain incidents which have poisoned relations within the majority. The UDF wants these tensions--for the most part artificially created, in our opinion--to subside. That will give us a better chance to reanimate a debate which, for us, possesses a different kind of reality and seriousness: namely, our debate with the PS. The Socialists' "proposal" embodies a vision of our society almost the exact opposite of ours.

[Question] One bank's slogan declares: "Your money interests us." It would seem that the UDF wants to make that: "Your voters interest us."

[Answer] Your questions tend to make some very bold assumptions. Before we can talk about voters, we have to talk about the PS. In 10 years it has neither forgotten nor learned a thing. It is pursuing the impossible dream of governing in tandem with the Communists. The more this dream fades away, the more the PS becomes trapped in Marxist ideology. It even goes so far as to fall into a kind of schizophrenia. Look, for example, at the unreal and frightening picture it paints of the "Giscardian Society" in its proposal. The PS is very far from socialism, real socialism that is, the German Social Democrats' brand of socialism, for example.

[Question] Could the UDF be equated with the Social Democrats?

[Answer] The UDF is not entirely social-democratic, but social democracy is already well represented in the UDF.

[Question] How do you define it?

[Answer] Social democracy implies among other things a permanent and pragmatic balance between a desire for social justice and the demands of economic efficiency. Now this balance is what the UDF is aiming at. We are at the center of the political chessboard. It is up to us to be the balance wheel between security and the new dispensation, between order and justice.

[Question] With a communist party that carries 20 percent of the votes, is not social democracy merely an enticement?

[Answer] Political labels matter little. As a principle of government, social democracy has permeated one segment of the UDF, and it corresponds to the aspirations of a large portion of the French people.

[Question] You attack the PS more and more, and yet you claim to be picking up votes from it. Isn't there a contradiction in that kind of behavior?

[Answer] I leave with you the responsibility for choosing the expression "picking up." For us it is a question neither of picking up nor luring away votes, but of convincing public opinion of the true nature of the socialist proposal. This text is an ersatz substitute for the joint program. It passes lightly over all the upsets we have experienced during the last 10 years. It does not draw any conclusions from them. It ignores the realities both in France and in the modern world in general. It is a last-ditch proposal, and people must be made aware of that fact. From now on our duty is to open up to all Frenchmen who are looking for something new, new perspectives for hope and imagination. That is the chief goal of our congress in Orleans. We shall take up in a new free and in-depth manner the most burning problems of our society: education, the family, the right of workers to a voice in the operation of their businesses and life in modern society.

[Question] And what place will Michel Rocard have in all of this?

[Answer] That question makes me think of those pretty stage settings which delight the eye at first glance; but when you open the door there is nothing behind them.

8117

CSO: 3100

ELLEINSTEIN ON POST-AFGHANISTAN DETENTE, SOVIET POLICY

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 26 Jan 80 pp 52-53

[Interview with Jean Elleinstein, communist historian, by Thierry Maulnier: "How Can One Be a Communist?" date and place not given]

[Text] If the young communists wholeheartedly approve Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, that is not true of party intellectuals such as Jean Elleinstein. Thierry Maulnier wanted to resume for LE FIGARO MAGAZINE his unexpected dialogue with the communist historian.

[Question] Jean Elleinstein, it is obvious that the turning taken by international policy since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the position you have stated invites us to question you. Many observers have the impression that we are seeing the end of an era: That of "detente"; and that we are at the beginning of a new period of tension if not of a cold war. I am inclined to think there is no radical difference between a cold war and detente; from the standpoint of Soviet policy, it is a matter of different methods corresponding to different situations. One could paraphrase Clausewitz by saying that detente is a cold war pursued by different means.

[Answer] Yes, I would more or less agree with you. But this is both a Soviet act and one of the Western powers, in particular of the United States.

[Question] Don't you think Carter was very much surprised and disconcerted by what has happened in Afghanistan?

[Answer] You are quite aware that in policy what seems to be and what really is are not necessarily the same thing. There are two superpowers. These two superpowers are quarreling over which is to have the larger share of the world. To a considerable extent they divided it between them at the end of the second world war and Yalta made the division legal; maintaining that apportionment has been ensured for about 35 years. And I think that if one looks closely at Europe there have been no fundamental changes.

[Question] In Europe?

[Answer] Yes, in Europe. The most significant changes have taken place in the Third World countries. To a considerable extent they have been the result of decolonialization. It is true that for 20 years now there has been an all-out struggle for control of the Third World countries; a struggle in which the superpowers are playing an extremely active role. Between American intervention in Vietnam and the direct or indirect intervention of the United States in Central America and South America and including the Soviet intervention in Prague in 1968 and now in Kabul, there is no substantial difference. A tank is a tank, military intervention is military intervention, financial and political pressure is financial and political pressure. There is one point that to me seems fundamental: The right of peoples to self-determination. This principle is hardly respected at all by the great powers whichever they may be. I would say that even France has some difficulty in taking it into account.

[Question] You are referring to Africa?

[Answer] Yes, and even more specifically to what happened in Bangui. I am not saying that to dismiss both parties nonsuited so as to defend the Soviet Union; I am condemning Soviet intervention in Afghanistan formally and totally and, like my Italian and Spanish communist comrades, I am demanding the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from that country. I feel very unperturbed in raising these problems. But one must not look at things from a single standpoint. This world remains dominated by the two superpowers which furthermore are not equal in strength in that if the Soviet Union is probably as powerful as the United States militarily, it is far from being so economically.

[Question] If the rivalry between the superpowers is the determining factor in world policy, it seems obvious to me--and I am not the only one to think so--that in this confrontation there is no equality. The USSR is on the offensive, the United States on the defensive.

[Answer] For 25 years the world's evolution has thrown the Third World countries off balance, not Europe. This destabilization has to a certain extent benefited the Soviet Union. So, from this standpoint the Soviet Union appears to be more on the offensive. And all the more so in that the United States suffered crushing defeats in Vietnam and in Central America. Western imperialism, it is a fact, has fallen back in Asia, Africa, Latin America.

[Question] The Americans were the ones who were in part the artisans of those defeats: In the case of Nicaragua, for example, the United States pressed for the ouster of the pro-American dictator and, while believing they were supporting the liberals, they encouraged the establishment of a pro-Soviet government.

[Answer] That is, they realized a little too late for them that their policy of supporting military regimes was in the end leading to setting peoples against those regimes and hence against the United States itself which was the one backing them. So it was that they abandoned the shah and Somoza at the last moment. But one of the problems which in fact arose in Iran and which has arisen in Central America in an ongoing way is that the support given by the United States for a long time and still today in a certain number of Central American countries, provokes a chain reaction. With the result that these countries lean on the Soviet Union because after all it is far away so it can help defeat an imperialism close to hand without really upsetting anything. Between two imperialisms, the small powers always choose the one further removed.

Massive Soviet military intervention occurs only on its borders or within its geopolitical space. That was the case in Czechoslovakia, that could be the case in Yugoslavia, finally, it is the case in Afghanistan. I would qualify the Soviet operation in Afghanistan as a geopolitical operation of a regional nature. It is nonetheless condemnable and there is no question of excusing or underestimating the magnitude of that intervention which is a consequence of Iran's destabilization, of the Soviet Union's problems with China, of Pakistan's role in that part of the world. The Soviets thought it necessary to "wipe out" the Moslem rebellion and intervene directly to ensure their position in that part of the world.

[Question] You cite the situation in Iran as one of the factors that may have made them decide on armed intervention. But their ambitions with respect to Afghanistan began long before the Iranian revolution.

[Answer] That is quite right. I am at present giving a course on Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to 1950 to my students working for teaching degrees and I recently covered the relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. I have the same feeling you do: It is a continuation of the Tsarist policy.

[Question] That means a colonialist policy?

[Answer] I would call that policy consisting in having access to the warm seas, in particular to the Indian Ocean, hegemonic. That policy has to be taken for what it is: an old pre-Soviet policy.

[Question] Pre-Soviet, but one that has become more effective in Soviet hands to the extent that that ideological justification of supporting peoples struggling for their liberation is part of it.

[Answer] This intervention at the international level is carried out in the name of the class struggle. If you criticize such intervention you are against the peoples, you are for colonialism, you are for imperialism, etc. It is a rather facile simplification of the events taking place in a certain number of countries. They were exactly the same arguments the Soviets used to justify their military intervention in Prague in 1968. They explained

that there was a threat from West German imperialism, that they were therefore obliged to intervene.

I would, for example, make a distinction between these acts of intervention and that of Cuba in Angola. In this specific case you had a state which was in the process of coming into being and you had actual intervention by South Africa in the internal affairs of Angola. The Cubans intervened at the request of the national liberation movement precisely as a counterweight to the South African attack.

[Question] The counterweight, however, was massive.

[Answer] I am not telling you it wasn't but above all it is enduring and I think that is the problem just as in the case of Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia.

[Question] It also so happens that the USSR has been present in Afghanistan since the 1978 military coup d'etat.

[Answer] It felt a need to intervene officially and massively.

[Question] Now, in so doing, it was taking risks. That is significant. It was partly responsible for causing the American national outburst marking the close of the post-Vietnam moral crisis.

[Answer] One must also take into account American internal policy problems. Today, Carter is just about certain to be re-elected.

[Question] And bearing that re-election in mind, it is obviously important for Carter to exploit the situation. The Russians were aware of that outlook and knew Carter would be forced to be firm so as not to endanger his chances of re-election. Among the consequences there is also the United States-Chinese rapprochement and the fact that many of the Third World countries now feel the Soviet threat. So there is an "opening" for the Americans who up to now were on the whole more detested in the Third World than was the USSR.

[Answer] One hundred and four countries have condemned Soviet intervention at the UN.

[Question] Of course. So there is a whole series of awkward consequences for the USSR resulting from the action taken, not against a country threatening the USSR, but against a country where the USSR was already solidly established. Did international reactions because of their broad scope go beyond those anticipated or, on the contrary, were they accepted in advance as the inevitable outcome of an action which in Moscow's eyes seemed to justify those great risks?

[Answer] I think that for the Soviets those reactions were stronger than they had anticipated.

[Question] Yet they thought it would go without a hitch.

[Answer] I think they accepted the risk. I am convinced there are doves and hawks in the Soviet Union. It is a secret to no one that the policy of detente which Brezhnev developed over a period of some years came up against resistance on the part of a certain number of pressure groups and it was the hawks that won.

At the present time the Soviet Union is experiencing very serious difficulties: Production of consumer goods is poor both as to quantity and quality, agriculture is not showing good results; there are lines in Moscow shops and even more of them in village and city shops located far from Moscow. The USSR needs major reforms in depth. The reforms undertaken since 1964, after Khrushchev's downfall, failed. The Soviets do not dare undertake those reforms; they haven't the courage, they haven't the will to do so. For that would require great political courage on their part, that would imply the development of democracy and a struggle against the bureaucracy. Now, a snake finds it hard to bite its own tail.

[Question] In contrast, if one acknowledges the regional nature of the Afghan operation, Soviet control over the new government of Nicaragua is not justified by considerations of regional geopolitics.

[Answer] I have already told you, it is a different kind of problem. First, there is no USSR control, but Nicaragua is relying on the USSR to counter-balance the power of its neighbor. Everyone has condemned Soviet intervention. Although a number of Western states in this respect have the attitude of old ladies of little virtue boasting of their chastity. The scope of the reactions as put into practice seems alarming to me and from this standpoint I would, if you will, go along with the concern which has been that of my friend Berlinguer on the European Parliament's tribune and also that of the European socialists: It is not a question of destroying detente on the basis of what has taken place in Afghanistan. One must take formal note of it. I think the reaction should have been strong condemnation of Soviet intervention, I do not for all that believe it was necessary to take retaliatory measures of the sort the Western governments have taken.

In my view we are in a phase of cold detente. It follows upon the lukewarm detente. I am not certain we are going to return to a cold war period and I do not think it would be desirable. If it is resumed, the Soviets will be partly responsible for it. It is they who gave the United States and the major Western powers reasons for and ways of isolating the USSR. Carter's policy for its part encourages the Soviet hawks and gives the cold war a fresh start.

Soviet policy is a dangerous one at the Soviet internal level because it does not resolve any of the major problems with which the Soviet Union is confronted today. At the international level, the USSR has isolated itself morally, politically, diplomatically: By endangering the Olympic Games that are to be held in Moscow and of which the Soviet Union was rightly proud, and by compromising ratification of the Salt II accords and the Salt III negotiations.

[Question] There is another comment to make: Afghanistan on the one hand because it was already virtually under the control of the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, because it does not itself contain known significant mineral resources, through its actual annexation by the USSR, does not represent a major change in the balance of forces in the world. Now, isn't the extent of Western reaction, which you consider exaggerated, really explicable by the impression Westerners have that things will not stop there, that it is only a stage, that the Soviet push is going to persist, if allowed to do so, toward Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf?

[Answer] We will find that out in the weeks to come.

[Question] That is when one could really talk about the end of detente.

[Answer] That is why I say we are still in a period of detente, but that this detente is much colder.

[Question] In my view, the greatest danger resides in an erroneous assessment or an underestimation by the USSR leaders of the potential reactions of the United States.

[Answer] I agree. That is what I especially criticize, the irresponsibility of the Soviet leaders who in contempt of detente decided on that massive and spectacular intervention in Afghanistan. They could have easily continued to send arms, military advisers, as they were previously doing.

[Question] A final question that I wanted to ask you: The French Communist Party which, at the time of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, took a stand that for all that was clearly disapproving, this time decided to justify Soviet intervention in Afghanistan completely. How do you explain this change of line?

[Answer] The French Communist Party has placed itself in a perspective of world destabilization. It is one radically contradictory to the texts of its congresses and in particular of the 22nd and 23rd Congresses which clearly condemned Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. If the French Communist Party were logical, it would have condemned Soviet intervention in Kabul for the same reasons. There is no basic difference between what happened in Prague and what is happening in Kabul. In the case of Czechoslovakia the Soviets evoked the danger of West German imperialism, there it is that of Pakistan. The arguments are exactly the same. And it is in large measure

for reasons of French internal policy that the French Communist Party was led to act in that way: To appear as the sole opposition party defending the peoples of countries on the way to liberation by showing the actual collusion there allegedly was between Mitterrand, Giscard d'Estaing and all of the other French political forces. Which places the PCF in a position of swimming against the tide of Eurocommunism. It completely breaks up the de facto solidarity existing between the French, Italian and Spanish Communist Parties. The latter have taken a firm stand. A large number of communists have the same concerns and clearly feel that by endorsing the military intervention in Afghanistan Georges Marchais has tolled the death knell of Eurocommunism. The PCF preferred the intellectual comfort of total opposition. Having taken refuge on Mount Avenin, the PCF is awaiting the electoral defeat of the noncommunist Left in 1981 and the splitting up of the Socialist Party.

[Question] It does not appear that that will necessarily win votes for it. Was it Marchais who took the initiative of going to Moscow?

[Answer] The trip had already been arranged for some months.

[Question] Before the Afghan affair?

[Answer] Yes, before the Afghan affair. What I regret in particular is that he did not put it off when that affair took place. I think it was not the right time to go. It is natural for talks to be held between Soviet and French communists. But they must be held in full awareness of the facts. In Moscow, Georges Marchais capitulate to the Soviets from the substantive standpoint and abandoned Eurocommunism.

8094

CSO: 3100

CARTER SEEN 'ENDANGERING SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS'

LD201621 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 14 Feb 80 p 8 LD

[Article by Max Leon: "Mr Carter Endangers a Series of Negotiations"]

[Text] Should the disarmament file be thrown aside? At all events this is what the White House suggests with its ever-increasing alarmist statements and measures typical of the periods of confrontation.

After President Carter's promise to his senators to repel "by all means necessary, including armed force" what he saw as an attack on "U.S. vital interests" in the Persian Gulf, the chief executive's special envoy Clark Clifford stated in New Delhi for the benefit of the Soviet leaders: "They must know that, if they plan moving toward the Persian Gulf, it will mean war."

How can we set about reducing nuclear arsenals when blackmail is being used so brutally in the conflict between the world's two greatest powers?

The end of the race for military supremacy was more than ever on the agenda. This week in Geneva and Vienna difficult but vital negotiations for peace resumed, on the one hand with 40 UN members--including the 5 nuclear powers of the Security Council--and on the other hand with the 19 countries of east and west directly concerned with military disengagement in central Europe.

Already last summer a considerable step was reached on the path to disarmament with the signing by Presidents Brezhnev and Carter of the SALT II Treaty, which established parity between the two great powers and between the two military blocs and fixed quantitative and qualitative limitations (and even reductions) in USSR and U.S. strategic forces.

The Moment of Hope

This fall, in Madrid, hopes for detente and disarmament could materialize with several concrete initiatives already planned by the participants in the second meeting to follow the 1975 Helsinki conference.

Geneva, Vienna, Madrid.... difficult negotiations which began some 12 years ago and marked the coming of political detente.

Now, despite obstacles, they could initiate a period of east-west military detente.

What is holding them back or threatening them?

The questions still unsettled at the Geneva UN Committee and the Vienna conference are, it is true, extremely delicate, because they relate to the prohibition of certain arms, the reduction of military dispositions and a lowering in the levels of confrontation without thereby endangering any country's security or having either bloc gain an advantage over the other.

At the next Madrid meeting attempts must be made to continue the Helsinki work for security and cooperation throughout Europe and, if possible, to adopt military confidence-building measures and initiatives for the future negotiation of disarmament.

However complex they may be, these problems are not insoluble. The SALT II negotiations showed that success or failure depend above all on the political will of the partners.

In Geneva and Vienna the debates are dragging in because the Atlantic bloc and especially its leader, the United States are captives of an enormous contradiction.

Between Suicide and Ambition

On the one hand they must agree that the two alliance systems are equal militarily and that launching a nuclear conflict would be suicidal for the aggressor; and that the race for increasingly sophisticated and miniaturized weapons increases the risk of a major accident and threatens to escape all future control.

On the other hand, the Atlantic Pact leaders do not want to abandon their ambition to dominate the world; to increase their economic and political power as well as the fabulous profits from arms sales; and to assure themselves even temporarily of a certain military advantage which would let them revive the diktat policy toward the socialist countries.

The U.S. arms race lobby is not just found in the corridors of power. They are on an equal footing at the Pentagon and the White House. They speak as masters at NATO Brussels headquarters and in diplomatic negotiations.

They did not wait for the events in Afghanistan before halting detente and restarting the arms race in every possible direction. In spring 1978, even before meeting with Leonid Brezhnev to sign the SALT II Treaty, President Carter had given the go-ahead to the MX ICBM program. And after the signing he relaunched the Pershing II and cruise missile program imposed by his ministers on the NATO countries last December.

By the fall the White House had already arranged the false alert over "the Soviet combat unit in Cuba," which served as a pretext for increasing military pressure on the Caribbean. And long before, in summer 1978, President Carter presided over the Washington Atlantic session which rubber-stamped the long-term programs for increased military spending and arms outlay by the countries in the blanket organization.

Like the schizophrenic in the joke, imperialism knows very well that two and two make four but "is annoyed by this".... whence comes this dangerous alternation between recognizing the world's new realities and the temptation to take risks--especially with the approach of the presidential election.

Thus we see President Carter postponing the SALT II ratification debate while at the same time asking congress to preserve the treaty which, he claims, is...absolutely necessary to U.S. security.

CSO: 3100

'L'HUMANITE' COMMENTS ON DETENTE VIEWED THROUGH PRISM OF CARTER DOCTRINE

LD211547 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 18 Feb 80 p 7 LD

[Commentary by Max Leon: "Order American-Style 'Anywhere in the World'"]

[Text] As the eighties begin the chances for disarmament are jeopardized less by President Carter's blustering and warmongering--the socialist countries have steady nerves--than by the specific U.S. decision which calls the present balance into question and will inevitably bring a response sooner or later. The White House chief has placed military ambition at the top of the "five essential goals which America must attain in the world" in this decade.

"First, we will continue, as in the past 3 years, to build up U.S. military strength and that of our friends and allies. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation will have cause to doubt our intention to provide ourselves with the most powerful and flexible of military forces."

"Anywhere in the World"

At the same time as the NATO leaders and eager newspapers were accusing the USSR of threatening West Europe with its tanks and SS-20 missiles and of intending to intervene in all parts of the world, it was in fact the U.S. President who was stepping up the war effort far beyond the real needs of American security. He did not wait for the Central Asian crisis and the Soviets' arrival in Kabul to increase the Pentagon's budget: "Every year since 1976 we have devoted larger sums in real terms to defense, and our allies, encouraged by our example, have done likewise.... We want to boost this effort still further in the next few years."

As a result of this the defense budget for fiscal 1981 will amount to \$158 billion (Fr640 billion, almost Fr2 billion per day).

In real terms (in other words, taking inflation into account) this is an increase of more than 3 percent--a rate of increase which the U.S. Government wants to maintain for at least 5 years.

The most important sphere to which this new effort will be applied is strategic weapons and NATO's conventional and nuclear forces. This program, Mr Carter added, "gives us the desired capability to give rapid aid to our friends and allies anywhere in the world. Finally, it gives us the certainty that our naval forces will continue to be the most powerful on the seas."

At this point it is worth stressing the insanity of the French press campaigns which attempt to arouse fear of the Soviet Union by maintaining that it has hegemonic ambitions and is providing itself with excessive military means superior to those of the West [HISTOIRE magazine among many others: "Is the Soviet military threat to West Europe real? Yes, it is not only possible but could even be imminent," Jean-Pierre Brule replied).

To give a more complete picture of the "Carter Doctrine" we must also mention the new Trident submarine soon to undergo sea trials; the missiles of the same name which are already operational (with a range of 6,400 km); the 1,700 new fighters and attack weapons which will reinforce U.S. squadrons in Europe in the next 5 years; the "quick-reaction forces" (100,000 men) being set up...and also the steps taken to consolidate or set up military blocs in addition to NATO, especially in the Persian Gulf region and in Central Asia, which the White House at present describes as a "security network" to be set up "with other countries in the region."

Return of the Stick

Will the world ambitions embodied in the "Carter Doctrine" ruin the chances of military detente and even of political detente? Must we, merely for the sake of peace and quiet, abandon all hope? The worst thing we could do would probably be to give way to American blackmail and to the pessimism being spread by the government press.

As far as content is concerned the "new" White House doctrine is not very different from the previous doctrine which Mr Kissinger, Mr Brzezinski's predecessor, defined cynically with reference to the beginning of the Nixon mandate in 1969: "We hoped to apply the carrot and stick principle." This "American stick" has claimed millions of victims by bombs, tyranny and famine. However, the White House and Pentagon strategists were nonetheless defeated by the insurgent peoples of Indochina. From Mr Nixon to Mr Ford and Mr Carter imperialism has increasingly been forced to step down: In Angola, in Iran, in Nicaragua and so forth.

Therefore, the same policy is less "profitable" than ever.

There is another essential mistake which Washington is making once again: That of preconditions. This is a policy which is as old as imperialism but which Mr Kissinger claimed to have initiated in the form of "linkage," which consists of making an agreement on a particular subject attractive while demanding that the partner back down on other problems under negotiation.

From Dream to Reality

The execrable "linkage" obsession has in fact served only to blackmail vassals when they tried to rebel. For instance, British diplomacy from Wilson to Thatcher has sunk into rather unenviable "privileged" relations.

Any country independent of the United States now has less reason to accept such a diktat than ever before. It is U.S. diplomacy which has had to give up its pretensions many times, during negotiations on strategic arms or during preparations for the Helsinki conference, for instance.

This is so true that, despite his loud "warnings" and while trying to revive the arms race in various directions, the U.S. President is not taking the risk of canceling the strategic negotiations.

In his State of the Union message he both "justified" blackmail over ratification (postponing the Senate debate) and stressed...that this ratification is vital!

This bilateral agreement, he said, "is the most important in the last decade. SALT II will put us in a better position to maintain a strategic balance in nuclear weapons.... Without SALT II, and if SALT III preliminary negotiations did not begin, it would take many more years of negotiation in the future to obtain further reductions.... I am convinced that the Senate will ratify SALT II because this treaty plainly is in keeping with our national security interests."

Which Carter are we to believe?

These are the inconsistencies of imperialism caught between dreams and reality. In any case they confirm that the interests of the American and Soviet peoples and those of the West European peoples are identical, at least when it comes to avoiding the holocaust of World War III on the old continent and elsewhere.

CSO: 3100

INCREASED COOPERATION, BIGGER ROLE SOUGHT IN CARIBBEAN

Bigger Role in Caribbean

FL151740 Port of Spain TRINIDAD GUARDIAN in English 12 Feb 80 p 1 FL

[Text] Roseau, Mon.--France indicated today it was preparing to play a bigger role in Caribbean affairs as it ended talks with Dominica.

In a communique released here after the discussions with Dominica Prime Minister Oliver Seraphine in Martinique, France said it was seeking observer status at meetings of the Caribbean community (CARICOM) because of its departments in the region.

It also expressed its commitment to economic and political development and stability in the Caribbean.

Seraphine held talks with the French foreign minister, Mr. Oliver Stirn, the prefect of Martinique, Marcel Julia, the cabinet secretary of the prefect's office in Guadeloupe.

The communique said: "Specific areas of assistance to Dominica were discussed with particular emphasis on the early implementation of a housing programme, the training of students and the extension of scholarships aimed at the creation of greater cultural exchange between the two countries."

Among the programmes for which a request has been made by the Dominica Government to boost medium and long-term development was "training and assistance in equipment and technology, in both fresh and sea water fishing."

The communique said that Mr. Stirn explored the possibility of receiving observer status at CARICOM meetings in view of the strategic position of the French overseas departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guyana.--
(CANA)

Increased Cooperation With Barbados

FL151650 Bridgetown ADVOCATE-NEWS in English 12 Feb 80 p 2 FL

[Excerpts] Barbados has been praised as being a country which has succeeded in creating, within a small land area, a balanced state, and a civilisation respecting freedom, democracy and tolerance.

Minister of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Oliver Stirn, made this observation at a luncheon at the Hilton Hotel yesterday, held in his honour.

Mr. Stirn was in Barbados on a two-day official visit, and held discussions with Mr. Henry Forde, minister of external affairs and other government officials and ministers.

This is the first time that a French minister has visited the island.

He said that France now wishes to help Barbados in terms of its economy, and this was easy since France is not far away through its departments (Martinique and Guadeloupe), in the Caribbean.

He said that there were many areas for co-operation, mentioning education, the economic sector, tourism, fisheries and agriculture.

Mr. Stirn noted that both countries intended to institutionalise the co-operation, and as a result, will be holding meetings every six months, so that the two countries can adapt the co-operation as time progresses.

The meetings, he said, will make it known that Barbados and France will always be together on questions of development.

In addition, the meeting will multiply the occasions for the two countries to meet on the private sector level as well as the public sector level, he said.

Mr. Stirn said that the co-operation will develop with time, with cordiality and friendship, because Barbados and France want to defend the same values, and reinforce friendship between the two countries.

CSO: 3120

DEFENSE BUDGET DEMONSTRATES GOVERNMENT DETERMINATION

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Dec 79 pp 152-155

[Article by Gerard Vaillant: "1980 Defense Budget Shows Government Determination To Achieve the Goals of the 1976-1982 Plan"]

[Text] The defense budget for 1980, approved 6 November 1979 by the National Assembly, is 88.6 billion francs, excluding pensions (16.8 billion francs) formerly supported by general taxes.

Basic Features

The defense budget for 1980 is up 14.9 percent, a greater increase than that for 1979 (13.9 percent). It is also increasing faster than the overall state budget (14.3 percent) and than the average of the civilian ministries (11 percent).

It must be emphasized that this budget is in accordance with the stipulations of the 1976-1982 Military Planning Act. In certain aspects, it even goes beyond these. Thus, the Planning Act anticipated a sum of 87.26 billion francs for 1980, whereas the budget approved will provide additional funds in the amount of 1.34 billion francs.

For the fourth consecutive year, the determination of the government to increase the national effort in favor of defense is thus confirmed. While the share of military spending within the Gross Internal Product had decreased from 1959 to 1967 and fell drastically after 1968, it has begun since 1977 "a prudent but certain return upwards" (1). From 3.37 percent in 1974, it went to 3.57 percent in 1977, 3.64 percent in 1978, 3.67 percent in 1979 and 3.76 percent in 1980 (i.e. a percentage increase of +0.09 percent between 1979 and 1980, a progression which the government, as we shall see, is committing itself to maintain until the end of the plan). The act has thus been well complied with and will remain so until

(1) These are the terms of the excellent report by Mr Jacques Cressard representing the Finance Committee, from which we are borrowing certain elements of this article.

Percentage								
Distribution	1977		1978		1979		1980	
of Funds	Plan	Apprvd	Plan	Apprvd	Plan	Apprvd	Plan	Apprvd
Title III	58.8	59	58.2	57.9	57.1	56.7	55.5	55
Title V	42.1	41	41.8	42.1	42.9	43.2	44.5	45

It must be noted, however, that although the defense funding has shown a noticeable increase, this has been less than that of the total sum of the state budget, and the goal as stipulated in the act of progressively increasing the share of defense within this budget up to a level of 20 percent at the end of the plan has had to be abandoned because of the large changes in structure which this budget has gone through. This goal was in fact defined in relation to the state budget in its 1976 structure. But in 1977 and then in 1978 and 1979, this was profoundly modified by the extraordinary increases in the public debt (37 percent from 1978 to 1979) and intervention funding, notably in favor of employment. The reference to the state budget thus lost its initial significance, and it became appropriate to peg the increase in defense spending to a more permanent reference, that of the Gross Commercial Internal Product (PIBm) (2). It is this new reference that was submitted, by an amendment to the Act of 1976, for approval by the National Assembly on the basis of 3.67 percent for the 1979 budget and 3.76 percent for the 1980 budget, with the increase of 0.09 percent to be maintained subsequently until 1982, at which date the defense budget will consequently represent 3.94 percent of the PIBm.

Operation Funds

Title III, with a sum of 48.759 billion francs (55 percent of the budget) is increasing by 11.4 percent, a figure which is close to the advance of the average of the civilian ministries, which have budgets which consist essentially (80 percent) of operation expenses. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the military is not coming out any better than the other departments and that it is normal that in a period of crisis the military support their share of the common constraints, although in the area of operating expenses the Defense Ministry has had to favor the sector called "activities" whose importance it wants to increase in the armed forces.

Title III will enable meeting the obligations which had been assumed for successfully completing the reform of the military condition begun in 1976 and which will end in 1980 with the last section of the corps of majors by bringing their number to 5,000 for the three branches of the armed forces and the police.

(2) The PIBm corresponds to the sum of the gross added values, including Value Added Tax, for goods and services.

In addition, the improvement of the lot of the enlisted men will be continued (the monthly pay of a draftee staying beyond the legal requirement will go from 730 francs to 1,165 francs and that of a corporal from 1,390 francs to 2,235 francs).

Also to be continued is the rehierarchyization of the non-commissioned officer personnel, particularly in the navy.

In addition, one thousand jobs will be created in the police, and they will be organized hierarchically, i.e. among them will be a certain number of noncommissioned officers, policemen and auxiliaries.

Finally, the fuel funding share is increased 22.3 percent.

Materiel Funding

In our earlier article, we already broadly discussed the question of the nuclear share in the budgets of recent years, showing that the figures appearing there demonstrated the determination of the government to pursue the development and modernization of our nuclear forces. This sector retains in fact an important position (31.2 percent) in the payments funding of Title V for 1980 and, in relation to the total amount of the defense budget, it represents 14.1 percent.

This figure, which certain members of parliament see as just barely adequate, is in fact considerable if one looks at the level of troops deploying the nuclear weapons and the modest funding for operations which is assigned to them: 2 percent of Title III. In order to judge the materiel effort approved for the nuclear sector, one must also take into account that the period of costly investments -- for example, for a plant like Pierrelatte or facilities like those of the Pacific Experimental Center -- is over. The nuclear funding is therefore now almost entirely dedicated to engineering, research and weapons development.

Also in connection with research, engineering and development, we should note the sharp increase in effort which is assigned to them: 18.45 percent in program authorizations and 21.8 percent in payment funds. In four years, these funds have doubled in size and they represent today a substantial portion of Title V for 1980: 24 percent of the program authorizations and 28 percent of the payment funds. More than half of the latter (28 percent) is dedicated to research, of which 15.8 percent is for nuclear and 12.2 percent for non-nuclear.

In addition, 5.4 percent of the materiel funding is dedicated to what one calls "upstream" research and they are the subject of a special chapter intended precisely to guarantee promising long-term research.

In a press conference which he held last 18 September, Mr Yvon Bourges indicated the areas which the research would concentrate on: composite

materials used in armor, firmed projectiles, shaped charges, perfection of nuclear warheads, guidance systems (artillery, tanks, aircraft-launched weapons), battlefront surveillance systems, electronic scanning radars, radar analysis, night vision, infrared, laser weapons, underwater acoustics, improvement of aircraft engines, turbines, compressors, improvement of aircraft aerodynamics, electronic piloting, missiles and, of course, everything involving the third generation of nuclear weapons.

"With respect to neutron weapons," the minister declared, "we have not planned any development, but we are doing research and we are conducting the basic studies on reinforced radiation weaponry. This is laboratory research with no application for the moment. If it becomes evident that this path is useful, it will be explored."

Nuclear forces: Strategic nuclear armaments will continue to have priority with, especially, continuance of construction of the 6th SNLE, the Inflexible, [nuclear submarine] development of the S3 program for the Albion Plateau and the M4 program for the SNLE's, design of a new nuclear component for the post-1990 horizon (Mr Yvon Bourges indicated in this 18 September press conference that we are leaning toward a mobile missile).

The tactical nuclear weapon capabilities will be strengthened, a third squadron of Jaguar aircraft capable of carrying the AN 52 tactical nuclear weapon will be operational in 1981, while the navy will have in the same year two aircraft carriers whose Super Etendards will have tactical nuclear capability.

Air Force: 23 Mirage F1's, 22 Mirage 2000's; renewal of the transport fleet (8 additional Transals) and equipping with modern trainers (22 Alpha-jets) will continue, as well as anti-aircraft defense which, with 4 Crotale sections and 56 20mm batteries newly added and with the construction of shelters, will complete the defense plan for seven airbases as approved in 1976.

Army: Continuation of the antitank effort (Milan, Hot) and anti-aircraft effort (Roland): command of 54 AMX30's, 96 AMX10P and PC's, 60 AMX10RC's, 40 A.U.F.1 155mm guns, 300 VAB's and 40,000 5.56mm FAMAS rifles (17,000 delivered in 1980).

Also to be noted is that for this service, as for the two others, the separation pay for enlisted men will be increased by 0.50 next July 1st.

It should be noted also that if the operations funding for the army seem relatively larger percentagewise than for the other services, it is because of the effort approved for modernization of the barracks and the construction of those of Gap, Pamiers, Sathonay, Castelsarrazin, Brive, Chambéry and the second section of the Draguignan academy.

The army troop level, which is to have 20,000 fewer draftees in 1982, will go down by 4,000 in 1980.

Navy: Besides continuation of construction of the 6th SNLE, the Inflexible, the 1980 budget will enable ordering an anti-submarine patrol ship, two escort ships (numbers 16 and 17), two minesweepers, two transport ships, and light training and service vessels. Considering the set of deliveries and orders for 1979-1980, we have 26 ships under construction at the naval shipyards (Brest, Lorient, Cherbourg). Despite this effort, the situation of our navy remains disturbing not only because of the dropping tonnage but also because of the age of a sizable portion of the vessels. Currently more than 15 years old, according to the report of Mr Jacques Cressard, are: 45 percent of our attack subs, 60 percent of our aircraft carriers, and 71 percent of our other combat vessels.

Police: In 1980, this will continue the modernization of its equipment (vehicles and armored carriers) and its housing program.

Reaching the halfway point in the progress of the 1976-1982 plan, the 1980 budget is the best that the Defense Ministry has had for several years and demonstrates the desire of the government to successfully fulfill, despite the impact of the world economic crisis, the requirements of the 1976 Act and to continue the defense effort along the lines of earlier policy, particularly in regard to the development of our nation's deterrent capability and the preparation of its new generation of nuclear weapon systems.

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CSO: 3100

ANTI-AIRCRAFT PATROL VESSELS DISCUSSED, DESCRIBED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Dec 79 pp 164-166

[Article by Jean Labayle: "France: The Anti-aircraft Patrol Vessels"]

[Text] The 1977-82 plan calls for the construction of three anti-submarine patrol vessels and another three for primarily anti-aircraft purposes. Whatever their mission, insofar as concerns their size and powerplant these vessels were to be identical to the George Leygues class presently in service or in completion. The CODOG type powerplant was to include two Rolls Royce gas turbines for high speed travel and two diesels for economical navigation. But it has become apparent that this system, if it was adequate for the antisub patrol vessels, was not at all suitable for the anti-aircraft vessels, particularly since it did not permit deploying in a satisfactory manner the weapons and equipment with which it was desired to equip these vessels. The utilization of gas turbines in fact requires large areas on the superstructures (fresh air intakes, exhaust gas discharge) which greatly hinder the operation of the weapons and radar.

Fortunately, a technological breakthrough in diesel propulsion can remove this handicap. This breakthrough is the improvement of the performance which is expected from the use of double turbocharging. By using this process, and without going into the technical details which are beyond the scope of this article, what is important is the fact that it is now possible to increase the power of a given motor by around 30 percent without changing its specific volume. The experimental repowering of the fast patrol ship La Combattante with engines of this type enabled increasing its propulsion power by 20 percent while the space requirements and weight were reduced by around 50 percent.

Now that one can increase the power of the engines without increasing the size and weight, the all-diesel system has several advantages:

- reduction of the space requirements for air intake and exhaust discharge;
- replacement of variable-pitch blade screws by fixed-blade screws;
- ease of operation resulting from having a single type of machinery.

But the diesel also has some disadvantages:

- noisy operation, which requires a good elastic suspension in order to reduce the noise radiated by the ship;
- major work and long downtime in case of serious failures, which is not always the case for the gas turbine, where it is usually sufficient to replace a failed component with another, an operation which sometimes requires only a few hours;
- constant maintenance.

After weighing the pros and cons of these advantages and disadvantages, the navy decided to equip the anti-aircraft patrol vessels with 4 SEMT-Pielstick 18 PA 6 BTC engines. At full power, a maximum speed on the order of 29 knots is expected.

The other specifications of these patrol vessels are as follows:

- displacement: 4,000 tons (test average)
- dimensions: 139 x 14 x 5.50 meters
- ranges: 8,200 nautical miles at 17 knots; 5,000 nautical miles at 24 knots
- armament:

a) surface-to-air missiles:

1 SM-1 MR system (MK 13 40 missile launcher) coming from recovered and reconditioned equipment taken from cannibalized squadron escort ships;

b) surface-to-surface missiles:

4 ea. MM 38 or 8 ea. MM 40 depending on the version selected;

c) guns:

- 2 ea. 100 CA (I x 2)
- 2 ea. 20 CA (I x 2);

d) antisubmarine:

2 fixed catapults for launching antisubmarine torpedos;

--electronic equipment:

- 1 airspace search radar DRBV 26,
- 1 three-dimensional DRBJ 11 radar with phased electronic scanning. This radar is in development,
- 2 fire guidance radars for the SM-1 MR missiles,
- 1 gunfire guidance radar,
- 1 SENIT 6 data processing system. Designed by the Navy Programming Center, it groups several Iris 15 M minicomputers designed and manufactured in France using digital links and includes a new display configuration particularly adapted for command,
- numerous electronic warfare equipment units including four chaff launchers
- 1 DUBV 25 sonar;

--crew: about 200 men.

The AA patrol vessels will not have helicopters assigned to them, but a pad will enable receiving them.

All in all, the new patrol ships of our navy compare very well with the units of the same tonnage in service or under design in the foreign navies.

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CSO: 3100

'I KATHIMERINI' REPORTS DISCIPLINING OF PASOK DEPUTY

AT211815 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Feb 80 pp 1, 3 AT

[Excerpt] The Secretary of PASOK's Information Committee, State Deputy St. Tzoumakas is being accused of distorting the ideological principles of the party, even though he correctly interpreted PASOK's principles. The issue which arose after publication of a circular by Tzoumakas will be dealt with today by the Council on Parliamentary Operation, which also acts as the party's disciplinary council, under A. Papandreou. This action indirectly repudiates both the circular and a statement issued by PASOK's press office.

As it is known the information committee last week sent a circular to the party's regional organizations in which, among other things, it mentioned that:

--PASOK is defined as a Marxist, national liberation, socialist movement.

--Because the ideological principles of PASOK are Marxist they are based upon class struggle.

--Display of photographs of Marx and Engels in all party offices is mandatory.

This circular created strong reactions both within the parliamentary group of PASOK as well as among leading personalities of the movement. Its contents were criticized even by members of the party's executive bureau which met last Friday without A. Papanreou.

More reaction was caused among PASOK's deputies who argued that the principles supported by the circular are contrary to the party's ideological principles. They stressed that this circular happened to be published at a time when PASOK is attempting to change its policy and to appear oriented toward the European socialist left. This change in the party's policy was expressed by A. Papandreou both during his chat with foreign press representatives as well as in his address to the parliamentary group last week.

MARKEZINIS ACCUSES GOVERNMENT FOR COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS

AT211829 Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 21 Feb 80 p 1 AT

[Excerpt] Addressing the gathering of progressives, yesterday, Markezinis also dealt with the more general problems which the country is faced with at the current critical period and particularly stressed that:

--Economic deterioration directly leads to social disturbance and, in view of the danger of bankruptcy, it could also lead Greece to the process leading to the International Monetary Fund which would mean a start of the course followed by Turkey.

--We have reached the point when citizens do not ask who is on strike but who is not striking.

--Greece is at the most dangerous point of international disturbances while the government, which is collectively responsible for the policy it has followed for 6 years, cannot even explain why we withdrew from NATO; at the same time we must not forget that the second Attila line in Cyprus was occupied while it was in power.

--Through its policy the government fails to understand that Greece as a member of a united Europe cannot rely on anything for its own security because there can be no security for Europe without NATO and that, whether we like it or not, NATO cannot exist without the United States.

In conclusion he stressed that those in power are thinking of avoiding elections but this is the worst possible solution because the only hope for salvation lies in the presence of a strong government which represents the will of the people who will have "voted with a full knowledge of the real situation and not in ignorance and under a state of misinformation through because of the monopolization of all mass information media."

CSO: 4908

'RIZOSPASTIS' ALLEGES ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE NEORION AGREEMENT

AT181617 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 17 Feb 80 p 1 AT

[Excerpt] Government and economic circles are planning the gradual slackening of Greece's relations with the socialist countries, with the current emphasis placed on efforts to undermine special areas of bilateral cooperation. Such attempts had manifested themselves in the past, but now are developing with greater coordination and almost undisguisedly in the cold war campaign by the leaders of Washington and NATO.

Exclusive reports by RIZOSPASTIS note that, despite government assurances to the contrary, the Greek-Soviet agreement on Neorion of Sypos [for ship maintenance] continues to be the target of strong polemics intended to weaken it and finally to foil its implementation.

At the same time, circles from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are trying to "block" cultural exchanges with the socialist countries, either by banning planned exhibitions by artistic groups or by putting forth decorous objections to proposals for the implementation of protocols for cultural and educational cooperation. As is well known, the corresponding bilateral agreements provide (specifically for the socialist countries) that the responsibility and the control over their implementation lies with the foreign ministries of the two sides.

As has been revealed by circulars of the Neorion Shipyard Company, its administrative officials are seeking to stop its productive activity on the pretext of the "difficulties" which have been created by the just claims for better wages by the workers. "The recent disagreements between the shipyard's management and some unions in connection with certain issues touching upon the implementation of agreements already signed—claims a member of the board of directors in a circular--make me worry about the [begin boldface] unencumbered operation [end boldface] of the shipyard in future." "Therefore--he adds--the planned long-term investments which should have been submitted to the board of directors [begin boldface] will be postponed." [end boldface]

These threats do not seem to be completely unconnected with other reports that in a meeting among the representatives of the company, the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank and a competent state official a discussion was held to seek a "formula" to invalidate the Greek-Soviet agreement.

It should not be precluded that the "dissatisfaction" about the workers' economic demands will constitute part of this unacceptable plan.

The island is pervaded by the impression that there is an intention to "cancel the agreement with the Soviets" and at the same time place the responsibility on the company's workers.

By making public the above facts, RIZOSPASTIS logically expects the necessary clarifications from the competent government personalities, especially when other sides outline with certainty that the agreement will not be renewed when it expires on 31 December 1980. It is recalled that only 3 months ago, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Holmes, speaking before a congressional subcommittee, let it be understood that there are official assurances about the "limited duration"--and consequently nonrenewal--of the agreement.

CSO: 4908

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ANALYSIS PRESENTED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 19 Jan 80 pp 16, 17

[Text] The latest edition of the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce Bulletin GREEK-AMERICAN TRADE contains an informative review of the Greek balance of payments situation for the first three quarters of 1979 prepared by Mr John Enepekides, Vice-chairman of the Credit Bank and First Vice-President of the Chamber. We present below an account based on Mr Enepekides' article which gives much valuable background information on the balance of payments figures.

Mr Enepekides begins by commenting that the balance of payments figures for the first nine month period of last year provided evidence of the growing strains and stresses on the economy of Greece which appeared to be cause for concern to government and regulatory authority officials.

He goes on to record that the growth rate for imports in the nine month period was "disconcertingly high" compared with the same 1978 period--34.3 percent higher--with slightly greater emphasis on private imports (+35.2 percent) as against imports by the public sector (+31.3 percent). In fact the high level of imports led at the end of last year to the imposition of a series of financial and administrative measures by the Ministry of Coordination designed to curb the flow of imports and prevent a further drain on the country's foreign exchange resources. An addenda to the article by Mr Enepekides summarises these measures, which were also detailed in B&F No 67, and which underlined several of the unfavourable developments highlighted in the Enepekides' report.

The author records that petroleum imports in the period under review were reported to have totalled \$1,483 million, up by 66.3 percent on the \$892 million level for the nine month period in 1978. Aside from fuel however, it is pointed out that increases in other commodity imports in the nine month period was still a "respectable" 28.1 percent over the levels of the previous year's period and supported earlier forecasts that total imports for 1979 (cif) would possibly reach \$9,500 million.

Exports on the other hand, Mr Enepekides points out, have done rather well in the three quarter period totalling some \$2,807 million on an fob basis and representing an increase in value of 33.7 percent on comparable 1978 figures. Commenting that exports for the whole of 1979 may be expected to top the \$4,000 million level, Mr Enepekides also points out that spectacular increases have been posted by exports of cotton yarns and textiles.

Expected Deficit

From the above figures the author sets the expected trade deficit for the year at between \$5,500 and \$6,000 million. On the more positive side the article notes that the performance of the invisible receipts sector has on the whole been quite satisfactory, even though the 20 percent growth rate in tourist earnings was somewhat disappointing compared to the much higher rate of increase in shipping remittances (which rose by 27.1 percent). Despite this, however, tourism became Greece's most important source of income from services, outstripping shipping remittances which had in past years been the country's major source of invisible receipts.

The NTOG estimates that visitors to Greece in the whole of last year totalled some 6 million but in the light of the figures for the first nine months of 1979, Mr Enepekides remarked that the forecast of \$1,800 million in total earnings would seem too high. He suggests that \$1,600 would probably be nearer the mark.

Thus net invisibles for the January to September period last year reached \$2,797 million, up 20.5 percent on the comparable 1978 levels, while Mr Enepekides forecast a total of \$3,700 million in receipts for the whole year.

Current Account Deficit

Commenting on the current account deficit for the period under review, the author states that the level for 1979 of \$1,714 million was 66.9 percent higher than the 1978 level of \$1,027 million and that even official estimates at the end of last year put the negative year-end current account balance at over \$2,000 million. However, he points out that: "It should be noted that this figure does not include an amount of between \$600 and \$700 million for payments to be made during 1979 on account of interest and principal to service Greece's foreign public and private debt." He continues by saying that the repayment of principal is carried in the capital operations section of the Balance of Payments statement (below the bottom line--see accompanying table) while interest payments, together with outgoing dividends on investments in Greece, are listed as invisible payments above the line. In Mr Enepekides' view this reflects the effects of rising interest rates abroad which have tended to wipe out the marked difference that had existed until recently between the tax-free rates obtainable in Greece on such deposits and the taxable rates paid by banks abroad.

Errors and Omissions High

The author also reports that the "inordinately high" errors and omissions figure of \$616 million which appeared in the statement is hard to explain. "Informed sources believe," he continued, "that this catch-all figure includes a variety of foreign currency assets, extending from bank deposits by nonresident Greeks and foreign nationals, to the working balances of the commercial banks, which as a matter of general policy, the monetary authorities prefer to keep temporarily under cover and bring to the surface whenever and to whatever extent might be required in order to forestall wide fluctuations in the amount of the 'official' gold and foreign currency reserves of the Bank of Greece.

A substantial portion of these items," Mr Enepekidis points out, "are eventually converted into drachma and moved above the bottom line."

The author adds in conclusion that whatever portion of the assets of the Bank of Greece are held in gold (coins or bullion), such assets are included in the Balance of Payments statements of the Bank at the fictitious IMF parity rate of \$42.22 per ounce (31.1 grammes) of fine gold. In this way, he continues, on the basis of the current market price of gold, these assets are grossly undervalued.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (First three quarter figures)

	1977	1978	1979
Imports (cif basis)	4,734	5,447	7,318
Private	(3,695)	(4,214)	(5,639)
State	(1,039)	(1,233)	(1,619)
Exports (fob basis)	1,925	2,099	2,807
Trade Balance	-2,809	-3,348	-4,511
Services and Donations			
a. Receipts			
Shipping remittances	835	851	1,081
Emigrant and workers' remittances	687	741	839
Tourism	770	1,024	1,229
Interest and Dividends	67	109	138
All other	287	357	481
Total	2,646	3,082	3,768

	1977	1978	1979
b. Payments			
Travel, tourism and education	117	166	186
Interest and Dividends	158	196	279
GOG expenditures	79	91	93
Transport	115	130	148
Other	176	178	265
Total	645	761	971
c. Net invisibles	2,001	2,321	2,797
Current Account Balance	-808	-1,027	-1,714
Capital Inflow (Private and public)			
Private corporations	190	239	237
Other Private	60	45	39
Purchases of real property	274	308	410
Change in foreign supplier credits	69	27	171
Commercial banks and financial institutions	574	605	508
of which			
(a) Deposits in foreign exchange	(306)	(338)	(60)
(b) Deposits in convertible drachmas	(152)	(211)	(293)
(c) Loans and credits	(105)	(48)	(125)
Central Bank Borrowing	269	273	-30
Government Borrowing	86	161	103
Loans to public enterprises	16	33	54
Total	1,538	1,637	1,492
Principal repayments (public and private)	313	279	327
Net Capital Inflow	1,225	1,358	1,165
Allocation of SDR's	--	--	25
Errors and Omissions	-216	-231	616
Net Position on External Operations (5+6+7)	201	100	92
Change in Assets			
a. IMF	42	5	32
b. Gold and convertible currencies	141	99	20
c. Nonconvertible clearing balances	19	-9	91
d. SDR's	-1	5	-11
Net change	201	100	132

	1977	1978	1979
Net change	201	100	132
Official Assets in Gold and Convertible Currencies			
Beginning of period	905	1,145	1,155
End of period	1,046	1,144	1,135
Net change	141	99	-20
Outstanding Foreign Supplier Credits			
Beginning of period	1,291	1,299	1,232
End of period	1,360	1,272	1,403
Net change	69	-27	171

CSO: 4920

PROFESSOR RAISES MONARCHY ISSUE

Athens ELEVTEROS KOSMOS in Greek 29 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Professor N. E. Devletoglou made the following statement in answering Mr A. Papandreou on the subject of the monarchy.

"The antidemocratic origin and physiognomy of the Constitution of 1975--that was confirmed with the known departure of PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] from Parliament as an indication of protest at the time it was voted for--as well as the defective plebiscite that abolished the Democratic Monarchy as a form of government do not allow Mr A. Papandreou to talk at the present time about 'temples of democracy' in Greece, nor to allege that a crushing majority 'condemned the Democratic Monarchy in the conscience of our people'.

"The subject of the form of government concerns every person in Greece who thinks democratically. Because the antidemocratic and purely antipopular character of article 110 of the Constitution--that, as is known, forbids the revision of the present form of government--has always been unacceptable to the Greek people exactly because it opposes popular domination officially. In a real democracy, it is inconceivable to have the basis and shape of the form of government defined in such a way that the institution of the Supreme Ruler would not be subjected to the flow of progress and change by peaceful means that derives from the inviolable principle of the diachronically unbound popular dominance. The neodemocrats of the party in power, of PASOK and the rest of the Left should understand once and for all that the subject of the form of the government is not closed. And it will continue to remain open as long as there is a democracy in Greece. The freedom of the citizens is not a regime that is tailor made to their measurements so that it would be in effect for a past period of time--in other words, for the past. The freedom of the citizens is in effect forever. Because that form of government is democratic that is comprised not of the momentary, but of the permanent governing 'in liberty' of the people by the people. And the democracy without fail extends to the free definition of the principles on the basis of which government power is exercised. Consequently, when the Greek people do not have the potential of changing the institutions they are governed with and of adjusting them freely to the changing social and political conditions from time to time, no mention of democracy is permitted to be made by Mr Papandreou.

"So much more when in our country, we all know the deceptive procedure that ended in the defective plebiscite that replaced the Democratic Monarchy with the present unprecedented regime of an all powerful, but popularly uncontrolled, President of the Democracy. Of course, the present president happens not to dare to activate his authority--since the prime minister of the country completely overshadows him and substantially has put his aside. Despite this, it is still an indisputable fact that the President of the Greek Democracy has unprecedented superpowers: a) Without precedence in Greece b) wider in many ways than the reinforced powers of even the popularly elected presidents of France and the United States and c) clearly unacceptable to a parliamentary democracy where the president is not elected directly by the people.

"I ask Mr Papandreou: If the Greek people knew that they would not themselves elect their loaded-with-superpowers Supreme Ruler, would the result of the plebiscite be the same? Or does Mr Papandreou by any chance think that every President of the Democracy would not be always condemned in the conscience of our people when he would not be elected directly, immediately and democratically by the Greek people--but would be appointed by the Parliament. Indeed, as long as the present Parliament--as Mr Papandreou himself compels us to hear every day ad nauseam--is in complete disharmony with the popular feeling, I am asking also: The imminent election of the President of the Democracy without the participation of our people and dependent parliamentarily upon a government of the popular minority, will it not be so full of dispute that it will be substantially spurious?

"If Mr Papandreou wants to convert the Parliament of the Greeks to a temple of democracy let him direct his 'pious' struggles toward the nationally imperative revision of the Constitution and the repetition of the plebiscite."

9346

CSO: 4908

PENSION INCREASE FOR FARMERS ANNOUNCED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 30 Jan 80 p 5

[Article by Ger. Apostolatos, deputy minister of social services:
"Farmers' Pensions Doubled"]

[Text] A major conference of ministers and other departmental figures, presided over by Premier Kon. Karamanlis, has finalized the decision on doubling the level of farmers' pensions.

Thus, beginning on 1 July 1980, the old-age, disability, and death pensions for farmers are being doubled for all categories, and--corresponding to family responsibilities--from:

1,500 drachmas to 3,000 drachmas;
1,250 drachmas to 2,500 drachmas, and from
1,000 drachmas to 2,000 drachmas.

For this doubling of the pensions, it was necessary to come up with an additional sum of money amounting to 10 billion drachmas per year.

The total amount of benefits from the OGA [Farm Insurance Organization] will now come to the sum of 31.4 billion drachmas per year, whereas in 1974 this was just 4.5 billion drachmas--that is, it is increased sevenfold.

Furthermore, I will remind you that at the change in government in 1974, the Karamanlis administration found the total amount of farmers' pensions to be 3 billion drachmas, and this year it will reach about 21 billion drachmas--that is, again it will have increased sevenfold.

Of course, pensions for farmers cannot be at the same level as the pension allowances from the insurance funds of the urban population.

Because the OGA--which was established through the inspiration and initiative of the man currently and at that time the premier, in 1961--is a peculiar type of insurance agency which is not based on individualized contributions but rather is based chiefly on social revenues and the support of the State Budget.

Prototype Organization

Nowhere else in the world is an insurance system in operation similar to that of the OGA, whose insured people do not pay the normally requisite contributions into it.

Today, the OGA gives pensions to 560,000 farmers--that is, to about 50 percent of the total number of people pensioned in the country, and from those directly involved it collects just 3 percent of the amount which the other insurance funds collect for their own pensioners.

With this small contribution, plus the participation also of the budget and the social revenues, the OGA gives free care to 3,300,000 farmers and their families in all the country's state hospitals, rural dispensaries, public-health stations, and in 100 additional private clinics which have a special association with the OGA.

Furthermore, it also furnishes free medicines for the more seriously ill, while it defrays all the expenses--when necessary--for the journey abroad of any of its insured persons for treatment.

The Health Centers

Recently, by a decision of Premier Karamanlis the decree was issued for the instituting of health centers, which will cover the countryside, for the improvement of the medical and pharmaceutical care of our rural community.

In addition, still with the same small participation of the insured farmer, which consists in paying a percentage of 4 percent in connection with the distribution of agricultural products and which at present brings in scarcely 3.8 billion drachmas, the OGA defrays the losses suffered by agricultural production from hail, frost, flood, and windstorm.

But it is well known that for such insurance, high insurance premiums are paid in all countries of the world, even in those of the Eastern Bloc.

That is, in these countries a sound insurance system is in operation in which the farmer involved pays the requisite insurance premiums and his necessary contributions.

I remind you that in our country, in the national insurance organization of the IKA [Social Insurance Foundation], the unskilled worker pays 3,500 drachmas per month for pension and illness coverage and other social benefits.

The Greek farmer does not have this burden, since up to now there has not been any individual contribution by him to his insurance fund, aside from the limited sum which is collected from the handling of agricultural products.

And while rich European countries with a percentage of rural population of 4 or 5 percent obligate their farmers to pay personal insurance contributions, Greece--with a percentage of farmers of about 30 percent--grants a pension to 560,000 farmers without their making a contribution, and it furnishes medical, pharmaceutical, and hospital care to another 3,300,000 farmers and their families, plus compensation for damage to their agricultural production.

By the decision of the premier, a representative committee made up of specialists has been formed, with the definite participation of PASEGES [Panhellenic Supreme Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives], to study the entire institution of farmers' insurance systems--that is, to submit to the government within 6 months specific proposals both on relevant outlays and also for the modernization of this institution within the framework of our general social-insurance institutions and those of European Community law.

Because with our entry into the EEC, the Greek farmer will be able to include for insurance purposes every period of his work both here and in the countries of the EEC, and for insurance purposes he will even not lose the time when he was employed in another occupation.

Contribution Through a Token Sum

But this including in of such time, so as to improve the farmer's pension, presupposes that the Greek farmer as well comes under some insurance system.

That is, our farmer also should have insurance obligations and corresponding rights, as is the case with all the other workers.

An old demand of our farmers, which is frequently repeated at meetings in rural areas and in memoranda of their organizations, is: The farmers' pension should not be a dole but a benefit right which should be based on the individual contribution of the insured farmer.

The initial phase of this is being achieved through the decision of the government to collect, by way of the Agricultural Bank and as a form of individual contributing, a token sum of 200 drachmas per month from each person carrying a card of ownership of an agricultural operation.

It is figured that this amount will come to 1.8 billion drachmas per year, compared to the OGA's total needs of 31.4 billion drachmas, but it does constitute an institutional modification of the system, since through this contribution of his, our farmer is fulfilling his first personal insurance obligations and is creating corresponding rights.

The Contributions

Moreover, in order to collect the sum of 10 billion drachmas needed for doubling the farmers' pensions, the government--despite the public-finance and the more general economic difficulties of these times--has added 3 billion drachmas more to the State Budget, has imposed an extra burden on society as a whole amounting to 2.5 billion drachmas, by way of a fee of 2 1/2 percent on the wholesale trade from handling agricultural products, and has added 1 point to the interest rate of the Agricultural Bank, from which it is figured that a sum of 1.6 billion drachmas will be collected.

The remaining sums of money are to be found from improving the revenue situation of the OGA.

It should be noted here that even with the addition of this 1 point, the interest rates of the Agricultural Bank will be 4 to 5 points lower than the rates in effect for business financing.

Given the new contributions and subsidies of the OGA and given the total annual needs of this organization of 31.4 billion drachmas, the farmers will contribute 22.90 percent through the new individual contribution and the fees for distributing agricultural products, while the remaining 77.10 percent is to come from the State Budget and the contributions of the society as a whole.

The recent decision of the government is a part of the more general pro-farmer policy followed by the administrations of K. Karamanlis.

Medical Care

I should remind you that the following have been introduced through the personal initiative and concern of the present premier:

a) The public-health care of our rural population, b) the pensioning of our farmers, c) the protection of their income from adversities of weather, d) the subsidizing and protection of prices for agricultural products, e) the modernization of the institution of agricultural cooperatives--just to mention the chief institutional measures for redistributing the national income for the benefit of the farming class and for improving the living conditions of residents of rural areas.

The acme of this policy is the entry of our country into the EEC, which will mean for the Greek farmer in particular a change for the better in his life.

Following the recent doubling of farmers' pensions, an intention which Premier Konstandinos Karamanlis had announced last September in his speech in Xanthi, the government is continuing to extend its pro-farmer policy to a section of our population towards which it is justifiably directing its particular concern.

For these reasons, the government believes that our farmers will appreciate this new offering from both the State Budget and the society as a whole, and that they will support it in the efforts being made to improve and modernize their social-insurance institution.

12114

CSO: 4908

SHIPPING INDUSTRY TO COVER OIL BILL

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 19 Jan 80 p 27

[Text]

The President of the Union of Greek Shipowners, Mr. Anthony Chandris addressing a luncheon meeting of the Foreign Press Association on 8 January 1980 stated that he believed that the foreign exchange contribution of the shipping industry to the Greek economy for 1980 will roughly balance the anticipated cost of oil imports for the year. He said that the target was 2,500 million dollars -- a billion dollars more than in 1970 and that part of this would come from the repair of more Greek owned ships in Greek shipyards.

Mr. Chandris in a general review of the Greek shipping industry gave some interesting statistics -- he pointed out that some 400,000 people constituting the families of Greek seamen lived directly off shipping and added that together with the figures for those working in direct relationship with seamen -- shipyards and offices the figure increases to some 700,000.

Mr. Chandris went on to say that during the last five years the industry has seen what he called "... the normalisation of relations between the Greek shipping community and the political world" He believed that the political world now acknowledges the contribution of shipping to Greece's balance of payments; particularly in view of increasing oil prices and also due to the

contribution of shipowners in investment outside the shipping sector itself.

In a reference to the forthcoming accession of Greece to the EEC Mr. Chandris said that he wanted to make it clear that as far as the shipowners were concerned they have been in favour of accession from the start. They believed in the formulation of a common shipping policy which does not at present exist and that they, and Greece, will, in the EEC, have a voice in this from the beginning of a new policy which they feel they will help to shape.

Pointing out that the Greek merchant fleet is, in effect, the world's largest, Mr. Chandris stressed the importance of this to the EEC, whose external trade accounts for some 35% of world trade which is seaborne.

He said "The size of the country's merchant fleet is of particular importance, since most of the community's external trade; accounting for about 35% of world trade, is seaborne. Consequently, the Greek merchant fleet will be an important asset for the development of the EEC's external trade. With the accession of Greece to the EEC, the share of the Community's merchant fleet will, in world tonnage, rise from 20% to about 30%."

Mr. Chandris also made the point that it was significant that while there was a gradual decline in the Community's shipping over the past 20 years, the Greek owned fleet has increased, now reaching 13.4% of world tonnage.

He also covered the problem of fraud and piracy and said that the image of Greek shipowners abroad continues to be worse than it should be, partly because of real factors but mostly because of imaginary ones. He believed that as Greek shipping in real terms is the largest in the world there will inevitably be those who use unorthodox methods, but stressed that it is Greek shipowners who have suffered most from this, and it is therefore the Greek Ministry of Merchant Marine and the Union of Greek Shipowners who are fighting, and will continue fighting, to solve this problem.

Mr. Chandris in answer to a question said that he believed that if the United States finally withheld 17 million tons of wheat from the Soviet Union in response to Soviet action in Afghanistan the results would have adverse reactions on the freight market: he thought it is a safe calculation that possibly 1,000 ships might be affected.

PROBLEM OF INCENTIVES WITHIN THE MILITARY

Rome RIVISTA MARITTIMA in Italian Dec 79 pp 79-91

[Article by LCDR Paolo La Rosa]

[Excerpts] Incentives Meeting Need for Security


By his nature, man tends to ensure protection against future risks for himself and his own family. The desire for security is, moreover, capable of motivating up to a specific minimum degree of satisfaction, beyond which it may, on the other hand, prove to be harmful by producing in individuals an excessive desire for permanency, leading them to shrink from any initiative.

These motivations have always been one of the strong points of military incentives: the so-called "secure career." Actually, the security offered by a military career was based on advantages that, although at times they were one of its "exclusive rights," at present are generalized in almost the entire world of dependent labor. Then, some negative aspects appeared precisely in the sector in which incentives should ensure advantageous conditions for those who face a life that already offers severe discomforts in other fields.

a. Living and Working Conditions

Military life must meet requirements making a level equal to the outside world possible by finding adequate solutions to certain everyday problems that contribute to depress the morale of the personnel by removing incentives to work.

The workload must meet criteria of fair distribution among all the personnel in the service and must be a load suited to individual capabilities. The free time that should be able to ensure the necessary activities outside of work depends on that. A typical example of a deviation from normality is offered by our ships, which are underway for around 1,500 hours a year, to which must be added, for those who are on sea duty, the normal 8 hours of daily work, when watch duty, drills, breakdowns, working parties, preparations are not added to this!



Compatibility of duty with the other individual roles that is made precarious by the above-mentioned workload often leads the military person to "marry" his profession, neglecting other tasks that cannot be renounced. Although, in fact, it is inevitable for military life, especially in operational units, to entail considerable commitment, it is essential, on the other hand, to take into account the fact that every military person takes on, at the same time, other roles requiring his participation, as husband, as father, as a unit in a social collective from which he cannot and must not remove himself.

Predictability of the future with regard to duties and stations must be guaranteed by establishing relations of clarity between the organization and subordinates. Although the act of joining the organization commits the military person to perform any duty assigned, he is usually not indifferent to the various alternatives. Thus, often a military person is called to unexpected duties and without the necessary preparation. Thus, still more often he is not put in a position to know his own future in time to enable him to organize his own life and to keep up secure family programs.

b. Career Development and Personnel Evaluation

An officer's career is extremely arduous. The requirement of reducing personnel as he proceeds in his career requires a series of selections whose rates increase with advancement in grade, reaching maximum values in the highest grades. This system of promotion, which meets the requirements of the institution, does not satisfy the needs of the individuals who, if they are not included in the small number of those who advance, see their career development blocked and with it the active duty and retired pay levels closely connected with the grade.


The problem is felt differently but similar in intensity by noncommissioned officers. For them, a considerable disparity in pay between components of the Armed Forces and various corps is added. All that discourages individuals and leads to the forced exodus of a large percentage of personnel in the lower grades and, therefore, at a young age that would still allow them to be employed usefully.

Added to this problem is the problem of personnel evaluation, which is the one that determines the items evaluated in the act of selection. The evaluation system adopted does not fully meet the requirements of fairness, objectivity and uniformity and is based, rather, on the effort and honesty of the "compiler." Very often, stereotyped remarks result that poorly describe the qualifying aspects required of the modern military person.

Possible lines of incentive might pursue the assumption of:

Patterns of more rapid, more qualified and also shorter careers when they ensure reemployment at an equal level in civilian life.

Evaluation systems capable of a more accurate specification of individual qualities.



c. Economic Treatment

Studies by W. F. Whyte on the relationship existing between pay and motivation have concluded that one worker out of ten has a "pure money motivation." In addition, in a consumer civilization, money represents a status symbol, a measurement with which a person's worth is "weighed," in

addition to being a means for satisfying current needs. Thus, when it does not reach minimum tolerable levels, it produces intense dissatisfaction in the individual. In the case of the military person, assigning a quantity to individual worth with the measurement of similar services performed on the labor market does not, of course, make a realistic evaluation possible and gives a feeling of how inadequate present pay levels are. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in accordance with the index of expenditures per man under arms, Italy comes out in tenth place among the NATO countries, followed only by Greece, Turkey and Portugal.

The problem is determined by a dual limitation:

The limitation imposed by public opinion, which does not see a priority requirement in the FA [Armed Forces] and in their maintenance at an adequate level.

The limitation imposed by the budget, which, in a period of crisis -- but crisis is perennial -- is not in a position to assign a larger share of financing to the FA.

The personnel, who have tangible proof of that situation in the "pay envelope," ask for definite assistance that will have the dual aim of improving the general conditions of pay levels and of putting order, at the same time, in the system used at present.

Although we are convinced that the specific situation of the country's economic conditions does not permit "illusions," it is also proper for every attempt to be made to achieve a balance between military persons and civilians with which the necessary pay fairness recognizing the quantity and quality of military work and rewarding its discomforts is affirmed.

d. Housing

The problem of military housing finds its reason for being in the mobility of the personnel and it is connected with a nationwide housing shortage. There is not much housing on the market and it is offered at prices beyond the reach of modest stipends. The consequences are serious, not only for the family problems resulting from them, but also for the efficiency of the FA, which are compelled to limit transfers and, therefore, the possibility of using the right man, at the right time, in the right place. Moves that are made in any case entail, therefore, great problems for the family, which remains at the old duty station, or with the family of origin, or in some out-of-the-way place where prices are less high. And with distance, commuting, a typical phenomenon among military personnel, comes into being.

Quarters available to the service certainly do not make it possible to cope with that problem, but a more equitable policy of distributing them would indeed meet part of the expectations of the personnel. A suitable

solution, among the ones proposed, seems to be "compensated rental," which has the merit of not creating unfairness in the assignment of quarters. They would be assigned on payment and the pertinent proceeds would have to be reassigned to Defense, so that an adequate "housing allowance" can go to personnel unable to use quarters.

Incentives Meeting the Social Progress Needs

Social progress is identified in the acquisition of an ethical status safeguarding the individuals' inescapable requirements. Alongside that, in a capitalistic society, the need for acquiring the symbols expressing the so-called material well-being is affirmed.

a. Protection of Individual Rights

The problem of defining individual rights stems from military life, which frequently invades the freedoms of individuals as they have been established in civilian life. From that point of view, the conflict between the needs of the individual and the demands of the organization, always latent, becomes immediate at times, creating psychological situations that do not facilitate labor relations.

The answer, in the outside world, to that conflict was obtained with the establishment of labor unions that continued to be supported by the demands of the individuals precisely where these demands were in conflict with the interests of the employers.

But the military organizational structure, on the one hand, and the essence of the principles on which it is based, on the other hand, deny the possibility of achieving the establishment of labor unions in the FA.

The law of principle represents the "revolutionary" movement sanctioning the guidelines that should subsequently make up the disciplinary relationships in the military world. Actually, nothing revolutionary but, rather, a set of rules emerges with a suitable law linking the Constitution to the new discipline regulations.

The concept of authority is taken in its "functional" sense; that is to say, in view of the scope that it should cover. Therefore, its affirmation in service matters in general and in operational matters in particular, in which, of course, it cannot be questioned! The response to an order must be prompt, immediate, like reaction in battle.

On the other hand, the law modified the principles governing matters in which the effectiveness of the military instrument cannot be lessened. Thus, with an administration of discipline that will no longer provide an excuse for the accusation that it represents a "privilege" on the part of the one giving orders, one that will produce a system in which a greater sense of responsibility in subordinates corresponds to less discretion on the part of the superior.

The ability to make representations is the most qualifying point in the law of principle. This law establishes a direct link between the bottom and the top, which, parallelly to the chain of command, will bring the thinking of the personnel to the top political-military levels.

Reference to the parallel presence of the chain of command is not casual, because it does not disappear, but rather remains to administer discipline, as provided institutionally for the chain of command. On the other hand, the representation organ would be the bearer of problems not suitable for forwarding through the chain of command. All this in a spirit of collaboration and participation that will succeed, by means of a gradual change in thinking and in plans, in unifying the entire military institution and perhaps to such a degree that it will be an incentive for the personnel.

b. Well-being

It is a problem of current interest to every organization wishing to keep up with the times, in order not to create a break between its situation and the situation of the subordinate personnel. The policy of human and social advancement is intended precisely for this, and the FA are devoting considerable effort to it, in order to adjust their own organizational structure to it. The so-called Well-being Committees, established for the purpose of promoting every possible incentive in the various fields but whose mandate still seems to be inadequate are considered from this point of view.

Concerning material well-being, assistance is needed in the sectors of welfare, of logistical systematization, of recreational and cultural activities. This assistance is not easy in view of an extremely complex set of topics for the objective difficulties of the outside world and the subjective difficulties represented by a large number of often antithetic requests. In fact, these incentives are measured in terms of individual values of the whole that make valid for one what cannot be valid for another. Long cruises may be an attraction for a young bachelor and be, on the other hand, a sacrifice for the head of a family. Moreover, they may change in value in time. Retired pay and health care may have little interest for a young man, while they may have a preponderant interest for an old man.

Concerning morale, military life must be able to restore importance to the human component, constantly being lessened more by the technical specialization required by the highly sophisticated equipment available.

c. Social Group


The group idea finds a natural expression in a military environment. Nearness and living close together by its members unites men in spontaneous structures that often compensate for the presence of a formalized ranking system. Especially in operational units, in which material and spiritual union promotes the establishment of a "band of brothers," of "one for all,

all for one." On duty and outside it, the group finds in itself substantially qualifying motivations, although, perhaps, it "amplifies" individual "grumbling."

The families are often also part of the group and then the communities are real islands that comfort the life of the individuals and motivate a desire to belong.

d. Qualification

The problem is especially felt by staff officers for whom proposals have been made for some time now for a qualification equivalent to civilian qualifications, like recognition of a university degree diploma in military and defense science. In that way, the long-standing problem of an extension to the military academies of the status provided by university institutions would be solved. That would be a sure incentive, making it possible to give balanced, complete training to personnel slated for executive and command posts, without limiting for the persons concerned the advantages connected with their final recognition and academic value.



Incentives Meeting the Need for Esteem

a. Reevaluation of the Role of the FA and Problems of Information

In the last few decades, the consumer society has promoted the aspiration of every individual to increase his own personal usefulness. Service performed for the community, consequently, has been downgraded with regard to service performed for oneself. The liberal professions and trade have asserted themselves with regard to the public professions in general and to the military profession in particular. This kind of thinking, by which a service regarded yesterday as "noble," because it was performed for others, is now regarded as degrading, because it is not performed for oneself, has dragged along with it the common reputation for military life. Thus, the anchorages that gave it importance in the past are failing the military profession, causing an identity crisis to emerge from it. For this reason, a reevaluation of the role of the FA is indicated, just as it is indicated by the Constitution. Public opinion must, on the one hand, be educated on the validity of the service that the FA are in a position to perform and, on the other hand, it must be stated, through the political authority on what military instrument it intends to specify its tasks and assign its means. Otherwise, the military instrument would prove to be useless, because, anchored to a status that does not expressly recognize its importance, it would not be able to support its will.

A balanced but determined information penetration in the national context must be achieved so that Italians may "rediscover" the FA and reincorporate fully their problem in the framework of public activity.

A step forward was certainly taken by means of the Defense White Book that made a realistic, complete survey of Italy's military situation. But, just as it is in other countries, this publication is annual. Thus, in our country it should not be a single episode that risks being forgotten quickly.


The task is exacting, but the FA can do much on their own account. Thus, they should penetrate into factories, schools and families, by means of the normal news media, activated not only by the "center" but also by every peripheral organization, in order to make the people feel that they belong to them, that their problems are the problems of the Italian people. They should arrange congresses and roundtables in which military problems are discussed not only by "employees" themselves and are broadcast by the radio and television networks. They should establish a direct contact with the cultural and university world from which it can receive a contribution of essentially important ideas. Especially, they should avoid gratuitous discredit and refute its sources, to safeguard their credibility. And finally, they should make themselves known with active, knowledgeable participation in the country's activity. The sum of these factors cannot fail to produce direct benefits in an immediate enhancement of the service and indirect benefits in greater competitiveness of military careers.

b. Affirmation of the Need for a Defense Policy

The esteem enjoyed in the past by the FA was based on the recognition of values of a nationalistic nature that attained maximum exaltation in them. In recent history, these values have been crumbling under violent attacks by critical positions not always disinterested with regard to defense and to the state-nation.

First of all, the concept of defense vacillates. Man, or rather his better part, has always aspired to the firm achievement of a world in which real progress can be made in peace toward a better life. According to some, peace can be attained only by means of ensuring nonviolence to be pursued by means of an immediate, unilateral process of demilitarization.

In the second place, the concept of state-nation vacillates. Man in the service of ideas does not recognize the territorial boundaries of the state. It is no longer territory, "living space," that is defended, but rather ideology, which, precisely because it is ideology, cannot have physical boundaries.



The traditional framework motivating the Armed Forces is completely upset by these interpretations and requires greater effort in affirming the constant need for the military instrument and for a defense policy. That need stems from a realistic view of the present-day situation according to which the only way to peace seems to be the achievement of an overall, dynamic equilibrium of forces that will lead international interlocutors to mutual respect, in other words, that will achieve deterrence. The policy of deterrence relies primarily on a balance of the nuclear deterrent. That does not, however, lessen the role of the FA in countries with a non-nuclear deterrent, which are capable of giving rise to "limited" conflicts, as recent history demonstrates amply.

Deterrence will lead to detente, that situation of security in which the instruments needed for overcoming the real factors that make war more likely can be sought: poverty, overpopulation, ignorance. Under those conditions, the function of those international agencies whose objective is to build a better world society will be able to be carried out.

Only then, will it be possible to achieve disarmament, total disarmament and not the disarmament limited by the present SALT agreements, in a truly changed world. Peace would be achieved, therefore, in the well-known equation Defense = Deterrence = Detente = Disarmament, in certainly not short historical times.

Naturally, thinking about our military nature as the expression of maintenance of land, sea and air power has relative significance, in the nuclear age, if it is not understood within an agreement broader in scope, like the Atlantic Alliance. An alliance that will have a military but also political, economic and social function, whose principles correspond to the same values affirmed in the national context.

Recognition of the need for defense and for an alliance means recognition of the importance of the military instrument. This recognition must involve not only a few minorities but rather the whole nation, so that service for it, which costs so much psychologically, physically and financially, will have the requisite credibility with regard to those who are called upon to contribute to it in person. This results in motivating the military person by a renewed solidarity and that will be able to reward his "sacrifice" no longer regarded as the instantaneous giving of his life in combat, but rather daily self-denial to improve the deterrent capability of the military instrument.

Incentives Meeting the Need for Self-Realization

a. Outside and Professional Realization

The organization must be able to meet positively the requirement, widespread at present, for autonomy and labor awareness. In spite of their hierarchical structure, the FA are able to meet those needs by modifying their own working methods in such a way as to achieve a greater sense of responsibility in the personnel in the field of operations and discipline, and more aware participation in the field of administration of the common services.

Spirit of responsibility: the operational functions of a military person are almost always able to satisfy the desire for self-realization by means of performing tasks that are even above the rank held in the chain of command. Tasks on whose performance the success of the entire organization depends are assigned to every military person, even at the lowest level. That is true of any officer in a command function, of any noncommissioned officer leader of a detachment, of any seaman in his operational duty assignment.

The problem arrives when we shift from the operational field to the administrative field, in which the chain of command creates a bureaucratic machine that reduces that desired responsibility to a long series of slow, complicated practices. In that field, a greater streamlining of bureaucratic red tape must be promoted.

Participation: this does not mean merely satisfaction of the individual desire to collaborate, but rather the organization's possibility of utilizing the creativity and imagination of the subordinates themselves by making them active participants in the policies followed. That can be accomplished only by means of greater two-way communication, from the bottom to the top and vice versa, that will bring about involvement of the individuals in the activities of the organization.

Participation must be viewed as an instrument for improving our system, clearly indicated to us by the sociological and psychological sciences and already applied by the organizational sciences for the purpose of bringing our organization into line with the times. The individual, who can make his own contribution, will be strongly motivated by that, because he will see his own capability used to advantage. He will also feel urged to improve his own training, because, now "in the front line," he will have to regard his own activity in terms of possible results. In short, he will be encouraged to regard his own relationship with the organization and, through it, with the chain of command differently. No longer in a status of passive subordination, but rather of responsible incorporation in the working group.

The innovation, as such, will not have to be regarded thus merely as reported here. Certainly a form of participation like that is already operating in most of the relationships between superiors and subordinates within military organizations. It is a question, instead, of establishing an adequate, specific set of rules that will make some real form of participation possible, in order to make all the military, regardless of their level, an integral part of the organization in which they are operating.



b. Interior and Vocational Realization

With regard to vocation the military profession would require not only a higher and more abstract order of motivations, but also a special manner of acting and of understanding life. Although this is true, although the choice of the military profession is also the choice of a different ethical and moral system, that must not, however, be a justification for the crisis of identity in which it is struggling. This crisis can be

overcome only by striving to understand the limits of that diversity, by finding their reasons and by erecting on them a newer and more rational system that will be capable to meeting the requirements of the personnel.

Although the social system is undergoing profound changes, abstract values, like duty, dedication, integrity remain unchanged. This is demonstrated precisely in the characteristics of present-day society, which, by making every ideal suspect, would make them intolerable, if they were accepted only by "contract" and not, also, by inner urge.

A member of the military must be anchored to values. Moreover, every historical "profession" in the Western world professes ideals: attorneys, justice; teachers, truth; priests, faith. Thus, the military profess duty and discipline performed with a special style of life in the service of the country.

A vast range of professional tasks uniting operational functions with instructional and diplomatic functions, research and planning activity to voyages and operations, thought to action, management of men to management of means, can also be introduced in that sphere of vocations.

An enormously vast sphere in which each one can find satisfaction of one part of himself. But acceptance of that kind of life cannot involve, at least in that connection, a small part of the individual, and then motivation should tend to the whole more than to the particular.

"Join the Navy and see the world." Perhaps even if it were possible, the prospect alone of being able to see the world by choosing the Navy would no longer be sufficient!

Conclusions

In the overall picture presented, there can be no fear that the statement cannot be denied that, at present, a system of incentives, too often inadequate and short-lasting, is set up against the real contribution in work and sacrifice required of the military. The guidelines that can be followed to improve the situation can be summarized as follows from all that was presented above:

Recognition of the importance of the human factor within the organization: in the senior officer's role in accordance with the model derived from the modern sciences, and in the subordinate's role in recognition of his requirements for asserting his own personality and his own capabilities.

Adjustment of material conditions to the nation's social situation.

Reorganization of careers in accordance with criteria of greater fairness and rapidity.

Recognition of the "differences" in military life, no longer accepted axiomatically, but rather deduced from the actual situation, making it necessary to apply special compensatory forms.

Enhancement of the role of the military by means of an exact understanding of the mission assigned to them by the Constitution.

Satisfaction of the expectations of the participants by the Organization.

It is difficult to say whether that kind of "operation," extended to greater material and spiritual motivation, can continue its present timid pace and with what results. Of course, it is not easy to foresee a reversal of the trend between sacrifices demanded of the military and incentives offered to them.

Nevertheless, the FA should continue to operate with tenacious consistency to improve the present situation to the utmost of their possibilities, modifying structures and methods and seeking at the same time a more just position in the social context in which they operate.

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CSO: 3104

MILITARY TO VOTE FOR REPRESENTATIVE BODIES IN MARCH

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 24 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by s.p.: "Voting To Take Place in Barracks in March"]

[Text] Rome. From 22 March to 30 April, 480,000 draft and career military personnel will go to the polls to elect--for the first time in the history of our armed forces--their own representative democratic bodies. Those scheduled to vote are members of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Carabinieri, and the Finance Guards. The news was relayed yesterday to the Chamber Defense Committee by Undersecretary Petrucci in reply to a resolution by the Communist group.

The month of February will be spent in preparing (printing and distribution in the barracks of documentation and election material) while campaigning will begin on 1 March. Then there will be the preliminary elections on the platoon level for the draftees and the meetings of voters in various categories to discuss programs and choose candidates.

The representative bodies will be elected in this order: from 22 [presumably March] to 1 April, the COBAR (Troops' Representatives Council); from 11 to 15 April the COIR (Intermediary Representatives Council). The COCER (Central Representatives Council) will be elected from 27 to 30 April.

Arnaldo Baracetti, PCI leader of the Chamber Defense Committee told us: "With the representative bodies, military personnel--as provided for by the law on principles of discipline--will have recognized for the first time in the history of our armed forces the right to participate in decisions regarding their own conditions of life, in relationships with the officers on all levels, with the Defense Ministry, with the authorized parliamentary committees and with the cities, the provincial and regional administrations."

After having emphasized the "great value of renewal for the life of the armed forces which will begin with the election of the representatives," Baracetti criticized the government for not having accepted many proposals advanced by the defense committees of the Chamber and Senate relative to certain norms

that restrict democratic rights contained in military regulations. Baracetti pointed out, "however, some of the shortcomings will be corrected by appropriate circular memoranda by the Defense Ministry." (Editor's note: this will be done on the proposal of the communist group which has been joined by Deputies Stegnagnini (DC [Christian Democratic Party]), Accame (PSI [Italian Socialist Party]) Milani (PdUP [Proletarian Unity Party]), and Undersecretary Petrucci.

Granted the clear distinction between hierarchies and the elected bodies which must be firmly safeguarded, the elections of the representatives assume great importance which should not be underestimated. In the regulation concerning implementation, there are, it is true, errors and shortcomings, but this must not lead to lack of confidence and absenteeism. Following the elections, once the military representative's organizations are heard, the PCI will promote certain improvements in Parliament. "What is needed is to have representative bodies with the maximum prestige and the necessary authority. This can be achieved only by a massive turnout at the polls by all military personnel."

The representative groups will be elected on three levels and in various ways. COBAR--the troops will be represented by delegates elected among the rank and file united with a direct, secret vote by name with terms of office that will guarantee the continuity of this organization. COIR--will be established on the basis of the "correct proportional" vote among the various components of military categories. COCER--is a national interforce organization articulated in category committee and in armed forces sections.

6034

CSO: 3104

STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES OUTLINED

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 12 Jan 80 (dossier) [page number not given]

[Article: "Our Jewel Is the Navy"]

[Text] Army

A total of 254,000 men, of whom 180,000 are draftees. The land forces are grouped into three armored corps at Milan, Bolzano and Vittorio Veneto. Overall, between 50,000 and 70,000 men are considered "operational."

The Army has: 2 mechanized divisions, the Folgore and the Mantova; 2 motorized divisions; 2 armored divisions, the Ariete in Friuli and the Centauro in Lombardy. A total of about 600 tanks including M60's (a modern version of the postwar U.S. tank) and Leopards; 5 Alpine brigades: Giulia, Cadore, Tridentina, Orobica, Taurinense (little used in modern warfare); 5 motorized infantry brigades consisting of independent battalions (500 to 1,000 men grouped under a single command). They are the Cremona, the Friuli, the Aquila, the Pinerolo and the Aosta; 1 mechanized brigade: the Sardinian Grenadiers based in Rome and expected to remain; 1 paratroop brigade between Leghorn and Pisa; 1 missile brigade at Portogruaro equipped with land-to-land Lance missiles with nuclear warheads, assigned to NATO.

Navy

A total of 42,000 men, of whom 27,000 are draftees. The fleet includes about 300 large and small ships to a large degree very modern, specifically: 3 cruisers; 17 destroyers; 11 frigates; 8 submarines; 9 corvettes; 45 mine-sweepers; 70 transport ships and 1,700 "Marines."

Air Force

About 69,000 men, of whom 26,000 are draftees. Close to 300 fighter planes: 90 F104G's (built in 1960); 54 F104S's (a modernized version); 54 G91R's (definitely obsolete); 36 G91Y's (used for reconnaissance and training); 18 Atlantics (antisubmarine planes); 28 C119's and 14 C130 Hercules (transport planes).

The F104's and G91's will be replaced in coming years with the Tornado, modern fighter bombers built by a pool of Italian, British and German manufacturers.

Missile Bases

In southern Italy, Calabria and Puglia equipped with medium-range guidance systems.

6034

CSO: 3104

PCI COFFERS TO BENEFIT BY NEW RETRIBUTION LAW

Rome IL BORGHESE in Italian 20 Jan 80 pp 154-155

[Editorial: "The Government Pays, the PCI Collects"]

[Text] Behind-the-scene effects of the law increasing the compensation of communal and provincial administrators and councilors. "Punished" by the elections, the PCI is "rewarded" by Law No 632.

Among the PCI's sources of finance is the not insignificant item of the contributions of those elected to public offices. It is not just a matter of members of parliament and regional councillors and deputies, on whose sources of income the PCI realizes withholding payments which are far superior to those realized by other parties; it also includes local administrators. It is an authentic exercise which, based on rather recent statistics published by the PCI itself, allegedly consists of 935 provincial councillors, 228 provincial assessors, 20 chairmen of provincial administrations; 1,325 councillors, 260 assessors and 21 mayors in the town councils of provincial capitals; 13,751 councillors, 3,078 assessors and 519 mayors in the town councils of other towns with more than 5,000 residents; 836 mayors and an indefinite number of assessors and councillors (but we are talking of many thousands) in towns with a population of less than 5,000. Then there are the chairmen, vice chairmen, secretaries and councillors of a myriad of other local bodies and organizations, from district representatives to sociosanitary consortia, from provincial agencies for tourism to chambers of commerce, from municipalized firms to consortia among local entities, from committees established by local entities to universities, public institutions of welfare and charity and hospital organizations.

Every communist representative to these entities is normally expected to contribute to the party in the form of attendance tokens, office allowances, attendance allowances and emoluments however received. The party collects these sums and pays some of its own administrators a monthly salary (we are speaking of "party officials," full time employees in all aspects of the "PCI firm," in truth not very generous compared with its own clerical employees); to others it gives reimbursements; to all it reimburses whatever

they must eventually pay in income taxes, even including income from public office (except for members of parliament). Moreover, there are many communist administrators who enjoy tax exemptions from public employment normally exercised in private life on the basis of precise legal provisions pertinent to mayors or assessors.

Thus, an enormous amount of money, estimated to be many tens of billions (even though not precisely determinable due to the impossibility of knowing what payments are made to the PCI and the lack of precise data on the number of administrators in entities which are not communes and provinces), enters the coffers of the Communist Party. Only a minimum portion of this income is included in the balance sheet furnished the National Parliament, since the law on public financing of parties, among other imperfections, does not provide for furnishing the balance sheets of a party's peripheral organizations but only those of the party's headquarters; in this way, no mention is made of all payments made to the PCI sections and federations by local administrators. You can be sure that the few federational balance sheets published in L'UNITA show high entries: there are federations in Emilia-Romagna which have local balance sheets containing amounts higher than 1 billion lire (as reported; actual entries and disbursements are then substantially greater).

To add considerably to the PCI's income, a law was recently passed, approved with the general indifference of the press: it is Law No 632 of 18 December 1979 published in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE of 22 December under the title: "Increase in Compensation for Communal and Provincial Administrators and Councillors." On the basis of this law the official monthly remuneration of mayors is doubled; the communes can pay their own mayor a monthly figure varying between 100,000 lire (towns with less than 1,000 residents) to 1.2 million (cities with more than 500,000 residents), passing through intermediate figures according to the population (for example, the mayor of a city with more than 50,000 and less than 100,000 residents may receive up to a maximum of 560,000 lire). Senior assessors may receive compensation up to 75 percent of that of the mayor (50 percent in towns up to 10,000 residents); other assessors, up to 50 percent in towns of more than 30,000 residents; in towns with a lower population (this is an innovation of the law in question) they receive an attendance allowance for every council session. Provincial chairmen, vice chairmen and assessors are entitled to similar compensation. Every town councilman is given an attendance allowance for each council session (and now, another innovation, for each committee meeting), which is double that of the past: 10,000 lire in cities up to 30,000 residents; 20,000 in those up to 250,000 residents; 30,000 in those up to 500,000 residents; 40,000 in large cities with more than 500,000 residents. Allowances for provincial councillors are also doubled: 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 according to population. Final innovation: territorial councillors also receive an attendance allowance equal to half that of communal councillors. This last provision is clearly in contrast with the institutional law of the territorial councillors (commonly called "district"), which specifically provided for the gratuitousness of the position of territorial councillor. The new law has taken note of the total desertion of the territorial council

sessions and has introduced compensation, hoping thus to overcome absenteeism. Not only this: the chairmen of the territorial councils of the larger towns or of those which have been assigned deliberative functions now receive compensation not to exceed 80 percent of that due the assessors of their commune. Naturally, all compensations referred to are before withholding for taxes.

The law is retroactive to 1 February 1979. The communes have 60 days to consider the increases. Naturally, all will be hurried along; and in like manner, all or almost all will be settled at the maximum limits provided by law (also because, objectively speaking, the duties and responsibilities of local administrators merit fair compensation, if we do not want to see only communist officials or retirees remaining to do the politicking). For example, the Rome commune deliberated very rapidly: the law was published on 22 December; the town council established the new compensation figures on 23 December.

What will the PCI gain? This is almost impossible to calculate. Figuring very approximately, it can be considered that, on the average, each councilman will receive 6,000 lire more per session; assuming that there are at least 30 sessions per year on the average, we arrive at 180,000 lire of back pay for 1979; if we multiply that figure by 30,000, the total presumable number of the PCI's communal, provincial and territorial councillors, we arrive at the beautiful total of 5.4 billion lire. We then calculate increases made in the case of operational compensation for assessors and mayors and the attendance allowances of assessors in small communes and the councilmen in committees; we must also consider the chairmen of territorial boards; with all this we come up with at least 1.5 billion. So we have the general total of the PCI's income increases for 1979 as a result of Law No 632 coming to 7 billion! A very high figure, cautiously calculated due to lack of precise information. This figure is higher than that received from the government in the form of public financing by the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party], the MSI [Italian Social Movement], the PLI [Italian Liberal Party], the PRI [Italian Republican Party] and even the PSI [Italian Socialist Party]. A mouthful of pure oxygen for a party which, following the bloodletting of votes chalked up in the elections of last June, will receive almost 2 billion lire less than the share of public financing allocated to parties.

8568

CSO: 3104

ISTAT FIGURES ON NOVEMBER TRADE DEFICIT

Milan IL GIORNALE NUOVO in Italian 13 Jan 80 p 16

[Article by Marcello di Falco: "Trade Deficit Increases Markedly"]

[Text] Rome, 12 January--Italian imports and exports, according to ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute], registered in November a record deficit of 1,458 billion lire, bringing to 3,017 billion the negative balance for the first 11 months of the year. This figure would be extremely worrisome if there had not been some anomalies in calculations on the part of ISTAT, which have emerged over the last few months.

The first illustrious "victim" of these anomalies was Finance Minister Andreatta. He estimated, in the 1979 forecast and plan report, approved on 29 September of last year, a deficit of 2,470 billion lire on the basis of official data. On 15 December, talking with a group of journalists, Andreatta admitted that his estimate contained an error and would have to be corrected to a 1,470 billion deficit in 1979. "The difference," the minister said, "must be attributed to the fact that ISTAT counts the customs reports of imports and exports of merchandise as soon as they arrive. Thus it happens that groups of statistics end up in a different month from the one they refer to." That is, we translate, the monthly figures are unreliable because there is always the possibility that a group of statistics may not yet have been counted. If the delay involves imports, the monthly balance will be abnormally positive, and vice versa. In November, the Central Statistics Institute must have counted statistics for imports which were left over from the previous month while it probably did not count all the exports.

The second illustrious victim was Minister of Foreign Trade Stammati. For him, fate was even more cruel because--just this morning--he officially stated that the 1979 balance, even after freight and insurance charges were deducted, will show a positive balance of 1,200 billion lire. A result which is by now improbable since over the 11-month period the balance has not been positive but negative by some 3,017 billion lire. Stammati has also estimated at 60,000 billion lire the exports for the entire year: even this figure is by now highly improbable, because exports

over 11 months have registered a total of 52,375 billion, corresponding to approximately 57,130 billion for the year.

Beyond these considerations, there exist reasons which lead us to believe however that the month of November was objectively a "heavy" month. The low rate of the dollar, the fears, which were later confirmed, of rises in the price of crude oil and the scarce stocks of the Italian oil reserves led Italian importers to accelerate their purchases.

The information is not, on the other hand, completely convincing because ISTAT indicates during the month of November a reduction of 9.4 percent in exports, which gives rise to important questions. It would have been logical to expect an increase in imports of 20-25 percent with respect to the previous year and instead the growth was only 16.2 percent. It was logical to expect a less rigorous increase in exports and instead there was a sizable reduction. The mysteries of Italian statistics.

8956

CSO: 3104

GOVERNMENT, UNIONS DISCUSS RAIL SECTOR REFORMS

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 6 Feb 80 p 24

[Article by Maurizio Ricci: "Semi-Agreement Only on Railroads; Disagreement Instead on Pensions"]

[Text] Rome--The labor unions are against a decree that will remove from the social security reform bill social increases and increases for the lowest pensions. "If there is a need for a decree," said Pierre Carniti, secretary general of the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], last evening, "let it apply to the entire reform." The CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], CISL, UIL [Italian Union of Labor] Federation will make this position official this morning through a communique. It is another element of tension between the labor unions and Cossiga's government, stirred up by the Social Democrats in particular, who solicit a decree to eliminate increases, because they have strong reservations concerning Scotti's draft of the reform text.

Cossiga had spoken of it with Lama, Carniti, Benvenuto, and Marianetti in a brief, restricted summit conference that preceded a meeting in the Chigi Palace regarding railroad reform. Along with the pension matter, the staff of the Unitary Federation raised the necessity of resuming negotiation on the public revenue and family allowances. The Federation directors asked Cossiga if, after the 15 January general strike, new positions had developed in the government that would make it possible to resume the confrontation--in other words, if the government had given up some of its "no's." "We are looking for some specific answers," explained Carniti, "certainly not a ceremonial and inconclusive meeting."

Cossiga's reply was evasive. Between the lines the chairman of the Council let it be understood that shortly the expiration date of the Christian Democratic congress and the hypothesis of a crisis will hang over his government.

On the other hand progress was made in behalf of the reform regarding the railroad agency. The communique issued at the end of the Unitary Feder-

ation speaks of a "productive but interlocutory meeting." For the moment, however, railroad employees will not strike again, while they wait for Degan, assistant transportation secretary, to present--perhaps even this week--a draft of the reform bill.

The points agreed upon today provide for the agency to assume broad autonomy in relation to the state organization. There will be an 11-member administrative council that no longer will be headed by the transportation minister, but by a chairman designated by the Council of Ministers and supported by a director general, whose choice is to be approved by the entire government. The legal status that the FS [Italian State Railways] agency thus assumes is profoundly different from that of the present situation, in which the railroads in practice are a branch of the state administration.

In short, it will have a much trimmer and more decentralized administration, the possibility of greatly modifying the organization of labor, of ridding expenditures and investments of the hodgepodge procedures of bureaucratic control. However, Degan's text will be the one to precisely define the new legal status. The government rejects the definition of an economic public entity and yesterday there was talk of an "agency."

The Degan text must also state exactly another point that is crucial for the labor unions: the work ratio. The possibility of a complete turning over to private industry (on the pattern of the ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] employees) now seems to have evaporated. Hirings, dismissals, disciplinary relations, responsibility for the safety of the service will remain "public," defined, that is, by law. The remainder (organization and salaries) will be left to negotiation with the trade union.

This is what the legal picture now provides for all public employees. However, for railroad employees the difference would be in the interlocutor, no longer the government, but the administrative council--with the possibility of bringing present salaries closer to those of the rest of the transport division (tramways, for example) rather than to those of public employment.

8255

CSO: 3104

NAVY ACQUIRES NEW ATTACK SUBMARINE

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Dec 79 pp 167-168

[Article by Jean Labayle]

[Text] Last year, the Dutch minister of defense placed an order for a high-performance attack submarine and took an option on a second submarine. These new submarines are to replace the Dolfijn and the Zeehond, the oldest submarines in the Royal Navy. The first was placed in service in December 1960 and the second in March 1961. Designed by Engineer M.-T. Gunning, they caused a sensation at the time because of their very original design, as their pressure hull consists of three parallel cylinders, an upper one and two somewhat shorter ones positioned below and on each side of the first. The crew and armament are housed in the upper cylinder, while the other two contain the batteries and propulsion machinery.

The replacement of the Dolfijn, which has been named the Walrus, was laid down last 11 October at the Rotterdamse-Droogdock shipyard. Her trials are scheduled for 1983. As with the new conventional attack submarine that the Royal Navy plans to build, the emphasis will be on as silent an operation as possible. The hull, made of the French Morel steel, a high yield-stress steel, will permit the Walrus to attain far greater depths than her predecessors. Due to a high degree of automation of all the equipment, of the ship's control and of the fire control from a single operations center, the Walrus class submarines will be able to make do with a crew of only 49, compared to the crew of 67 on the Zwaardvis class submarines, approximately of the same tonnage. The other characteristics of these new submarines are as follows: displacement, 1,900 t standard and 2,500 t submerged; length, 67 m; maximum external diameter, 8.5 m; diesel electric propulsion including three diesel engines and an electric motor activating a large, seven-blade propeller; maximum submerged speed; 21 knots; and armament consisting of six 533-mm torpedo tubes and 20 torpedoes. In addition, there are plans to employ the encapsulated American Harpoon antiship missile.

SCHOLTEN STRONGLY OPPOSES DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 6 Feb 80 p 1

[Article: "Scholten Strongly Against Pruning in Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] The Hague, 6 February -- Discussions within the administration about extra cuts in the 1980 national budget ran aground because both Minister Albada (Social Affairs) and Minister Scholten (Defense) obstinately resisted the budget cuts proposed by their colleague Andriessen (Finance). In Scholten's opinion, if the Netherlands were to carry out Andriessen's plans, it would no longer be able to meet its NATO obligation to increase defense expenditures this year by 3 percent.

Now, Prime Minister Van Agt will first consult with the parliamentary party leaders of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] in the House. The cabinet will then continue to discuss the budget cuts on Friday.

Minister Albada objects most to the amount of the budget cuts proposed by Andriessen: 4 billion guilders in the specifications for '81 economy plan are included.

Albada is suspicious of the Central Planning Office's prognosis on which the savings are based. He does not want an extra savings of more than 2 billion guilders. He is afraid that too large a cut would lead to the collapse of expenditures and therefore to a reduction of jobs.

Minister Andriessen (Finance) would like to find part of the 4 billion guilders in extra savings through general measures, the specific application of which would be left up to the ministers concerned. Thus, he wants to cut the government contribution to the social security funds by 400 million guilders. Next, he wants to reduce the general item for price compensation, which was included in the budget memorandum, from 1.3 to 0.3 billion guilders for all departments.

This means that all departments which have expenditures sensitive to price fluctuations will hardly be compensated for the price increases which will occur in 1980. Consequently, they will be forced to cut back.

On Tuesday, Minister Scholten (Defense) strongly objected to this. The expenditures of his department are very sensitive to price fluctuations. Out of that 1 billion, the Ministry of Defense would have to cut back by more than 300 million guilders. Scholten has calculated that in that case the Netherlands would no longer be able to meet its NATO obligation to increase its defense expenditures in 1980 by 3 percent. In his opinion, the implementation of Andriessen's plan would mean that the Dutch defense expenditures would end up being even 0.2 percent lower than in 1979.

8463

CSO: 3105

FRICTION REPORTED BETWEEN PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 2 Feb 80 p 1

[Text] According to well-informed sources, very strong reactions were evinced in Belem by the address which Diogo Freitas do Amaral, vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, delivered in Strasbourg. Speaking before the Council of Europe, Amaral defined the master lines of the foreign policy of the Sixth Constitutional Government.

Circles close to the Belem admitted that it was particularly shocking for a member of the government to have used an international forum to criticize the president of the republic for his handling of foreign policy, specifically in Amaral's reference to "parallel diplomacies."

Week Away From Belem

Meanwhile, contrary to present practice in relations between the president of the republic and the prime minister, Gen Ramalho Eanes has not met this week with Francisco Sa Carneiro to discuss current issues.

Actually, for the last two days Eanes has been on an official visit to Evora, and hence postponed his meeting with Sa Carneiro. Incidentally, EXPRESSO has confirmed that the prime minister is also considering the possibility of paying an official visit to Evora very shortly.

Two More Sore Points

In addition to the reaction to Belem circles to Freitas do Amaral's address before the Council of Europe, two other points are still at issue and could have an effect on relations between the government and the president of the republic. The first point concerns the petition on ratification presented by the Parliamentary Groups at the "Dia de Camoes a das Comunidades [holiday celebrated on 10 June in honor of the poet Luis de Camoes and the religious orders]," a matter which could be debated in the Assembly of the Republic when it meets next Tuesday.

The defeat of ratification or the introduction of radical amendments would mean a certain confrontation between the government and the president of the republic.

This fact is motivating a certain reserved stand on the part of the reformers, who are not too enthusiastic about the possibility of such a confrontation.

Another point of dispute could be the issue of ratification of the decree law creating the "Damiao de Gois Institute of Social Research," under the Presidency of the Republic.

In a very direct way, it could happen that refusal to ratify would rob the president of the republic of an instrument of technical support created by the Fifth Constitutional Government.

However, it might well be that the AD [Democratic Alliance] will have to give way, without raising the issue of ratification in Sao Bento, above all because the reformers will not vote for it.

Just yesterday, EXPRESSO learned directly from a reform group source that this is a "closed question," and thus they should not be expected to support this initiative. (See "Political Analysis," by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, p 2, and "In the Halls of Sao Bento," by Pedro d'Assunçiao, p 3).

6362

CSO: 3101

PINTO BALSEMAO ON FOREIGN, DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Lisbon POVO LIVRE in Portuguese 30 Jan 80 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Associate Minister Pinto Balsemao; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Importance of Foreign Policy

PL: In the debate on the government program, one of the most novel aspects was the emergence of foreign policy as a key issue. The debate was lively and heated. In view of the responsibilities that you have, as director of the PSD's [Social Democratic Party] foreign policy, I would like you to make an assessment of the debate.

PB: It seems to me to be advantageous for foreign policy to assume an importance among us that it has not had heretofore. I think that this is evidence that Portugal is rediscovering itself. We cannot continue to contemplate our own navel, forgetting that we are linked with everything that is happening in the international area and, to a certain extent, are limited thereby.

On the government side, the debate revealed, in general, the implementation of the principles of the Democratic Alliance's electoral program. On the side of the parties, the PC [Communist Party] was forced, once again, at a crucial point, to demonstrate its orthodoxy and its obedience to Moscow. As for the PS [Socialist Party], it took a clearcut stand in the realm of principles with respect to the Soviet Union; but later, it did everything possible to botch that position, so great was the need not to back the government in all respects. For example, the entire discussion about the recall of the Portuguese ambassador to Moscow ended up becoming ridiculous, and reverting to the PS itself.

On the side of the parliamentary majority, I think that it supported the government well in this area. There were interesting, and even lofty interludes in the debate, related to the new style adopted by the majority, namely, the PSD parliamentary group.

PL: Do you think that the Sakharov case could serve to increase the tensions even more after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

PB: That is already happening. One need only read this week's newspapers. Sakharov's banishment was another drop (but an important drop, owing to the person involved and the time) exacerbating a situation which was already quite tense.

Rapprochement With the Arab Countries

PL: As head of the PSD's International Relations Committee, I would like you to comment on the rapprochement that has been noted between the PSD and the Arab countries, specifically through recent visits that we have reported.

PB: This is related to a plan which was devised and implemented throughout 1979, and which is about to bring its results now. We have received personages from the Arab world here, and have participated in functions such as the Conference on Solidarity With the Arab People, which took place in Lisbon; however, we have at all times maintained, in a consistent manner, our position based on the party's foreign policy. I think that we are now about to reap the benefits of all this activity.

PL: When you talk about Arab countries, are you referring to the moderates, the others, or all of them?

PB: It is the PSD's policy to talk with all people, as has always been the case; but there may be countries and regions which have priority over others, as is normal. I would like to emphasize that we have found great receptiveness among countries with which Portugal has had virtually no relations to date. I am thinking of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

A So-called PLO Passport

PL: Why is it that Portugal has not had access to those countries? For ideological reasons?

PB: Because those countries, among others, did not have confidence in the previous Portuguese governments.

I would also say (and we would do well not to forget it) that the fact that we have received PLO members in Lisbon and that we have had a meeting with its leader has been essential.

PL: Nevertheless, that fact has been severely criticized by members of the PSD and by AD [Democratic Alliance] voters.

PB: All the Arab countries, even the most moderate ones, want to know the parties' position toward the PLO. Our position is clear, and has been based essentially on the fact that, during 1979, the PLO changed in a way that appears positive to us, aiming toward a peaceful solution of the conflict in which it is involved.

PL: Then is the receptiveness to the PLO a kind of passport for the Arab nations?

PB: Yes, it is a passport for all the Arab nations, without exception. And it should be noted that all of them, including the PLO, understand the "nuances" or variations in our position, which are moreover quite clear.

The Media: (Also) a Changing World

PL: What is the government's strategy with regard to the news media: a change or continuity?

PB: A change, as is obvious! This means demanding competence and professionalism, improving the quality and, in particular, assigning individuals with those qualifications to head the state-owned organs.

PL: Will there be a replacement of the individuals who head the state-owned organs of communication?

PB: That could happen. However, it is included in an overall plan; because the government does not want to make gradual replacements. It feels that, if and when they are made, they should all take place at the same time.

PL: But will it make them?

PB: It is possible that they will be made in some instances. However, the Council of Ministers has not yet made a statement.

PL: What are the most serious news media problems to be solved by the government?

PB: This is an entire world! The first aspect is the dreadful financial status of the state-owned companies, which the prime minister has already stressed in the AR [Assembly of the Republic]. The second is the need for clearly separating reporting from the political views of those who convey the news; something which entails giving priority to professionalism, and consequently rewarding the best professionals monetarily, and this is not the case at present. The salaries of journalists, in addition to being low in general, are more or less aligned.

There are also concrete problems involving territorial and social coverage. There are media which do not reach the entire country, and the majority

do not yet reach all the social classes. There is also the problem of the emigrants, with whom a more complete and more permanent contact must be created; something which has not yet been resolved.

Receptiveness Toward the Private and Regional Press

PL: Will this government have a more receptive attitude than the previous ones toward the private and regional press?

PB: I think so, simply because of the way in which the government views reporting. We do not want any discrimination to exist between the nationalized and the private press in the area of assistance, as the Constitution moreover stipulates.

In the concrete instance of the regional press, heed must be paid to its specific nature. The regional press quite often does not share in the aid that is to be given to the press in general. Note the case of the paper subsidy, which has little effect on the regional press. On the other hand, note the case of the postage paid for mailing abroad, which is of particular concern to the regional press, because many of its subscribers are emigrants.

PL: What is the role of the State Secretariat of Social Communication?

PB: It is the government's policy that the State Secretariat of Social Communication should engage increasingly less in politics. The ideal situation would be for it to gradually disappear, and be converted into a general directorate, such as exists in other European countries, like Great Britain or Germany, operating as a government information agency, but not as an organ of political propaganda.

It should be noted that the state secretary of social communication has not yet appeared to read any communique from the government, and he probably will not appear....This is no coincidence. But we are also aware of the fact that there is a complicated transitional phase, due mainly to the financial status of the companies.

PL: In the area of the civil society, the institution with the greatest influence on the media is unquestionably the Church. What will the government's position be in this regard?

PB: Section 4, Article 41 of the Constitution allows the Church and the religious denominations as a whole to have their own news media for the pursuit of their goals, namely, freedom of education. This provision of the Constitution has been implemented slightly or not at all. This government thinks that it could and should be implemented.

PL: Was the prime minister's visit to the Cardinal-Patriarch of Lisbon related to this view?

PB: It was a courtesy visit, during which several problems were discussed. I see no reason why it should not have taken place.

Governing With the Parliamentary Majority

PL: How do you view the government's relations with the parties, and with the parliamentary majority?

PB: It is a fundamental relationship; I think that everyone is aware of this and, thus far, there have been no problems. The relations between the government and the parliamentary majority are carried out basically through meetings, which are held in my office on Mondays, attended by the leaders of the parliamentary majority and the AD's general coordinator, Dr Lucas Pires. We shall improve this system with direct contacts between the ministers and deputies, specifically on the level of the parliamentary committees.

PB: What are the relations between the AD national majority and the PSD regional majorities?

PB: The bond between the government and the regional governments has been constant, and there are good personal relations between the prime minister and the presidents of the regional governments.

On the party level, there is also a relationship. Both I and engineer Eurico de Melo still serve on the National Policy Committee [CPN] to insure that relationship. On the other hand, the acting chairman of the CPN, Dr Carlos Macedo, also takes part in the Monday meetings.

Later, we shall have to arrange all this in terms of an election campaign; but that will be a second phase. However, I hope that it will not take long to begin.

A Positive Performance

PL: There have been 36 weeks of government; and there will be elections in October and December. Do you think that it is possible to win?

PB: This government has, as one of its rules of conduct, not to say what it "will do," but to stress mainly what it has already done.

For example, we have already solved several problems relating to basic products (such as oil, potatoes and wine), I think, to the satisfaction of both the consumer and the producer.

PL: But the prices have risen, in the case of oil....

PB: They did not rise. That was erroneous information from the ANOP [Portuguese News Agency]. The price of all grades was maintained, except for the purest oil, the price of which was unlimited. The controlled price was reinforced, benefiting the producers. The average consumer has not been harmed. Anyone who wants high quality oil will have to pay more, but only those individuals.

PL: How did the government deal with the tragedy in the Azores?

PB: Considering the serious consequences of the earthquake, I think that we dealt with it in the best possible way, in cooperation with the regional government.

Unfortunately, it will take many more months to be resolved. But the way in which the Azorean population reacted, with persistence, perseverance and resignation, was impressive. Returning to the question that you asked a few moments ago, I do not think that 36 weeks is a long time; but, in the campaign, we have the great virtue of speaking seriously, explaining the situation, saying that we did not promise a great deal, and that we promised work. And the work to be done will bear fruit in time; we hope, with victory in the next elections. I think that, thus far, the government has shown a positive image of its performance, both to its voters and to those who did not vote for AD. That image will be reinforced as we carry out our program; and it should not be forgotten that it was only a little over a week after that program went to the AR that we were fully installed.

AD Will Not Back Ramalho Eanes

PL: The victory in the next elections will have repercussions on the presidential elections. When do you think the AD's candidate will be selected?

PB: AD will have to have a candidate for the presidency of the republic in time to prepare the election campaign, and also from the standpoint of the constitutional revision; because that, obviously, will be one of the fundamental issues, and it would not make sense for us not to have a personage to embody our plan.

PL: Do you think that we shall witness an election battle between the AD candidate and Ramalho Eanes?

PB: It depends on the current president of the republic, whether he decides to run again or not.

PL: What support could he count on?

PB: He is the one who will have to seek it. AD has already stated clearly enough that it will not give its backing for another candidacy.

PL: Do you think that the AD candidate should be a civilian or a member of the military?

PB: Personally, I would prefer a civilian; but I do not consider this an essential issue at the present time. As part of a precept for normalization of Portuguese life, a civilian would be more logical, on principle; although I have nothing against the military, who are as much citizens as civilians are. However, I admit that, in view of the situation, and the end of the transitional period which will not conclude until there is a constitutional revision, a military man could be selected.

2909

CSO: 3101

BRIEFS

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH CUBA--Under the terms of a trade agreement which has just been signed, Portugal will buy 70,000 tons of sugar from Cuba, and will sell equipment and pharmaceutical products to that country. Portugal will also lend assistance in the repair of ships. The information came yesterday from the secretary of state for foreign trade, on his return from Havana, where he headed the Portuguese delegation at the third meeting of the Joint Luso-Cuban Commission. Sousa e Almeida noted that Portugal "will repair 9, possibly 10, Cuban ships this year," and added: "The Portuguese government will also collaborate on tourist programs in Cuba, both in construction of hotel units and in the training of personnel." The Portuguese delegation included representatives of 17 companies in the fields of naval repair, textiles, petroleum derivatives and lumber. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Feb 80 p 2] 6362

UNEMPLOYMENT DIFFICULTIES CONTINUE--Job offerings in the labor market fell 7.4 percent in November from the previous month, a January bulletin from the Labor Ministry has reported. According to the publication, unemployment rose 1.1 percent from October to November, having risen 2 percent in the previous month. The situation underlines "the problem faced by those entering the labor market for the first time in finding employment," since the figures now favor the new job seekers who benefited from the break in unemployment between April and August. The information sheet on labor and employment adds that although the job offerings reported to the Labor Ministry in November dropped by 0.4 percent, actual placements rose by 3 percent over October, basically the result of employment in the agriculture sector. Meanwhile, in order to maintain and create jobs, the General Directorate for Promotion of Employment, through the Office of Administration of the Unemployment Fund and the Fund for Manpower Development, allocated about 459,000 contos in financial support for the second half of 1979, which helped to create another 541 job opportunities. The bulletin mentions that during 1979 the General Directorate for Promotion of Employment authorized the dismissal of 2,108 workers in all. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Jan 80 p 2] 6362

CSO: 3101

PSOE'S GONZALES INTERVIEWED ON DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Rome AVANTI in Italian 13-14 Jan 80 pp 1, 24

[Interview with PSOE Secretary, Felipe Gonzales by Ugo Intini]

[Text] Felipe Gonzales, the leader of the Spanish Socialist Party, has not managed to carry out the great "overtaking" of Prime Minister Suarez. But, after having temporarily given up, the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] secretariat has resumed authoritatively, in a renewed climate of unity, the direction of a party which today has 26 percent of the vote, which controls the administrations of Madrid, Barcelona and of the largest Spanish cities, which has good prospects of reaching in the next political elections the objective which was missed in the previous ones.

Our interview begins with the most topical subject in Italy but, alas, also in Spain: that of terrorism.

[Question] Gonzales, in Italy the phenomenon of terrorism is particularly aggressive and serious because it is reinforced by political instability. But in Spain it has dimensions which are even more alarming when we consider the number of dead; it is supported in certain areas of the country, at least partially, by a real popular consensus; it develops in a society which freed itself not 35 years ago, but only in 1976 from a fascist dictatorship. Does there exist also in Spain as, in our opinion, there exists in Italy, a foreign "puppeteer" who maneuvers the subversion with the aim of making the country unstable?

[Answer] We must distinguish two types of terrorism even if the consequences rather resemble each other. There is a terrorism which we could consider of the same type as Italian terrorism, a terrorism like that of the Red Brigades, and there is another type of terrorism, better known, which is that of the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], tied to a nationalist movement, with separatist pressure. These are two distinct phenomena, which deserve a different diagnosis and therefore the application of two

different methods. Almost certainly there are international contacts on the part of both types of terrorism. There has been a lot of talk of contacts between the ETA and the terrorist movements of Northern Ireland and there has also been talk of another type of contact with the group called Grapo, a group similar to the Baader-Meinhof gang. I believe that these foreign connections undoubtedly exist: there is an arms traffic which is at times very well organized: terrorism is often practiced with fairly sophisticated technical means and the suspects are numerous. But it is certainly very difficult to demonstrate anything with certainty.

[Question] When people are fighting terrorism in a country which is by this time exasperated, there is the danger--we are discussing it these days in Italy--of using methods and laws which would greatly limit democracy and therefore transform the democratic state, involved in defending itself against subversion, into an authoritarian state. What is your position also concerning the frequent manifestations of impatience which come from military milieus? Are the dangers of this situation under control?

[Answer] It is not clear whether these dangers are under control. I believe that we must fight terrorism democratically. Recently, there has been a parliamentary debate in Spain on the struggle against terrorism during which the form more than the measures adopted was debated. The fact that there was recourse to the prorogation of a decree law. It seemed to us that this came close to unconstitutionality and we therefore opposed it because of problems of procedure. I believe that these problems are more serious in Spain than in any other European country and this is logical, because we have barely recovered a framework of democratic liberties and there still exists a popular psychology which links some of the anti-terrorist measures to the authoritarian measures of the previous regime. There exists at times the feeling that the democratic stability, the democratic process is jeopardized by measures of this type. But at the same time there is a great civilian consciousness of the necessity of fighting terrorism with firmness. The balance is always very difficult, the controls are very complicated because not much time has gone by since Franco's death and there has not been a renewal of the state apparatus. This creates many dark areas, as happened recently with the escape of five dangerous terrorists from the Zamora prison. There always remains a certain atmosphere of suspicion which there also is in Italy, about possible connivance with some remainders of the previous regime.

[Question] At the PSOE congress at which you noisily presented the resignations, dominated by the ideological dispute on Marxism, we caught apprehensively signs of division and of quarrelsomeness which have been a disastrous constant in certain periods of the history of the PSI [Interior Socialist Party]. We then saw with relief that the crisis was overcome. How can the insurgent opposition be defined today, in a more relaxed climate?

[Answer] It was simplistic to define the opposition in terms of "Marxism, yes or no." Basically, there were other questions. The truth is that some

comrades feared that the party was moving toward the right of the political picture, after having come out from underground and therefore conserving a mentality still conditioned by its clandestine nature. Other comrades feared that the party might become sectarian, might remain in a very restricted area, on greatly ideologized positions. This was fundamentally the battle at the ideological level. Behind this battle, then there was also a certain struggle for power, which is logical in any political party.

As far as the ideological debate is concerned, I have the impression that there has not been enough quality and loftiness of tone in the confrontation. It has been rather poor.

There is much more richness in the Italian debate, within the left. This is also logical, because Spanish socialism has never been very rich ideologically, there have never been many intellectual contributions, and one could not expect it after 40 years of absolute suppression of any possibility of debate. Also for this reason, I think that the problems have not been resolved: the crisis, in the most positive sense of the word, remains. What has been created has been a platform of party unity, very solid, which permits the incorporation of this ideological debate over the next few years, so as to make very clear the political plan. I would like to add that the debate within the base of the party has been perhaps more interesting than the one which appeared at the summit and through the mass media. This has produced a certain emotion, has been felt very strongly, there has been a strong search for the identity of socialism both with respect to the communists and the moderate forces.

[Question] On the subject of the identity of socialism and of this still open debate, who are the socialist authors and spokesmen who have the greatest influence?

[Answer] I can say that a good part of the present debate within Italian socialism has passed into Spain and has spread within the framework of the party, at times more than what took place in Italy. During the 1960's for instance, we followed attentively the ideological evolution of Basso and Lombardi. Recently, we have followed with interest the debate opened with the Communist Party, last year, by Craxi, through his essay on Leninism. Intellectuals like Bobbio or like Federico Mancini have some influence. Also, the subject of liberal-socialism gets some attention and there are those who claim socialism is a liberalism taken to its extreme consequences. In this cross-breeding of influences, one sets out on a sectarian and non-dogmatic study of Marx such, however, as to reject everything which led to his Leninist and Stalinist interpretation.

[Question] After the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan, we find ourselves facing an international crisis which could cast doubt upon detente and alter the terms of the political struggle within the individual countries. How do you see the new US-USSR confrontation?

[Answer] I must tell you that there is still a surprising phenomenon in Spain: that of the "interiorization" of the problems. Foreign policy occupies a very secondary place in the national concerns. We socialists are concerned about the international situation much more than the other political forces. And this is because of a tradition of Spanish socialism. We think that Soviet penetration into any continent is cause for concern and that a basic tendency toward hegemony is intensifying. This happens to be taking advantage also of a certain weakness of North America, which is very tied to the pre-electoral situation and the somewhat unstable policy of Carter, a weakness which is demonstrated clearly by the problem of Iran, which puts in a state of crisis the relations of the United States with the moderates among the Arab countries. The Russian aggression against Afghanistan has made a crisis even more of the confidence which the Western allies may have had concerning the capacity for dissuasion and resistance of the Americans. I believe that there is at this moment a very clear imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union. The socialist position, from a theoretical point of view, should be: no to American influence, no to Soviet influence. But the current reality is that the Soviet capacity for penetration and influence is much superior to that of the Americans.

[Question] Do you expect much from the admission into united Europe?

[Answer] For us, the admission into Europe has been a political banner for many years, a political banner for the struggle against Francoism. Then, when the crisis of the 1970's began, we thought that the integration of Europe would be at any rate a guarantee of maintenance of democratic stability and, furthermore, the incorporation into a broader macroeconomic zone, which would give economic stability to Spain. But today, if one does not want any type of demogogy or to provoke vain hopes, one must say that the situation is very difficult, both for the EEC and for Spain. In Spain, we have the good fortune not to have any party opposed to the process of European integration, but it is certain that we will have very serious problems from the point of view of the adjustment by sectors of our industry and also of agriculture. The admission into the EEC which has been defined up to now is, in my opinion, more like a political operation than an operation of defense of economic interests.

[Question] A final question: the Spanish socialists have, by national tradition and culture, important relations, also in the name of the International, with South America. They have played an important role in the attempt to make the South American nations advance toward democratic solutions. How do you see the prospects for overcoming caudillismo?

[Answer] I believe that not enough attention has been paid to what is happening in the Caribbean where there are many small countries, not very self-sufficient from the economic point of view, which need to define their special relations and which are moving toward democracy. Not only toward democracy but, at times, toward situations which are very advanced as it is happening in Granada. The case of Nicaragua has been very spectacular and

it is very difficult to make forecasts about its future. I believe that there is in Managua a great desire for democracy, but also great difficulties.

There are two key countries which are not being sufficiently considered: Panama and Costa Rica, very small, with different characteristics, but with a great capacity for radiating influence throughout Central America. I believe that El Salvador will have a decisive role for the development of the rest of the area and that Guatemala and Honduras, if democracy stabilizes in El Salvador and in Nicaragua, would move rapidly toward a democratic system.

We have then other democratic processes on the continent. Like the one in Ecuador and the one in Bolivia, of great importance. While Colombia has been going through a worrisome institutional crisis for several years. Ecuador's democracy, if it survives a year of existence, will stabilize, while Bolivia is still at this moment under the threat of a coup.

I believe, however, that here the hopes end, I say this with a certain sorrow. In the South of the continent, the situation is in fact very solid from the point of view of military control; the regimes have concerns about what the popular responses may be, but one does not observe a degree of political articulation sufficient to make us glimpse a way out of dictatorship.

[Question] And Brazil? Is it not a key country in rapid evolution?

[Answer] In Brazil, there is occurring an evolution which is very particular. I believe that this country within 4 or 5 years will avail itself of a practically total political democracy. The process of legalization of the parties will place, in my opinion, in an optimum position the party of the workers (labor party) which is a populist and socialdemocratic party. But be careful. We always have the fault, in Europe, of looking at the democratic movements in Latin America with optics similar to ours. At home, the parties of the left are class parties which are born in opposition to other class parties: in Latin America, this is not absolutely true. The basic element is anti-imperialism, the national affirmation against foreign dependency; there is not a class struggle as the element which would define any progressive movement. This gives a totally different dimension, with respect to the European one, to the progressive movements of Latin America.

8956

CSO: 3104

SANCHEZ-TERAN ON AGREEMENTS WITH MOROCCO, DENIES SECRET CLAUSES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 6 Jan 80 p 35

[Text] The minister of transportation and communications, Salvador Sanchez-Teran, has said that there are no secret clauses in the fishing agreements signed with Morocco and that the so-called commitment for 50,000 tons of Moroccan citrus fruit to be shipped through Spain "is not definite."

Among other things, Mr Sanchez-Teran said the following:

There are no secret clauses in the fishing agreement with Morocco. Three documents were signed with Morocco on 29 December: an agreement on ocean shipping, an agreement concerning international land shipments of goods, and a draft agreement for extending the temporary fishing agreement.

The 5-year agreement on ocean shipping establishes the distribution of cargo at 40 percent for each party, leaving 20 percent for third countries, and also includes appendices on port facilities and passenger traffic. It is an agreement which is of interest to Spain, since our merchant marine has had problems with Morocco concerning ocean shipping.

The 1-year agreement concerning land shipments establishes the general framework of the conditions for rail and highway shipping. It is similar to those which we have signed with more than 15 other countries.

These agreements concerning shipment of goods require subsequent drafts stipulating traffic quotas and the number of shipping permits to be mutually granted by the signing countries. In its appendix, the agreement establishes a 3-month period for a mixed commission to study all matters concerning shipping procedures.

The draft fishing agreement establishes a 3-month extension for the temporary agreement of June 1979, updating the figures for recorded gross tonnages and rates.

There is nothing more than what I just said. It is false that there are secret agreements or clauses or verbal or written commitments of a confidential nature with the Moroccan Government. The so-called commitment for shipment of 50,000 tons of citrus fruit is not definite.

Between Spain and Morocco there are now important trends of land shipment of goods, which will be able to be covered by the agreement now signed. As for the shipment of agricultural produce, this is an old Spanish-Moroccan dispute. The Ministry of Transportation has all the information in this regard and has advised Moroccan officials of respective existing problems, considering the various EEC customs duties and the matter of phytosanitary guarantees. All of these questions will be under study over the next 3 months.

All national interests must be considered when an international agreement is being negotiated and, of course, the interests of the citrus fruit sector and of other agricultural produce are important to the Spanish Government.

With regard to the remark made by PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] deputy Marin, the most that can be said is that it was rash and uninformed.

11915

CSO: 3110

OIL EXPLORATION IN MEDITERRANEAN CONTINUES

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 9 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by Jose Maria Milagro]

[Excerpts] Concession Granted Covers 30-Year Period

The "Montanazo-D" permit for hydrocarbon exploration in Zone C, Subzone a), which was granted by decree of 5 December 1975 to a group of multinational corporations, has yielded positive results 4 years later and after investments of more than \$9 million. Drillings made during the years of exploration have led to the discovery of a commercially exploitable oil field.

Some 8 months ago, the coholding companies of the aforementioned exploration permit submitted to the Ministry of Industry and Energy the respective application for the exploitation concession of the aforementioned field. The response was affirmative. The exploitation concession was granted for a 30-year period that began on 5 January.

Government Participation

In addition to the six international companies jointly holding the concession, the Empresa Nacional de Investigacion y Explotacion de Petroleo, S.A. (ENIEPSA [National Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Company, Inc]) is also participating as current concessionaire of the rights of the National Institute of Industry (INI), which was appointed by the aforementioned decree of 5 December 1975 "to handle the management and participation offered to the government in the event of the discovery of marketable quantities of petroleum." In the concession granted for exploitation of the field, ENIEPSA has now taken over the 30-percent joint participation. The largest participation is that of Chevron Oil Company of Spain (CHEVRON), with 34.125 percent.

It should be noted that "if production from the concession granted should be more than 50,000 barrels but less than 100,000 barrels daily, ENIEPSA will be able to increase its joint participation up to 35 percent of the total." And if production exceeds 100,000 barrels daily, the government's participation could be raised to 40 percent of the total.


The area of exploration covered by the exploration permit was 45,633 hectares on the day that it was granted. As a result of the drillings made, this figure has since been reduced to 5,128.28 hectares in the exploitation concession.

Less Than 200 Meters Deep

The aforementioned oil field--according to the concession granted--is located in water less than 200 meters deep, thus if other deposits more than 200 meters deep are found within the zone covered by the concession, the concessionaires are authorized to postpone production from these deposits "until the time that the technology and manpower to be used in said production are used in waters of similar depth in other parts of the world."

The western border of the zone covered by the concession is located 37 km from the nearest point to the shore of Buda Island in the Ebro River delta.

At a time when we are so concerned about the rise of petroleum prices, the concession for a new production zone in the marine subsoil of Tarragona Province is comforting news.



Key: 1. Mediterranean Sea

11915
CSO: 3110

SWISS CANNOT REPLACE OIL WITH SOLAR ENERGY

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 19, 20 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by Jean-Pierre Gattoni: Switzerland Unable to Replace Petroleum with Solar Energy]

[Text] Let us assume that Switzerland must face a critical petroleum shortage. If, for example, the OPEC countries ruthlessly turn off the taps, we would be forced to rush for energy substitutes: wood, coal, electricity from nuclear power plants or even solar energy. But would it really be possible to exploit this solar energy, on short notice? The answer is surprising. Switzerland would lack installers and technicians capable of setting up the solar collectors.

This crisis scenario was conceived by a commission of experts on solar energy appointed by the Federal Bureau of Energy. The commission members asked themselves the following question: Would it be possible to rapidly set up in Switzerland, that is, in a period of 2 or 3 years, enough solar energy collection systems, to make maximum use of this type of energy supply? After all, the experts say, to govern is to foresee.

Let us state the problem: The experts have contemplated a house with one or two apartments. It would be necessary to install there 25 square meters of collectors and 5 cubic meters of tanks for processing sanitary sewage and heating. In all, Switzerland would need 400,000 installations of this type.

It is there that the obstacles loomed up before the expert commission, which made the following findings:

The most important and critical difficulty is the fact that Switzerland would have a 60 percent shortage of installers and technicians to set up projects, even if workers in related trades were used, such as heating installers or plumbers.

Consequently it seems that the workers in the trade could only install 40 percent of the potential solar collectors.

The production capacity for solar collectors and heat storage devices would be inadequate. It would only cover 70 percent.

On the contrary, "the raw material" would be mainly sufficient: Switzerland actually has enough glass, antifreeze, pumps and regulating devices. In addition, there would be enough capital available.

The commission thinks the shortage of installers would create a knotty problem. The apprentice period for an installer actually lasts 3 or 4 years and setting up solar installations requires skilled work by the installer, if it is intended to have the equipment operate for several years.

It is obviously only a crisis scenario. However, experts say nothing prevents making every effort to overcome the supply crisis, if perhaps it threatens to appear.

8490

CS0: 3100

FEDERAL COUNCIL INFORMS CANTONAL GOVERNMENTS OF BUDGET CUTS

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 19, 20 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by Jean Pierre Gattoni: "Confederation: 700 Million in Economies Required in 1981"]

[Text] Bern--The confederation budget can no longer show an excessive deficit in the future. Such was the opinion of Georges-Andre Chevallaz, finance chief last autumn. The chambers themselves had supported the austerity policy contemplated by the government. In a letter addressed to the cantonal governments, the Federal Council reports a series of economy measures which it intends to institute to reduce confederation expenses and which will be in effect partially in 1981 and 1982. Some of these measures aim at reducing federal payments to third parties, others will require constitutional changes. Overall, the confederation intends to save 700 to 800 millions per year.

The examination of the 1980 confederation budget led to extensive discussion during the winter session. The parliament expected the Federal Council to considerably reduce expenses of the central state. The latter had especially announced that it would draft a special message about a series of economy measures. Theoretically, everything will be known about the content of this message on next 4 February, after the government itself is definitely formed (24 January).

In the letter addressed to the cantonal governments, the Federal Council announces at this time the following measures, some of which were already known.

Reduction by 10 percent of federal payments to third parties in 1981 and 1982. The CFP [expansion unknown], AVS [expansion unknown] and the sickness funds will not be included among the third parties--the text is not explicit on this point. The

government is saving some 360 million there. This figure is close to what Georges Andre Chevallaz had announced to the chambers. It is a reduction all along the line.

Elimination on the part of the cantons of the revenue from stamp rights (135 million), progressive reduction on the part of the cantons of the revenue of the Federal Alcohol Excise office (135 million) and repeal of measures lowering the price of bread (100 million). These "reductions" will only be possible with constitutional changes. The people will have to express themselves.

Five legislative amendments are still contemplated to achieve economies in the following fields: water protection, reduction of subsidies in combating epizootic diseases and assistance in investments in mountain areas, new regulation of insurance covering damage caused by automobiles and unknown and uninsured bicycles, elimination, in short, of the cantonal shares of revenue from customs' fines and monopoly.

According to rough calculations--the letter does not have detailed figures--the economies achieved through these various measures would amount to 700 to 800 million a year.

8490
CS0: 3100

BRIEFS

MINIMAL ENERGY ECONOMY--Bern, 18 (ATS). The Swiss participated in October in the international energy economy month, restricting their heating oil consumption, but electric power consumption increased and few people gave up their beloved automobile. This is what the trend observed by the Federal Bureau of Energy indicates. The bureau published for the first time in this fashion an "energy saving meter." Regarding heating with fuel oil, fairly noticeable savings have been achieved. The bureau claims that the increased use of electric heaters probably has made this possible. Be that as it may, electric power consumption continues to increase. As for automobile transportation, no great differences in conditions could be observed. As for industry, it could not be determined from monthly statistics, if it recorded savings, compared with October of the preceding year. [Text] [Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 19, 20 Jan 80 p 17] 8140

NEW RIGHT WING PARTY--Lausanne, Bern 18, (ATS)--A "National Swiss Liaison Committee," whose address is a post office box in Lausanne, announces it was founded in Bern on last 13 January, with groups from German and French speaking Switzerland being involved. It wants more particularly to encourage a European confederation "morally and militarily strong and independent of other blocs," assure through a federalist organization the protection of the ethnic groups which are Europe's greatest asset, reserve the right of police to the cantons and eliminate the federal police, limit private property where the public interest demands it and "eliminate parasitism." Another point on the new committee's program states its political orientation: "peoples from Africa and Asia, brought into Europe by plutocrats will be returned to their countries of origin." [Text] [Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 19, 20 Jan 80 p 17] 8490

LEFTIST ASSOCIATIONS SUPPORT SOVIET'S AFGHANISTAN ACTION

Istanbul HERGUN in Turkish 11 Jan 80 p 8

[Text] Istanbul--Twenty-Eight leftist associations have issued a joint statement and declared their support for the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

While even some Socialist Block countries have reacted to the occupation of Afghanistan by the troops of Soviet Union, (Turkish) communist organizations, which brand themselves as "Democratic Establishments," have declared that they support and applaud the Soviet communist invaders who have been massacring the Afghan moslems since their invasion of Afghanistan.

Below is the list of some of the associations which support the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which has been denounced by Romania, a Socialist Block country, and on which Poland and Bulgaria refrained from issuing any statement.

TUTED (Universal Technical Workers' Organization); TOB-DER (Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Organization); ENERJİ-DER (Energy Worker's Organization); GENEL-DER (Communication Workers' Organization-As published); BANK-DER (Bank Workers' Organization); CİRAK-DER (Apprentices' Organization); GİB-DER (Wearing Apparel Workers' Organization); KOGEF (Cypriot Students and Youth Federation-Turkish); İLERİCİ GENÇLER (Progressive Youth); BOTOK-D (expansion unknown); İLERİCİ KADINLAR (Progressive Women); and İLERİCİ DERNEĞİ (Progressives' Organization).

In their joint statements these communist organizations--which dictate to the official State broadcasting organs to repeatedly refer to them as "Democratic Establishments"--say this in summary:

"The fascist dictatorship which some wish to set in motion in our country is against our people, the peoples of Afghanistan and Iran and all the peoples of our region.

We heartily applaud the struggle being waged by the Afghan people to lead their National Democratic Revolution to a successful end and the support given by the Soviet Union to this struggle in the direction of proletarian internationalism.

On behalf of our members, we declare that we are on the side of courageous Afghan people and the Soviet Union against American imperialism, Maoists and those supporting Chinese hegemony."

COLUMNIST COMMENTS ON CONSPIRACY THEORY

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 11 Jan 80 p 5

[Article by Teoman Erel: "Conspiracy Theory"]

[Text] Is there any direct relation between external and internal developments? Does America want to draw a new map of the Middle East? Are there any roles considered for Turkey to play in such an operation? Since it is felt that a civilian government in Turkey could not take on such roles, are there any plans to reshape our regime?

Let us be frank. These subjects are being debated. And this is not something new, they have been debated for some time now.

Our politicians too have these issues in mind. They are all ears. In every step they take, in every sentence they utter both the government and opposition politicians are taking into account, along with daily developments, long-term possibilities and possible courses of action by the powerful external and internal circles.

The opposition leader, Bulent Ecevit, too is interested in these issues. In a recently delivered speech he openly expressed his sensitivity. However, before touching upon Ecevit's new points concerning this issue we would like to recall an evaluation made by him a few months ago.

During the last days of his government Ecevit did not share the view that developments in Turkey take place according to a plan drawn up by internal and external "Forces." Or he considered it expedient to pretend so. Even during his private conversations, he spoke with utmost care and stated that he did not accept the view that mysterious hands could influence everything.

In one part of a lengthy speech he delivered during a group meeting at the beginning of this week, the RPP (Republican People's Party) leader broached this subject!

Let us quote here that part of the speech which has been given very little prominence in the press:

"There are many among the rightist and leftist intellectuals in Turkey who are very keen to deal with theoretical and imaginary solutions and comments which are similar to the "Conspiracy Theory" as described by the Westerners. External developments may be indications, rightly or wrong that justify this kind of conspiracy theory. I believe, however, that the situation concerning the latest action by the Turkish Armed Forces is based on certain obvious causes and uneasiness which render such complex solutions and interpretations unnecessary. In my opinion, the situation must neither be oversimplified, as was done by the Honorable Demirel, nor must it be examined in the blind alleys of conspiracy theories. Both approaches ignore the obvious stark realities."

Ecevit says as much. He politely orders us not to walk into blind alleys of conspiracy theories. However, in a speech made public he himself walked into the same blind alleys. Moreover, he did it by giving up his old, unyielding skepticism.

Despite the fact that in the past he completely rejected such theories, Ecevit now admits the existence of certain indications which justify such conspiracy theories. However, while doing this Ecevit attempts to show that the memorandum submitted, under the title of the views of the Turkish Armed Forces, has no relation to these theories.

Ecevit may be playing politics in order not to disturb the Turkish Armed Forces. But, he may also be expressing his true views. In fact, there is a delicate point here. Any intervention directed against the regime does not necessarily mean a part of conspiracy. To put it more correctly, those forced to resort to such an intervention do not act under mysterious or secret directions. However, if there is a conspiracy, it will be sufficient to create conditions to render such an intervention imperative. After the creation of these conditions the commanders will be forced to submit memorandums and Ecevit will, on his part, either see no way out but to defend the idea of an RPP-JP (Justice Party) coalition, which he had been so violently opposing in the past or will be forced to do so.

If the escalation of violence is being organized by external and internal conspirators and if in the same way, there are plans to deprive Turkey of credits and foreign exchange, and if there are plots put into effect with the aim to form a political government which would accept America's demands on the question of bases, the rest will come by itself. If such a plot can be staged there is no need to engage all the heroes in Turkey and to turn them into agents...

The developments will take their planned course and the Turkish nation will merely watch them unless it wakes up.

Let us state at this point that we are not in possession of any mysterious information. But, there are plenty of "indications" referred to by Ecevit.

However, even if there is a conspiracy, this must not be a cause of inactivity. It is extremely wrong to become fatalist and say: "America has already decided, whatever will be, will be." For even the great powers are, on many occasions, unable to accomplish their plans.

America could not accomplish its plans in Vietnam. The Soviet Union planned to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan through Taraki and Hafizullah Amin--without resorting to direct intervention--with the help of internal supporters. However, this plan went wrong and the Soviet Union resorted to direct intervention risking a loss of face before world public opinion.

To this end, we must deal with the conspiracy theories realizing at the same time that if we carry out our obligations fully the events will, sooner or later, take a course desired by our nation.

9558

CSO: 4907

FUEL SHORTAGE THREATENS INDUSTRIES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 Jan 80 p 6

[Text] CUMHURIYET Economy Service--As the fuel shortage reaches extreme dimensions homes become uninhabitable and, at the same time, the danger of complete industrial stoppage continue to increase. Moreover, there is an ever growing suspicion concerning the question whether the present shortage is a real scarcity or an artificially created one.

Various industrialists, on the other hand, criticize a government circular which provides for the use of fuel oil in heating homes and not in industries. They indicate that several big factories in industrial sites in and around Istanbul have been forced either to stop their production or to cut it to below 50 percent of their full capacity.

Some other industrial circles complain that they are out of production despite the fact that they have secured fuel oil in sufficient quantities, for oil tankers cannot find gas oil to transfer their fuel oil to the factories.

Lack of fuel creates different types of danger in industries:

Industries May Stop:

It is stated that certain factories, which have made export commitments and are in a position to secure considerable foreign exchange income, are supplied with 30 percent of their fuel requirement and thus they are being forced to drop their production at a dangerous rate.

As a matter of fact, Istanbul Otosan (Automotive Industries) Factories have suspended their production, "for the time being," until Monday. According to reports leaked, unless the fuel shortage is overcome and certain semi-finished goods are secured these factories may close down for 10 or even 15 days. For the time being workers are on paid leave.

Moreover, the Pasabahce Glass Factories, which have important export commitments, can obtain only 30 percent of their fuel oil requirement that had been allocated to them. According to the same reports, the high temperature furnace, the cost of which is estimated at more than 400 million liras,

faces the danger of cooling. Furthermore, the investments being made by these factories in various parts of Turkey for new installations--totaling more than 13 billion liras--are also facing the danger of suspension.

Officials of the Profilo Holding are also complaining that their factories at Cerkezkoy have been unable to operate for the last 4 to 5 days and that they have been unable to offer (transport) services to the workers at these factories.

At various cement factories chimneys have begun cooling and their bricks are falling. Furthermore, a great danger is being faced now because of the fact that the Konya Brick Factory, which produces chimney brick, is also out of production as a result of fuel shortage. Indicating that the continuation of this situation will result in a brick shortage in Turkey, officials say that because of the lack of foreign exchange the emergency import of the bricks needed is out of question.

The Seydisehir Aluminum Factory too faces the danger of freezing because of the lack of heating fuel despite the fact that it has the necessary "allocation."

Distribution Errors:

Meanwhile, according to a report by ANKA (Ankara News) Agency, not even 25 percent of the required crude oil imports for the months of December and January--1.25 and 1.0 million tons respectively--has been realized.

Furthermore, the Batman Refinery, which processes local crude oil and meets 16 percent of the nation's needs, is suspending its operation due to "over stocking" (Stok Sismeleri).

It is observed that while the situation is thus, the existing "scarce" resources are being handled and distributed very badly. Under the "Urgent Distribution Plan" provincial governors are being given powers but governors in various provinces have shown differences in their implementation (of these powers). For example, it is stated that certain governors are, under the powers given to them, distributing fuel to "soft drink" or "beer" factories and not to factories producing "basic foodstuff" such as macaroni and flour.

On the other hand, certain factories secure fuel oil but cannot obtain permits from governors for fuel needed by vehicles used for the transportation of fuel oil.

The "Fuel Distribution Committee" formed by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources--in order to ensure the prudent use of the existing scarce resources--is subject to "various pressures." According to ANKA Agency, the Committee comes across lists sent daily by "influential people" who indicate which homes should be supplied with fuel oil. This forces the Committee to deal with these homes one by one.

Distribution Companies:

Meanwhile, Petrol Ofisi (Turkish Petroleum Office) has been given extraordinary privileges in the distribution of fuel and thus Petrol Ofisi' distributors, which consist of large and small private establishments, have been enabled to distribute the existing stocks of fuel. According to information obtained, almost none of these distributors sell fuel despite the fact that their storage tanks are full of fuel.

The greatest factor in the creation of this situation is the expectations of the distributors that fuel oil prices, which sh : up to 30-40,000 liras per ton at blackmarket in Istanbul, will go up further.

It is a common knowledge that, as a result of blackmarket prices having risen to attractive levels, distributors have secretly begun supplying homes with fuel, specially after midnight, and that homeowners, having no other choice, are willingly paying the demanded price.

What Will Happen:

Everyone, from industrial circles closely interested in the problem to people who are unable to heat their homes, admits that after the arrival of oil loaded tankers in Turkey--these tankers, as reported, have already sailed around the Cape of Good Hope--the existing fuel shortage and scarcity can be overcome, though slightly, possibly toward the end of February. However, they are aware that this is not a temporary problem and that next year they have to face greater hardships.

9558

CSO: 4907

BRIEFS

CDU-JP MEMBERS MEET--A representative of the West German Christian Democratic Union [CDU], (Heinz Shwartz), called on Justice Party Secretary General Nahit Mentese today. In a statement before the meeting (Shwartz) said there were favorable reactions in his country to the development of relations between the CDU and the Justice Party. He added that there were plans to establish friendship organizations in cities in their respective countries. Mentese said the two parties were based on similar principles. He noted that the CDU would try to help Turkey overcome its present difficulties and that at the meeting they would discuss the issues on which they would cooperate. Mentese stressed that his party was in favor of having state-to-state relations and that it had good relations with both the Social Democratic Party and the CDU of the FRG. [Text] [TA191851 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 19 Feb 80 TA]

MIGRANT WORKERS AS SOLDIERS--Ankara 21 Feb (AA)--Defense Minister Ahmet Ihsan Birincioglu said in reply to a question from the press today that it was not possible for Turkish migrant workers to be employed as soldiers or policemen in Federal Germany. Such a thing is not possible as long as they remain Turkish nationals, he stressed. [Text] [TA211433 Ankara ANTOLIA in English 1425 GMT 21 Feb 80 TA]

RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS CHANGED--A good will committee of representatives of political parties represented in the parliament met for the first time today. The committee was established to provide continued impartiality in TRT news programs concerned with political party activities. In a written statement made in Ankara, TRT Director General Dogan Kasaroglu said the religious culture and education programs which were to be shown on the television on Sundays have been moved to Friday. The statement adds that the new religious programs has evoked great interest and that many viewers have sent letters and requests regarding them. The statement continues: We have agreed to requests for the change in broadcast time so that a greater number of citizens can more easily watch these programs. As a result, the religious programs have been moved to the evening hours on Friday instead of Sunday. The first program will be shown on Friday, 29 February. Other programs will be aired every Friday. Pointing out that the programs are being prepared with the assistance of the Religious Affairs Directorate, the statement says the object of the programs is to facilitate religious education and culture. [Excerpts] [TA221300 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1000 GMT 22 Feb 80 TA]

OIL FREIGHTER AGROUND--Efforts continue to save the freighter that ran aground off Karaburun while carrying oil from (?Ipras) refinery to Cyprus. The Naval Forces Command has issued a communique in connection with the issue. It says: This is an announcement by the Sailing, Hydrography and Oceanography Department of the Naval Forces Command: Communique No 24 to seamen: A fuel oil tanker has run aground on the rocks off Izmir Karaburun. Its exact location is 38 degrees, 30 minutes and 54 seconds north, 26 degrees, 25 minutes and 4 seconds east. High octane gasoline, diesel oil and gas oil is spilling into the sea from the tanker. All vessels sailing in the area are urged to be alert. [Text] [TA230552 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 0430 GMT 23 Feb 80 TA]

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